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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
Patriotic Education: 
The Teaching of National Identity in Hong Kong Secondary Schools 
Submitted by Tse Yuen Man 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Anthropology 
at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in January 2008 
This research aims at exploring how national identity is taught in Hong Kong 
secondary schools. Patriotism and national identity, although largely taken for 
granted in most parts of the world, are a novelty to Hong Kong people. However, 
since the change of sovereignty of Hong Kong from Britain to China on 1 July 1997, 
the Hong Kong government has started to advocate the promotion of national 
identity through formal schooling. Accordingly, more and more Hong Kong 
secondary schools have shown interest and effort in incorporating elements of 
"patriotic education" into their curricula and teaching activities. However, given the 
differences between many Hong Kong people and the Chinese government in their 
understanding of the meaning of "love for country", the teaching of national 
identity remains to be a highly controversial topic in society and a problematic task 
for Hong Kong teachers to handle. 
Based on in-depth interviews with secondary schools teachers and participant 
observation of classroom teaching and schools activities, this thesis examines the 
ways in which “patriotic education" is organized in individual schools, the specific 
practices and approaches adopted by Hong Kong teachers in their teaching and 
individual teachers' attitudes towards patriotism and nationalistic education 
concerning China in Hong Kong. It will show that while the teaching of national 
identity in Hong Kong appears to be partially effective, encouraging and instructing 
a new sense of national belonging, the image of China presented through such 
teaching remains to be remarkably ambiguous, and the teaching of “love for China" 
iii 
in Hong Kong is shadowed by the scepticism of those teachers who are ambivalent 
about their teaching. 
In light of the controversy about the ultimate purpose of the teaching of 
national identity in Hong Kong, this study seeks to bring insight into the 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
The Research Question 
This study examines how national identity is taught in secondary schools in Hong 
Kong. Patriotism and national identity, though largely taken for granted in most 
parts of the world (Bloom 1990; Billig 1995), are a novelty to Hong Kong people. 
Having been a British colony for more than one and a half centuries, Hong Kong 
has been unique in that its people had never been taught formally to love a country. 
However, since the change of sovereignty of Hong Kong to China on 1 July 1997, 
Hong Kong people have been urged officially to adopt the identity of belonging to 
China. The socialization of Hong Kong people into patriotism is most notable in the 
introduction of "patriotic education" into the formal schooling of Hong Kong, a step 
that typifies any long-term process of nation-building. This constitutes a new 
education experience for both education providers and recipients in Hong Kong. 
In this study I examine how the teaching of national identity takes place at the 
secondary level of Hong Kong education by looking at how teachers specifically 
teach civics-related content, and by interviewing teachers about what they think of 
their teaching/ Hong Kong's secondary education curriculum has first become 
featured in official documents in the mid-1990s to be the stage for the inculcation of 
national identity among students. Although in recent years more and more local 
secondary schools have acted in line with the official advocacy by incorporating 
"China elements" into their curricula, which seems to indicate general support for 
the official call for a strengthened patriotic/nationalistic education, this study shows 
1 In Cantonese, IS^^^'^{gwokmahngaaujiihk), meaning "national education", is the term that I 
used to introduce my research topic and questions in my interviews. 
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that the teaching of Chinese national identity in post-handover Hong Kong is 
shadowed by the ambivalent and sceptical attitudes of many teachers. A 
fundamental reason for this may be sought in the contradiction between different 
interpretations of the meanings of patriotism and patriotic/nationalistic education. 
Whereas in terms of the Chinese government's definition, patriotic/nationalistic 
education is the promotion of essential attachment to a monolithic Great Chinese 
national family^ and unquestioned loyalty to the Chinese nation, state, and the 
Chinese Communist Party (He and Guo 2000:34-35), opinions among the Hong 
Kong public on the question are extremely dissonant and often fundamentally in 
conflict with the ideal of the Chinese government (Ming Pao Editorial Board 2004; 
Liang and Zheng 1998). In such a context, the teaching of Chinese national identity 
in schools mirrors a highly politically sensitized and contentious issue in 
post-handover Hong Kong society. 
A substantial body of literature has documented the gap between the intended 
curriculum and the implemented curriculum of Hong Kong's education (Cogan, 
Morris and Print 2002; Lee and Leung 2001). In this research, I adopt an 
anthropological approach and examine in a detailed way how national identity is 
actually taught in schools. By conducting in-depth interviews with teachers and 
participant observation in schools, I seek to offer new insights into the 
patriotic/nationalistic education issue in Hong Kong in a way that is closest to the 
ground. I focus on the changes in the curricula of individual secondary schools and 
the specific practices adopted by individual teachers in teaching national identity 
since the handover. I show that despite the apparently successful advocacy for a 
strengthened national education and the gradual normalization of the inclusion of 
2 In the Chinese government's nation-building agenda, this Great National Family includes not only 
the PRC and its two Special Administrative Regions, Hong Kong and Macau, but also Taiwan, 
Singapore and Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. 
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the item in education policy, individual schools vary enormously in terms of their 
degree of emphasis on nationalistic education. We will see that although the 
majority of teachers would agree that civic and nationalistic education should be 
taught in today's Hong Kong, many of them disagree as to what nationalistic 
education should consist of and how such education should be promoted. In 
particular, the following questions are asked: should civic and nationalistic 
education be taught in a critical or uncritical way? Should "Chinese national 
identity" be instilled on an affective or cognitive basis? Should the teaching about 
China be that of ancient, cultural China or contemporary, political China? 
Moreover, we see throughout this thesis that underneath the divergent views of 
nationalistic education among teachers in Hong Kong, there lie strong ambivalences 
regarding one's national identity. In exploring how individual teachers seek in their 
own background and senses of identity to justify their motivation and approaches in 
teaching, this study addresses the conflicting meanings of “love for China" among 
Hong Kong people, and throws light on the possible future of patriotic education in 
Hong Kong. I will enquire how and in what sense the teaching of national identity 
has "progressed" and what form of national belonging may be developed in the 
peculiar context of Hong Kong. It is hoped that the unique case of Hong Kong can 
bring about a better understanding of the fundamental question "what does love for 
country mean?" 
Terminology 
Before proceeding to my literature review, I shall mention a few words about the 
terms used to refer to the teaching of national identity, such as “patriotic education" 
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and “nationalistic education", and the different meanings that they may connote.^ 
In the broadest sense, "patriotic education"(愛國主義教育 aiguozhuyi jiaoyu) 
and "nationalistic education"(國家主義教育 guojiazhuyi jiaoyu or 民族主義教育 
minzuzhuyi jiaoyu) can be taken as similar as generally referring to the inculcation 
of identification with the nation and a sense of belonging to the nation through 
schooling. In writing this thesis, I use "patriotic education" and “nationalistic 
education" interchangeably to stand for “the teaching of national identity" in 
general. However, these two terms may be distinguished from each other in certain 
contexts. In the Chinese usage, the adoption of the terms "patriotism"(愛國主義 
aiguozhuyi) and "patriotic education” is based on a set of values specifically 
meaningful to the Chinese context. Zhao (1998) writes that "the concept of 
nationalism is often expressed in Chinese as aiguozhuyi (patriotism)" and that “the 
PRC government never officially endorsed nationalism" (1998:290). Indeed, in my 
research I also noticed that in Chinese official documents and Chinese government 
officials' speech, "patriotic education"(愛國主義教育 aiguozhuyi jiaoyu), rather 
than "nationalistic education"(國家主義教育 guojiazhuyi jiaoyu or 民族主義教育 
minzuzhuyi jiaoyu), is habitually adopted. According to Zhao, the Chinese 
government's preference of describing the sentiments of Chinese people as aiguo 
(patriotic) instead of nationalistic demonstrates its aspirations in fostering in its 
multi-ethnic population a state-centric sense of loyalty without arousing the 
nationalistic fervor for independence among the country's 55 “minority 
nationalities" (Zhao 1998:290-291). Thus, the Chinese official choice of terms 
unmistakably involves serious political deliberation in favour of the Chinese 
nation-state building agenda.^ 
3 I provide Putonghua transcription for Chinese terms that are from Putonghua sources and 
Cantonese transcription for those that are from Cantonese sources. 
4 It may be useful to talk about the definitions of "patriotism" and "nationalism" here. In the most 
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Rather than following the PRC's use of words, the Hong Kong government 
chooses to adopt in English "national education" and in Chinese “國民教育 
{gwokmahngaaujuhky to refer to this process of education in Hong Kong. 
"National education" or ''MS^$k^{g^'okmahngaaujuhky\ literally meaning 
education of the people or citizens of a nation, without direct reference to patriotic 
feelings, is arguably a more moderate and acceptable term at first sight to the 
politically ambivalent Hong Kong Chinese. Just as the Chinese government's 
choice connotes its attempt to convey a "non-political notion" of the Chinese nation 
as one and united irrespective of ethnicity (Zhao 1998), the Hong Kong 
government's choice is in a sense a reflection of its instinct of keeping Hong Kong 
people's political sensitivity dormant while attempting to promoting national 
identity in Hong Kong society. 
I used in my interviews with Hong Kong teachers in Cantonese the term “國民 
敎育(gwokmdhngaaujuhk)” to introduce my research topic and questions. Although 
as an official title it is generally understood among my informants to represent “the 
teaching about (Chinese) national identity and patriotism (for China)", some 
teachers avoided using any specific terms to refer to the subject,5 and some 
preferred using the English term “civic education" to stand for it. At the same time, 
however, several of the teachers told me that they disliked the official title “國民教 
(gwokmiihngaaujuhky, because of its vagueness. Instead, these individual 
teachers insisted that “國t青教育(gwo众d/m双aawyw/zA：)，’ is a more proper term 
basic sense, these two terms are similar to each other in that both of them refer to love for one's 
country, and loyalty or devotion to it. In a more specific sense, patriotism is thought to be of its 
nature culturally and militarily defensive, while nationalism, defined sometimes as "a sense of 
national consciousness exalting one nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on 
promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups" 
(Encyclopaedia Britarmica Online 2007), is used in some cases to refer to a narrow and aggressive 
form of patriotism and thus may connote a negative sentiment when compared to patriotism. Despite 
this difference in meanings, "patriotism" and "nationalism" are often used synonymously. 
5 In avoiding using specific terms, these teachers commonly referred to the subject as “與國家/國民 
身份有關的咅！^份(the part related to the nation/national identity)". 
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because of the dual meanings that the phrase “國 1 青 (gwokc ihngy [the state of the 
nation and affection for the nation] carries. These incidents are not only a matter of 
terminology but also reflect what individual teachers believe the teaching of 
national identity in Hong Kong should mean and consist of. The different 
interpretations of the meanings of nationalistic education among the teachers will be 
discussed in detail in this thesis. 
Literature Review 
National Identity，Nation and Nationalism 
"National identity", according to Smith, is a world-wide cultural phenomenon and 
virtually the most powerful collective identity that human beings share today 
(1991:143). The study of this phenomenon cannot be done without also examining 
the concept of "nation" or "nation-state", the unit on which "national identity" rests, 
and that of "nationalism", the ideology and movement that divides the world into 
"nations" or "nation-states" (Smith 1991:143). An overview of some classic 
theories regarding these key concepts and their implications for this thesis is in 
order. 
Ernest Renan, Joseph Stalin and Max Weber were among the earliest scholars 
who attempted to conceptualize the "nation". In his essay "What is a Nation?" 
Renan argues that the nation should be viewed as a "spiritual principle", a form of 
moral conscience, not identifiable by "objective" criteria such as race or language. 
In Renan's words, the nation exists as an "everyday plebiscite", in which the 
nation's desire to perpetuate national memories and heritages from the past and to 
hold together at present is the “only real criterion" for its existence (in Hutchinson 
and Smith 1994:17). In contrast to Kenan's stress on the spiritual aspect in 
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identifying the nation, Stalin defines the nation as “a historically constituted, stable 
community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, 
economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture" (in 
Hutchinson and Smith 1994:20) and emphasizes that for a nation to exist it is 
essential that all those mentioned elements are present together (in Hutchinson and 
Smith 1994:20-21). Unlike Stalin, Weber, recognizing the vast variety of empirical 
features of the nation, refrains from providing any monolithic definition of the 
nation. Nevertheless, Weber emphasizes the power of “prestige” interests for which 
nations seek to define themselves as unique communities of peculiar cultural values 
bearing a common "culture" mission under the leadership of their elites. Moreover, 
he situates the nation in the realm of politics and points out that the "nation" can be 
in general identified by its tendency of producing an autonomous state, which he 
defines as “that agency within society which possesses the monopoly of legitimate 
violence” (Gellner 1983:3). 
Echoing Weber, Anthony Giddens contends that the nation exists only when a 
state does. In his words, the nation-state is a "bordered power-container" and "a set 
of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a 
territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and 
direct control of the means of internal and external violence" (in Hutchinson and 
Smith 1994:34-35). On the other hand, however, Conner (1994) argues against the 
propensity of reducing the nation to the state and cautions against treating “nation’’ 
and "state" as synonyms. According to Conner, it is important not to equate 
identification with the state with loyalty to the nation. Moreover, the expression, 
nation-state, a term intended to describe “a territorial-political unit (a state) whose 
borders coincided or nearly coincided with the territorial distribution of a national 
group" is often misleading. He points out that among the 132 states in 1971，less 
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than 10 percents of them can justifiably be called as "nation-states" (Conner 
1994:96). 
The foregoing is useful for a basic understanding of the multi-dimensional 
nature of the “nation”. National identity is a multi-faceted concept, which may be 
defined in both subjective and objective terms, as well as on both cultural and 
political bases. This is important for comprehending my informants' perceptions of 
the nation, which will be featured in Chapter Four. 
Nowadays the majority of scholars of national identity and nationalism 
recognize that the nation is not a primordial, natural entity but rather an artefact of 
modernity developed in close conjunction with capitalism, industrialization and the 
making of the modem state (McCrone 1998:10). Embedded in the question of 
whether the nation is ancient or modem are two main themes which are crucial to 
an understanding of national identification: the relation between ethnic attachment 
and civic loyalty, and between the cultural component (the nation) and the political 
component (the state) (McCrone 1998). 
Anderson defines nation as an “imagined political community - imagined as 
both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson 1991:6). He argues that the 
emergence of print technology and capitalism in late eighteenth-century Europe is 
an importance condition for the origin of nationalism, in that materials such as 
national calendars, books, newspapers and novels in vernacular languages made it 
possible for readers who consumed the same cultural products but do not know each 
other to imagine that they are related as fellow members of a larger community. 
According to this theory, the nation is a product of modernity; but more 
fundamentally, Anderson contends that nations and nationalisms are cultural 
products of a particular kind (Anderson 1991:5) and points out the importance of 
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looking at the different ways in which nations are imagined. This provides a 
perspective for any study of national identity to consider: in examining national 
consciousness, we should enquire as to what era and against what historical 
background and cultural context national identification comes into being. 
Smith defines the nation as ‘‘a named human population, sharing an historic 
territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common 
economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (1991:14). He 
emphasizes the multidimensionality of national identity and identifies two chief 
principles that underlay the construction of national identity - the 
"ethnic-genealogical" concept and the "civic-territorial" concept (1991:15). While 
the former emphasizes the historical and symbolic-cultural attributes of the 
community and entails a sense of common descent, collective destiny and presumed 
duty that cannot be chosen, the latter refers to a political and legal commitment to 
an overarching civic culture that one can choose irrespective of specific ethnic 
origins. The ethnic and civic principles are readily applicable to the national identity 
problem in Hong Kong. The Chinese government's definition of national identity is 
based on the primordial ethnic conception. Although most Hong Kong people 
believe that they posses a Chinese cultural identity, they tend to define their 
Chineseness differently from their mainland counterparts and believe in a separate 
Hong Kong identity rooted in internationalism rather than nationalism. As we will 
see in this thesis, the struggle between civic loyalty to cosmopolitan Hong Kong 
and national allegiance to totalitarian China has formed part of the debate among 
Hong Kong teachers on how nationalistic education should be taught. 
Just as important as the discussion of the civic and ethnic principles is that of 
the political dimension (the state) and the cultural dimension (the nation) of the 
country. Gellner defines nationalism as “primarily a political principle, which holds 
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that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (1983:1). He believes 
that nationalism creates nations where they do not exist (Gellner 1983:55) and that 
nationalism is not "natural", but originated in the context of industrialization, in 
which modernizing society is transformed into “a new form of social organization, 
based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by 
its own state,, (Gellner 1983:48). Hobsbawn's studies of nation-building processes 
in Europe between the 1870s and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 also 
underscores the importance of understanding nations as ideological fabrications of 
states. Hobsbawn examines the nation as “invented tradition" and identifies three 
major cultural innovations particularly crucial to the invention of traditions for the 
building of nations: the development of primary education, the invention of public 
ceremonies, and the mass production of public monuments (Hutchinson and Smith 
1994:44-46). Finally, Eugene Weber's study of nationalism in France offers an 
important reference about the role of the nation-state in creating nationalism and 
nationalists (Weber 1976). Weber's historical account demonstrates that by the late 
nineteenth century, France was characterized by remarkable regional differences 
and a sense of French nationhood was absent in most rural areas until the French 
government started its nation-building campaigns through such means as 
compulsory public education, promotion of the French national language, 
instruction of national history and geography, and distribution of national maps. In 
essence, Weber (1976) suggests that national identity and sentiment are not 
instinctive and have to be leamt and that schooling can be a powerful tool of the 
states in altering values and perceptions of the people. 
In examining the process of invoking identification from individuals and the 
existence of national identity from a psychological perspective, Bloom proposes 
identification theory, which states that human beings possess an inherent drive not 
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only to seek identity actively but also to protect and enhance identity actively in 
order to achieve senses of well-being. In regard to national identity, it is the 
tendency of a group of people given the same social environment to act as one unit 
that enables the state to evoke a common identification among the people by 
monopolizing the symbols of that shared identity and mobilize its people to act in 
unison in favour of the nation (1990:23). This notion of regarding the relationship 
between the state and the mass as dialectical is significant, as it suggests that 
whether the state can succeed depends not on coercion but rather on how well it can 
do in making the mass experience and internalize its symbols and presentation. We 
are thus reminded that a study of the implementation of nationalistic education that 
centres on policies would not suffice; rather, a study about the perception of the 
participants from the people's perspective is an imperative. 
The literature reviewed above provides the theoretical bases for my research in 
Hong Kong. National identity, rather than one-sided and static, is multi-faceted; it 
may, for instance, be animated by cultural and political forces, and be formulated 
upon historic, ethic and modern, civic bases. This suggests that in the study of 
national identity it is necessary to explore the ways in which people imagine their 
nation and ask what kind of patriotism will emerge out of the particular 
circumstance of Hong Kong society. Moreover, the literature points to the role of 
centralized schooling as an initial step in the process of nation-building and the 
power of national symbols in influencing people's consciousness. In Hong Kong, 
recent phenomena such as the promotion of Putonghua as the medium of instruction 
in schools,6 the featuring of Hong Kong-China relation in the permanent exhibition 
6 After the handover, the Education Manpower Bureau announced that making Putonghua the 
medium of instruction would be the long-term goal of their language policy. This, however, has yet 
to be implemented. 
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of Hong Kong Museum of History/ the telecast of the Chinese national anthem,^ 
and most important prominently, the emphasis of "national identity" in the central 
civic education curriculum (see next chapter) signify the beginning of a 
territory-wide state-led nation-building programme. This thesis treats schooling as 
one window to the national identity problem of Hong Kong and examines the 
various education processes that are now being undertaken for making Hong Kong 
students into “patriotic Chinese citizens". 
Hong Kong and the Problem of National Identity 
Of all the modern societies in the world, Hong Kong is a unique case worthy of 
particular attention in the study of national identity, in that unlike people in other 
parts of the world, most Hong Kong people do not find it natural to belong to their 
country. After more than 150 years of British colonial rule, Hong Kong, a world 
capitalist economy, was returned to communist China in 1997. C.K. Lau describes 
Hong Kong Chinese at the time of this momentous event as a "special breed of 
Chinese" with a strong local identity and a mentality radically different from their 
counterparts in mainland China (1997:2). Indeed, although most Hong Kong people 
identify themselves as culturally and ethnically Chinese, many of them do not 
embrace their Chinese identity at the political and national level (Mathews 2000). 
The complexity of the attitudes among Hong Kong people towards the nation has 
been thoroughly explored in a book by Mathews, Ma and Lui (2008), which was 
published when this thesis was in its final stage of completion. Although this work 
7 On 30 August, 2001, the Hong Kong Museum of History launched a modified version of its 
permanent exhibition, The Hong Kong Story, which differs from the previous version in its 
distinctive emphases on the long history of mutual relations between Mainland China and Hong 
Kong (Leung 2004:63). 
8 On 1 October, 2004, television viewers in Hong Kong witnessed the debut broadcast of a 
45-second music video of the Chinese National Anthem titled Our Home Our Country' on the Hong 
Kong Chinese-language television channels. After the debut broadcast, the video was shown nightly 
before the evening news programmes on three local channels. 
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by Mathews, Ma and Lui is highly beneficial for a comprehensive understanding of 
the socio-cultural context for my research question, I will refer to it mainly in the 
conclusion of my thesis. In this section I will discuss the development of the 
identity of Hong Kong people and its relations to China by drawing on earlier 
studies about Hong Kong history and society. 
Until its sovereignty was transferred to the People's Republic of China on 1 
July 1997, Hong Kong was a British colony from the year 1842.9 Colonial Hong 
Kong was initially a territory of immigrants, who were mostly refugees from 
mainland China. Tsai's account (1994) of Hong Kong's relationship with China and 
Britain in 1839-1911 mentions that after the acquisition of Hong Kong, the British 
colonial government quickly worked at developing Hong Kong into a major trading 
port in Asia; at the same time, a large number of immigrants from mainland China 
began to arrive in Hong Kong to meet the colony's great demand for labour (Tsai 
1994:11). Regarding Hong Kong people's senses of identity, Tsai maintains that up 
until the 1870s, no political consciousness or sense of patriotic loyalty to the 
Chinese nation-state was present among the Chinese in Hong Kong, largely because 
the majority of the local population were working class people whose hard-pressed 
lives could hardly leave any room for the formation of abstract concepts of politics 
and nationalism. However, there is evidence that these Chinese workers did harbour 
9 Hong Kong, located in the south-eastern coast of the PRC, consists of three main regions, namely 
Hong Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula, the New Territories and some outlaying islands. Hong Kong 
Island was ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 after the First Opium War and 
Kowloon Peninsula in 1860 by the Convention of Peking after the Second Opium War. The New 
Territories was leased by Great Britain in 1898 for 99 years. It was agreed in 1984 by the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration that the entire territory of Hong Kong would be returned to China on 1 
July, 1997 and would be governed as a Special Administrative Region of the PRC under the Basic 
Law of Hong Kong. The Chinese government promised that by the "One Country, Two Systems" 
principle Hong Kong SAR would have freedom in managing its economic and cultural affairs, and 
retain its capitalist system and lifestyle for at least fifty years after the change of sovereignty. 
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anti-foreign sentiments, which gradually turned into popular nationalism during the 
revolutionary movement of 1911 (Tsai 1994: 14). 
In examining the role of Hong Kong in modem Chinese history, Fok (1990) 
recounts Hong Kong's close relations with mainland China between the 
late-nineteenth century and the end of World War 11. According to Fok, during that 
period Hong Kong not only contributed to the course of modernization in China by 
providing financial support to the business in China and being an important centre 
of cultural exchange between China and the West, but also played a critical role in 
shaping historically significant events of China. In particular, Hong Kong served the 
1911 Revolution in various ways, such as being a political shelter for the 
revolutionaries as well as a base for the preparation of revolutionary strategies, 
propagation of revolutionary ideas and collection of funds (Fok 1990:53-65). 
Moreover, the strong influence of mainland China on Hong Kong was observed in 
education. In 1930s, vernacular schools in Hong Kong commonly adopted the 
education policy of the Nationalist Government in China and the objectives of 
China's war-time education (Fok 1990:118). During the Sino-Japanese War 
(1937-1945), many of these schools actively functioned in the promotion of 
war-time nationalistic education, providing education programmes that were of a 
highly nationalistic and militaristic nature (Fok 1990:122-123). In contrast to the 
situation of Hong Kong in the later half of the century, an upsurge of nationalistic 
spirit and patriotic sentiment was observed during wartime among the Hong Kong 
Chinese population. 
The border between mainland China and Hong Kong was closed after the 
Second World War, but this did not end the cultural interactions and economic 
exchanges between Hong Kong Chinese and their counterparts on the mainland. In 
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fact, post-war Hong Kong experienced a massive increase in population due to an 
influx of refugees from the mainland in escaping from Chinese Communist rule. 
These Chinese immigrants are the forebears of the present Hong Kong Chinese. 
Still harbouring strong attachment to their motherland and maintaining close ties 
with their relatives on the mainland, they reached Hong Kong only in search of a 
convenient haven from politics (Ma and Fung 1999). In the next two decades, they 
formed a largely loosely-organized and politically apathetic population keen on 
pursuing personal success in the colony's economy without any sense of loyalty to 
the Hong Kong community or the colonial government. 
However, the development of Hong Kong residents' identity took a new turn in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, when Hong Kong began to emerge as a strong Asian 
market economy and mature into a more demographically settled society. The 
Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong and their children began to see Hong Kong as 
their home. At the same time, the growing economic prosperity and rising living 
standard of Hong Kong also attracted a later wave of Chinese immigrants in 
escaping from the political upheavals and economic turmoil aggravated by the 
Cultural Revolution in China. Thus, a local identity of “Hong Kong people" 
vis-a-vis their counterparts in the mainland and the new Chinese immigrants began 
to take root among the settled Hong Kong population. Lau and Kuan describe the 
period between late 1960s and late 1970s as a crucial decade in which the 
divergence in the paths of development between capitalist, cosmopolitan Hong 
Kong and socialist, introverted China intensified (1988:1-2). In their words, “[i]f the 
normative orientations, life-style and mental outlook of the Hong Kong Chinese and 
the Chinese on the Mainland were already quite different by the late 1960s, they 
became wide apart in the late 1970s" (Lau and Kuan 1988:2). However, it must be 
15 
Chapter One Tse Yuen Man 
noted that the distinctive Hong Kong Chinese identity did not represent having a 
strong sense of belonging to Hong Kong society; rather, it was characterized by an 
absence of strong attachment to the Hong Kong community and the prevalence of a 
low level of political interest and a general sense of political powerlessness (Lau 
and Kuan 1988:94,179). 
Despite their general apathy towards politics, the majority of Hong Kong 
Chinese, the immigrants who initially went to Hong Kong in order to flee life under 
the Chinese communist rule harboured a deep anti-Communist China sentiment 
(Leung 1997:40). Based on the results of several surveys conducted at the time the 
1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed, Leung (1997) suggested that the 
attitude of the Hong Kong Chinese in the 1980s towards reunification with China 
was a mixture of reluctance and fear. This mainly stemmed from many Hong Kong 
people's dislike of the communist political system and lifestyle, as well as their 
scepticism towards China's authoritarian attitude and increasing interference in 
Hong Kong affairs after the Sino-British negotiations started in the early 1980s 
(Leung 1997:40).iG In Leung's words, after the Joint-Declaration was signed, Hong 
Kong came under “a dual political authority structure" influenced by both the Hong 
Kong government and the Chinese government. Hong Kong Chinese also 
experienced a strong feeling of alienation from the Chinese government in conflicts 
and confrontations between the two governments during the 1980s, such as the 
disputes on the drafting of the Basic Law and political reform (Leung 1997:41-42). 
The distinctiveness of the Hong Kong Chinese's identity in terms of its dual 
The surveys that Leung used to support his argument include two studies commissioned 
respectively by two famous civic groups in Hong Kong, which were the Hong Kong observers and 
the Reform Club, an opinion poll conducted by South China Morning Post, and a survey by Survey 
Research Hong Kong (Leung 1997:40). 
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Hong Kong and Chinese nature has been explored in a notable study by Siu-Kai 
Lau (1997). A series of surveys conducted since 1985 found that up until 1995 
consistently more respondents identified themselves as “Hongkongese” rather than 
“Chinese”, n However, instead of being mutually exclusive, the two identities 
embody similar types of attitudes towards the Chinese nation, the Chinese 
government and the democratization issue of Hong Kong: both "Hongkongese" and 
"Chinese" in the surveys identified strongly with the Chinese nation in the 
12 
ethno-cultural sense (1997:10), harboured mistrust and fear of the socialist 
Chinese government (1997:15), and had “mild democratic aspirations permeated 
with mixed feelings" (1997:21) within a “moderate political mentality" (1997:24). 
In addition, the study points out that the June Fourth Incident in 1989 and the 
resultant anxieties and disillusionment among the Hong Kong Chinese about their 
political fate significantly shaped the local identity of the Hong Kong Chinese as 
separate from that of their counterparts on the Mainland (1997:21).'^ S.K. Lau's 
findings and analysis about the attitudes of Hong Kong Chinese and the impact of 
the June Fourth Incident on Hong Kong people's perception of China and their 
cultural identification are paralleled by many of my informants (see Chapter Four). 
11 It is acknowledged in S.K. Lau's study that those who claimed a Chinese identity were more 
likely to be those who are male, older in age, less educated, with lower income and with less 
prestigious occupation. The study also found that there was a "long-term though slow trend for the 
proportion of people claiming both identities to increase" (1997:5). 
12 For example, strong identification with Chinese traditional moral values and a strong sense of 
pride of Chinese culture and the Chinese nation's achievement. 
13 The June 4 Incident, also known commonly as the Tiananmen Square Incident, refers to the 
protests led by students, intellectuals and labour activists in the PRC during the Spring of 1989 and 
in particular the Chinese government's crackdown by military force on the protestors campaigning 
for political reform at Tiananmen Square in Beijing on 3 June and 4 June. The violent suppression of 
the movement caused widespread international condemnation of the Chinese government and 
evoked strong political and emotional reactions among Hong Kong Chinese. According to Wilson 
(1990), for three successive Sundays following the Incident, there were respectively over half a 
million, about one and a half million, and almost a million Hong Kong people who took to the streets 
to protest against the Chinese government's action (1990:220). 
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In the last two decades before the change of sovereignty, economic ties 
between Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China grew continuously. 
Nevertheless, the discrepancy between the two regions in both social and political 
realms persisted. The ambivalence of Hong Kong people at the time of the handover 
in their attitudes towards China has been well illuminated by C.K. Lau (1997). Lau 
writes that by the late 1970s China had existed only in the abstract for the majority 
of Hong Kong Chinese. But even after it adopted the Open Door Policy in 1978, 
communist China had largely been associated with negative images in the mind of 
many distrustful Hong Kong Chinese. Due to lack of political and nationalistic 
education in colonial Hong Kong, Hong Kong Chinese are unique not only in that 
“they are moved neither by the national flags nor the anthems of their past and 
present sovereigns" (1997:18) but also in their casual attitude towards citizenship. 
As the handover of Hong Kong was approaching, the lack of nationalistic feelings 
among Hong Kong Chinese aroused much disapproval from the Chinese 
government. The Chinese government's desire to strengthen nationalistic education 
caused concern among the Hong Kong public. Among teachers, some were 
uncomfortable with the idea because they themselves were totally inexperienced in 
the matter and had ambivalence in their own senses of identification (1997:17). 
Among students, some expressed a lack of confidence about Hong Kong's future 
and felt reluctance to accept their mainland counterparts (1997:22). 
Hong Kong people's ambivalent attitude towards China is sometimes 
expressed in terms of a struggle between Hong Kong's cosmopolitan identity and a 
Chinese national identity. Tang (1997) draws our attention to the two competing 
perspectives, globalization and nationalization, towards Hong Kong's political 
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transition in 1997. Tang suggested that both of these processes would be shaping 
Hong Kong in an equally powerful and yet competing way. On one hand, having 
been an active participant in international institutions and a major international 
business, finance, communications and transport centre, Hong Kong could represent 
the best example of globalization. On the other hand, the fact that the Beijing 
government had always regarded the recovery of Hong Kong as a step in its 
nation-state building agenda suggested that nationalization would undoubtedly be a 
major force in shaping Hong Kong's development. Thus, Tang (1997) writes that 
although the Beijing government had promised to give Hong Kong a relatively high 
degree of autonomy under the "one country, two systems" principal, it is 
questionable whether Hong Kong could retain the qualities that had made the city 
tick as an international metropolis. In the same vein, he cautions that it would be a 
tricky task for Hong Kong to balance its need of "maintaining its openness" on the 
one hand and that of "demonstrating its patriotic credentials to the Beijing 
government" on the other hand (1997:194). The contradiction between maintaining 
cosmopolitanism and being assimilated into nationalism constitutes a problem for 
some of my informants, as we will see in this thesis. 
Mathews (2000), in examining what it means to belong to a particular culture 
in this increasingly globalized world, offers ample ethnographic data to understand 
the ambivalence found among those Hong Kong people who have received 
education during the colonial period and who are now being urged to identify 
themselves with China. Mathews's comparative study of the cultural identities of 
Japanese, Americans, and Hong Kong Chinese shows that Hong Kong's experience 
is significant not only at the local Hong Kong or national Chinese level, but also at 
the global level. Globalization theorists sometimes argue that the nation is receding 
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before the force of market (Tomlinson 1999). Hong Kong, as a market-oriented 
society learning to belong to a nation for the first time in history, represents an 
example in opposition to the global trend, and can provide insights into the future of 
nationalism in today's increasingly globalized world (Mathews 2000). 
Political and Civic Education 
In an international comparison of policies and practices in citizenship education in 
sixteen countries, including England, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Switzerland and the USA, Kerr (2000:205-206) points out that a common challenge 
that countries face in handling citizenship education stems from the tension between 
a "value-explicit" approach, in which education is oriented towards promoting 
distinct values as part of the “broader nationally accepted system of public values 
and beliefs”，and a "value-neutral" approach, in which individuals are given 
freedom to form their own judgement on any controversial issues. While individual 
societies may choose to interpret their citizenship education curriculum according to 
their own context, both of the two approaches have weaknesses: a "value-explicit" 
approach involves dangers of indoctrination and a "value-neutral" approach can be 
criticized for being less effective in equipping students with skills to tackle real-life, 
controversial problems (Kerr 2000:206). In Hong Kong, whether civic education 
should be value-explicit or value-neutral is a complex question. As we will see in 
this thesis, there is no consensus among Hong Kong teachers on the articulation of 
values, and there is a distinctive dissonance between the belief of the Hong Kong 
Chinese and the "broader nationally accepted system" endorsed by the Chinese 
national authorities. In addition, Kerr's study draws our attention to the strong 
power of teachers in influencing the content, teaching methodology and learning 
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environment of citizenship education worldwide (2000:217) as well as the gap 
between policy and practice at various levels of the education system, from national 
level to individual schools and classrooms (2000:219). These findings, which have 
been echoed by other studies on civic education, identify the significant role of 
teachers and the complexity of the education process. 
Cogan, Morris and Print (2002) offer an analysis of the implementation of 
civic education in six societies: Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand and 
the USA. They point out that civic education has been given increasing attention as 
a vehicle for changing and strengthening the nature of the individual and the state in 
societies worldwide (2002:1). Their study reveals some basic problems that 
different societies have had to face in common in their implementation of civic 
education. For example, there are the contradictory goals of how to teach students 
to be obedient members of the community while at the same time to train them to 
have critical thinking (Cogan, Morris and Print 2002:10). Admittedly, both of these 
aspects are equally important for an individual's development; how to strike a 
balance between them remains a difficult task for schools to handle, especially for 
teachers of civic education. Moreover, the delineation of four different levels of 
information, namely "the formal curriculum", “explicit civic education learning 
experiences within the curriculum", "implicit civic education learning experiences 
both within the classroom and the school" , and "the hidden curriculum" 
(2002:15-16) reveals the complexity of schooling. i4 Thus, in line with what Kerr's 
study (2000) suggests, the influences of teachers should be paid more attention in 
particular, because their attitudes and knowledge make a big difference in how 
14 The four levels refer respectively to first, school subjects stipulated by the school or equivalent 
curriculum agency, second, learning experiences considered as part of the officially defined 
curriculum, third, non-compulsory extra-curricular activities, and finally, the values that students 
learn from the interactions with teachers and other students that are often found not to be in line with 
the school's formal intention (Cogan, Morris and Print 2002:15-16). 
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things are taught and what values are transmitted. A holistic understanding of 
schooling dynamics demands an examination of the relationship between three 
levels of education: government policy, individual schools' curriculum and the 
actual teaching that takes place in schools. 
Lee and Leung's study (2001) draws our attention to the debate about whether 
post-1997 civic education should stress more on "the inculcation of national identity 
or on the cultivation of a democratic personality” (2001:268). It points out that 
although government policies have placed many institutional constraints on 
education practitioners in realizing their teaching ideals, teachers are also found to 
have taken only half-hearted attempts in teaching by internalizing and normalizing 
the existing institutional constraints. The constraints identified in the study are of 
four types: the first type is “resource constraint", which refer to the insufficient 
resources the government puts in the implementation of civic education; the second 
type is “constraint of formal curriculum design", which means the differential 
accessibility of civic education due to the examination-oriented nature of secondary 
schooling; the third type is "constraint of informal curriculum design", which refers 
to the lack of extracurricular activities designed with the theme of civic education; 
and the fourth type is "constraints of gatekeeping of controversial issues", which 
refers to education practitioners' conservative political stance and their tendency to 
avoid involvement in sensitive issues. Thus, we are again reminded that the part 
played by teachers in influencing the teaching of civic education is as important as 
institutional forces. What would be transmitted to students very often depends on 
the attitudes and teaching strategies of the teachers irrespective of the rhetoric of 
government policies. 
The experience of Hong Kong has been compared with Taiwan in the study by 
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Hughes and Stone (1999), which points out the failure of both Hong Kong and 
Taiwan in resolving the conflicts between the objectives of teaching individuals to 
participate in their democratic societies on the one hand, and of socializing them to 
support the states' nation-building projects on the other hand (1999:977). In specific 
reference to the Hong Kong situation, the study illustrates the incompatibility 
between the values and concepts attached to Hong Kong and those attached to the 
PRC. It emphasizes that to reconcile the need to promote education for an 
increasingly democratic Hong Kong and the urge to inculcate a sense of "Chinese 
nationhood", following the Chinese Communist Party, constitutes an essential 
contradiction for the development of civic education in Hong Kong (1999:983). 
This is despite the official education document issued in 1996, the Revised 
Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, which argued that civic learning in Hong 
Kong must in the end be placed within the Chinese national context (1999:984). 
The question that Hughes and Stone raised in the above illuminates that 
approaching civic and national education in post-handover Hong Kong is bound to 
be full of conflict and problematic in practice. Such problem will be explored from 
the perspective of education practitioners throughout this thesis. 
Fairbrother's study (2003), based on surveys conducted between 1999 and 
2000 on the political socialization in Hong Kong and in Mainland China, tells us 
much about the different national attitudes of Hong Kong students and mainland 
students. The contrast between the two societies in regard to their education can be 
summed up as follows: while civic education in colonial Hong Kong has been weak 
and depoliticized until recently, detailed policies of patriotic education have been 
adopted in Mainland China. 
In his comparison between the national attitude of Hong Kong students and 
that of mainland students under the influences of the two education systems, 
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Fairbrother found that mainland students had stronger national attitudes than Hong 
Kong students in all of the seven dimensions of national attitudes that he explored, 
and the greatest differences between the two groups were found in “emotional 
attachment to the nation", “the idea of national interests taking precedence over 
local or individual interests,’, and ‘‘a sense of duty to the nation,,” While mainland 
students gave explicit expressions of love for the country, displayed strong 
attachment to national symbols, and showed great pride in China's recent progress, 
Hong Kong students were found in Fairbrother's research to be ambivalent in their 
national attitudes, unmoved and even annoyed about the national symbols, and 
indifferent about China's progress during recent decades' reform. 
While some of the above studies, such as Hughes and Stone (1999) and Lee 
and Leung (2001), have mentioned national identity, it is only studied as defined in 
official curriculum guidelines, without showing us how the teaching is actually 
conducted in schools and what changes have taken place in recent years in this 
process. Moreover, while these studies show us the government's attitude towards 
education and the nature of the formal curriculum, most of them do not reflect the 
perceptions of the people involved in the actual process of teaching and learning. 
Given the discrepancies between different levels of the education system mentioned 
by Cogan, Morris and Print (2002), more attention must be paid to the lower level 
of the system, that is, the education practitioners at the forefront as well as the 
students. Among the works mentioned above, Fairbrother's works (2003) is 
exceptional in featuring students’ opinions. However, the voice of teachers about 
15 The seven dimensions of national attitudes explored in Fairbrother's study are: "an emotional 
attachment to the nation", "a sense of duty to the nation", "the precedence of national over individual 
and regional interests", "a favorable impression of the Chinese people", "a perception of China's 
superiority over other nations", "a desire for China to be more powerful nation", and "a belief in the 
importance of patriotism over internationalism". 
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their roles in nationalistic education cannot be heard from this study. Nor can this 
study tell us how nationalistic education in Hong Kong actually takes place today. 
These suggest that empirical research concerning teaching in classrooms as well as 
activities not necessarily defined in the formal curriculum, which is what I attempt 
to do in my research, is essential for a further understanding of the issue. 
Leung's research (2003) on the role of nationalistic education within civic 
education in Hong Kong examines the conflict between “critical thinking" and 
“patriotic education" in the implementation of civic education in the initial years of 
the post-handover era from an educational perspective. Leung devises a typology of 
nationalistic education applicable in the Hong Kong context by identifying five 
types of nationalism on a continuum ranging from the liberal to the illiberal 
(2003:70), namely cosmopolitan nationalism, civic nationalism, cultural nationalism, 
anti-colonial nationalism and totalitarian nationalism. Moreover, to examine 
teachers' teaching methods in practising civic and nationalistic education, four 
‘‘desirable pedagogies”，namely, participatory learning, issues based approach, 
critical thinking approach, and affective perspective, are identified. Leung's study is 
different from the rest of the most recent works about nationalistic education in 
post-handover Hong Kong in that it has paid attention to the education practitioners 
and has placed the particular question of how to practise nationalistic education into 
the centre of discussion. Nevertheless, with the adoption of a largely etic 
perspective and a heavy emphasis on the educational value of teaching methods, the 
cultural dimension of the issue is neglected and the opinions of the teachers both as 
an educator and as a Hong Kong person are not yet heard through their own voices. 
As the campaign for patriotic education in Hong Kong has become 
increasingly popularized over the past few years, there is still a gap in the existing 
literature as to what patriotic education actually consists of or why the teaching of 
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national identity is shaped as it is at the ground level of teaching in Hong Kong's 
secondary education. My research attempts to fill this gap by offering a study 
grounded in empirical data from an anthropological perspective. As an ethnography, 
it emphasizes interaction with the people being studied and direct observation of 
people's behaviour in order to find out what they do and why in their social world. 
Thus, this thesis does not focus on official documents and government policy like 
most existing studies from the education faculty have done. Rather, it puts the actual 
practices and perceptions of education practitioners in focus. It reveals in detail 
what teachers actually do in their everyday work setting and what they think as well 
as how they feel about this particular aspect of their life. Moreover, instead of 
treating the teaching of national identity as a necessary task and looking at the 
implementation and strategy of patriotic education per se, this study goes beyond 
the level of teaching—and asks fundamentally whether patriotic education itself is 
desirable and what loving one's country means. By examining specifically how 
national identity is taught in Hong Kong secondary schools, this study seeks not 
only to offer insights into the national identity problem as peculiar to the case of 
Hong Kong but also to provide implications on this almost universal phenomenon 
to people in all parts of the world. 
Methodology 
The data for this study was collected through two major channels: in-depth 
interviews and participant observation. 
Semi-structured In-depth Interviews 
From June 2005 to January 2006,1 conducted interviews with 30 teachers (17 males 
and 13 females) from 23 local secondary schools. As a Hong Kong Chinese who 
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graduated from a local government-aided secondary school, I was reasonably 
familiar, at least from the perspective of a student, with the structure of Hong 
Kong's education and its secondary education scene. As the teaching of national 
identity has been a very recent phenomenon in Hong Kong and did not exhibit any 
obvious patterns from my observation, I found that it is necessary to obtain data 
about as wide a range of schools as possible in terms of their political background, 
religion affiliation, location and academic reputation so as to arrive at a fuller view 
of the field. At the same time, based on the literature I reviewed about civic 
education as well as my personal experience, I decided to start my research by 
interviewing teachers who taught the subjects that are presumably most related to 
my topic, that is, Civic Education, Chinese History, History, and Chinese 
Language. 16 This prioritization proved to be beneficial since teachers of Civic 
Education and Chinese History helped me a great deal in refining and staying 
focused on the important questions in the beginning of my research. In the later 
stage of my research, teachers who have not taught these subjects but were 
interested in my topic were also interviewed. In the end, it turned out to be a sample 
of teachers who taught a variety of subjects, including those mentioned above as 
well as English and Physical Education. ^ ^ The age of the teachers ranged from their 
twenties to fifties and the schools that they taught in also varied as earlier 
1 R 
mentioned. 
I found my informants mainly through snowball sampling. I started with my 
personal network: my former secondary school teachers, my friends who were 
teachers and former teachers of my friends. Direct and indirect introduction was 
16 In this thesis, I use capitalization for these terms to denote school subjects. Otherwise, I write 
these subjects entirely with small letters when I refer to them in a general sense. 
口 All of the mentioned subjects are relevant to civic education, since civic education can be taught 
in a variety of different classes, as teachers emphasized. 
18 For the details of the teachers and the schools, see Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. 
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thus my major source of interview opportunities. Apart from this, I constantly 
looked out for prospective informants “on the spot" whenever I visited a school to 
do an interview or attended teachers' public seminars and conferences, and this has 
helped me locate several interviewees. In Hong Kong, there are currently more than 
25,000 teachers teaching in over 500 local secondary schools. My limited sample of 
30 teachers from 23 schools certainly does not represent the teaching community in 
Hong Kong as a whole. But the variety that I have sought to attain within the 
sample does, I think, provide a window to the multiple interpretations of national 
identity and nationalistic education in Hong Kong. 
Each time I got the name of a prospective interviewee, I set up initial contact 
with them on the telephone, in which I presented myself as a research student of 
anthropology, introduced my research topic, and asked for an opportunity to 
conduct a face-to-face in-depth interview. The majority of the teachers whom I 
called accepted my requests for an interview. A few of these teachers showed strong 
interest in my research, but many of them expressed a concern that they might not 
be “of much help" to my research because what they taught in school was, in their 
own understanding, not really related to nationalistic education - even though I 
generally feel that it instead was. Also, some of the teachers were worried about the 
legitimacy of accepting to be interviewees. In that case I had to get the approval 
from the principal of the school to assure the interviewee of the propriety of our 
meeting. 
Prospective interviewees who turned down my offers did so for various 
reasons. Secondary school teachers in Hong Kong are very busy and because of the 
traditionally de-politicized and conservative ethos of Hong Kong education, I had 
expected that the request from a strange researcher would not assume priority in the 
teachers' agenda. Some of the teachers did specify that they did not want to have a 
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face-to-face interview but preferred a “casual” telephone interview or having a 
closed-ended questionnaire sent to them. Although these are possible means for me 
to collect data, I decided that face-to-face interviews are most suitable for my 
research because I wanted to be able to record in as detailed a way as possible the 
words of individual teachers when they articulated their personal senses of national 
identity as well as to observe closely the way they reacted to certain controversial 
and potentially sensitive issues. 
My interviews were semi-structured; all of them were conducted individually 
in Cantonese, and lasted from 45 minutes to 3 hours. Before each interview, I 
promised anonymity to all of my informants. Most interviews except one, in which 
the teacher refused to have his voice recorded but allowed me to jot notes, were 
taped and then transcribed directly into English afterwards for analysis. The 
questions that I asked in the interviews fell into two major types: first, about the 
school's curriculum and the teaching experience of the teacher, and second, about 
the teacher's personal view of the teaching of national identity and their own sense 
of identity. 
Some of the core questions included: Are there formal instructions from the 
government or from the school director about the teaching of national identity in 
this school? What are these? What has your school done in order to promote the 
teaching of national identity? How important is nationalistic education in the 
school's curriculum? What is the role of nationalistic education in the subject(s) you 
teach? What is nationalistic education in your view? How do you think it should be 
carried out? Do you personally agree with the teaching? Do you love your country? 
Why? Why not? What do you think of nationalism? How would you comment on 
the progress of the teaching in giving the students a sense of national identity? How 
do your students react to the teaching? What are your future plans for teaching 
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national identity? 
Naturally, interviewees interpreted questions based on their preconceptions 
about the subject. But throughout my research the sensitive nature of my research 
topic has been clear. Although the majority of teachers seemed glad to talk to me, I 
sensed that many teachers initially assumed that I was in favour of nationalistic 
education in line with the government's policy and thus at first tended to be 
defensive about my queries and chose to present to me a certain side of things that 
they believed would be accepted from the official point of view. The political 
correctness aspect of the national identity issue sometimes became so serious that it 
prevented informants, at least initially, from telling me what they really thought and 
felt. In one extreme case, a teacher who was against nationalistic education 
addressed me in the beginning of the interview as ‘‘you people who work for 
nationalistic education" and assured me that his school had indeed implemented 
nationalistic education. The message was clear: "this school has done everything 
that any ordinary school is supposed to do, so there is no reason for you to pick on 
us.” It was only when I clarified again to this teacher that I was a student of 
anthropology and was not personally in favour of any stance that he started to relax 
and tell me about his discontent about the curriculum. Also, in a few other cases, 
teachers wondered aloud whether it is "okay" to speak against the government. 
Being outspoken about politics and bringing up controversies about the country thus 
appeared not to be something that the average teacher was comfortable doing]9 
Hence, whenever necessary, I explained to the teachers that my research was not 
intended to look for any types of data that "fit" a certain ideology and I was 
interested in learning every bit of information about the topic from different 
19 The reaction of these teachers is rather unusual in the context of Hong Kong, where people 
actually enjoy a large degree of freedom of speech. 
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perspectives. If not for repeated clarification like this, a number of the interviews 
would not have yielded as much data as they did. 
Participant Observation 
The process of finding opportunities for participant observation has been full of 
obstacles. My initial ideal of conducting participant observation on a regular basis 
in History, Chinese History and Civic Education classes in both pro-China and 
non-pro-China schools has not been realized. This can be attributed to a number of 
reasons. Typically, the secondary school environment does not welcome outsiders. 
It takes a really enthusiastic teacher and an open-minded principal to allow the 
presence of a stranger in their formal teaching activities. Moreover, informants from 
pro-China schools have been unexpectedly hard to find. As such, I have tried to 
contact two Civic Education teachers from two traditional pro-China schools 
through their colleagues, but both declined to meet me in person even for an 
interview. In addition, the timing of my research — the start of the schools' academic 
year - missed the prime time that topics about national identity are taught in 
schools' Civic Education curriculum, which is at the end of the academic year. Two 
informants turned down my requests for this reason. 
In the course of my interviewing teachers, I became convinced that fieldtrips to 
mainland China should be one of the focuses of my study. Indeed, existing 
programmes of this kind are many, but it has turned out to be extremely difficult for 
me to get a chance to join them as a researcher. In July 2005,1 had the help of two 
of my informants to be considered a self-financed assistant to their summer cultural 
exchange fieldtrips in China, but their school principals refused to let me join, 
saying that the programmes were "intended for students of the school to join only". 
Also, I approached the National Education Centre twice, in Fall 2005 and Spring 
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2006, for an opportunity to join their Beijing tours as a voluntary student helper and 
participant observant. My offer was turned down both times. Based on my 
understanding of the tricky status of nationalistic education in the teaching 
community of Hong Kong after my interviews with teachers, I gathered that it was 
strange for the Centre to see a person who was neither a nationalistic education 
teacher nor a student participant to show so much interest in their programme. Thus, 
it is not surprising that they rejected someone like me out of suspicion as to my 
motives. 
Irrespective of these limitations, I had the chance to do a degree of participant 
observation. Through three of my informants, I got the consent of 3 local 
non-pro-China secondary schools (School A, I , and M) to visit them for their 
classes and “China Week" programmes held in late September and early October, 
2005. The activities that I observed included in School A hall assemblies for junior 
students and senior students respectively that featured students' presentation of 
topics about contemporary China issues, in School I Civic Education lessons of a 
Form One class and students' sharing sessions about fieldtrips in mainland China in 
the past summer, and in School M two talks by guest speakers on topics about 
"China as our home" and on 30 September their flag-raising ceremony. These 
events were either taped or recorded in hand-written notes. As mentioned earlier, 
secondary schools in Hong Kong are generally conservative. All of these three 
schools which welcomed me to visit and observe are thus among the more liberal 
type of schools. This may have shaped my research findings in a way that renders 
the data I gathered from participant observation in schools rather one-sided, 
reflecting the situation of only one type of school. Indeed, had I had the chance to 
observe also pro-China schools, more contrasting findings could have been yielded. 
However, my interviews with teachers provide a valid broad view of the issue, and 
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this, I believe, enables me to offer a sufficiently balanced picture in this study. 
Apart from observing classes and activities in schools, I participated in 
programmes that were not organized for students but for educators, which helped 
me to get a glimpse of how the education profession prepared for the teaching of 
national identity. I attended the International Symposium on National Education 
which took place in Hong Kong on 7-8 June 2005, the first large-scale public 
academic event to have taken place in Hong Kong in which international scholars, 
educators, and Hong Kong government officials exchanged their views of 
nationalistic education. From November to December 2005,1 attended a series of 
courses on topics about national identity and the Basic Law, which were organized 
by the Joint Committee for the Promotion of the Basic Law of Hong Kong and the 
Education and Manpower Bureau for all Hong Kong teachers and school principals. 
This thesis is based essentially on the in-depth interviews that I conducted with 
my 30 informants because, for various reasons mentioned above, other kinds of data 
have been extremely difficult for me to obtain. The participant observation of 
school activities and teachers' programmes has allowed me to see in person the 
actual implementation of the teaching of national identity in Hong Kong and helped 
augment my understanding of the issue that I am studying as a researcher, but the 
data that I could gain by this channel for this research has turned out to be scanty. At 
the same time, because of the constraint of time for this project, I did not get to 
obtain the views of students, who are recipients of this patriotic/nationalistic 
education. These limitations might make this work look restricted in terms of data 
source. Nonetheless, my in-depth interviews with informants have proven to be 
highly beneficial, and the comprehensive data about classroom instruction and 
teacher beliefs yielded from my informants' narratives have served as a substantial 
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basis for my detailed study of particular practices by teachers in Hong Kong. 
Reflexivity of the Researcher 
Ethnographic writing has an essentially constructional and reflexive character 
(Walsh 1998). It may thus be worthwhile to talk about how my background and my 
cultural identity may have influenced the outcome of my research. 
I was bom in Hong Kong in the early 1980s to a Chinese working class family 
from which I received basically no political socialization. But as a teenager I did 
notice some subtle difference between my parents in their attitudes towards China: 
my father, who was born in mainland China and came to Hong Kong during the 
1950's, was much more emotionally attached to China than my mother, who was 
born and grew up in Hong Kong. While my father was enthusiastic about news 
from China and would enjoy watching television programmes with patriotic themes 
produced on the mainland, my mother shared no such interest in China and 
sometimes scorned my father's more eager attitude towards the country. However, 
politics and nationalism had never been topics of open discussion in my family, and 
at that time I did not see any significance at all in what I had observed of my 
parents. 
I have received all of my major education at local schools in Hong Kong. As a 
on 
secondary school student, I studied in an EMI school and have had first hand 
experience of local schooling in both colonial Hong Kong and post-handover Hong 
Kong. During those years, I learnt about China mainly through Chinese culture and 
history classes, which in retrospect might have helped shape and reinforce the 
‘‘Chinese,，part of the Hong Kong Chinese cultural identity which I have held up to 
EMI secondary schools refer to local secondary schools in Hong Kong that use English as the 
medium of instruction. This and other issues of Hong Kong schooling will be discussed in Chapter 
Two. 
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this day. Nevertheless, apart from these classes, my interest in learning about China 
and my consciousness of China affairs was minimal. In 1997, the year in which the 
momentous return of Hong Kong to China took place, I was to start senior 
secondary school to begin preparatory courses for the Hong Kong Certificate of 
Education Examination. I must say at that time my mind was preoccupied more 
with worries about my performance at school than reflections about the political 
transition. Furthermore, although in this research I have learnt from my former 
teachers that my former school now offers a full Civic Education course and formal 
patriotic education including flag-raising ceremonies and programmes about the 
June Fourth Incident,21 I did not receive any such education during my study until 
2001 at that school. In short, under the influence of the traditional de-politicized and 
examination-oriented culture of Hong Kong schooling, as I will discuss in Chapter 
Two, for the greater part of my life I have been uninterested in politics, ignorant of 
the "nation" and alienated from contemporary China, just as many scholars (C.K. 
Lau 1997; S.K. Lau 1997; Leung 1997) have described of my contemporaries in 
Hong Kong. 
As mentioned above, I identify myself as both Hongkongese and Chinese 
(primarily Hongkongese and secondly Chinese). For a long period this identity was 
an utterly unquestioned one. I did not come to consciously examine it until I 
chanced to learn in university as an anthropology student about the concepts of 
culture, identity and nationalism. In the final year of my undergraduate study, I was 
encouraged by my professor to do my research project on the cross-cultural 
21 Today the June 4 Incident remains a controversial topic: people who support the pro-democracy 
movement in China view it as an incident of a repressive authoritarian regime's killing of innocent 
civilians, an example of human rights violation; but the Chinese authorities justify that the 
crackdown was a necessary reaction to ensure stability and render it a forbidden topic in the country. 
For Hong Kong education, whether it should be included as part of nationalistic education is a 
problematic issue, as it involves different definitions of patriotism and nationalistic education in 
Hong Kong. These will be discussed more in subsequent chapters. 
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comparison of national identity, in which I interviewed individuals of eight different 
nationalities about their senses of national belonging and experiences of patriotic 
education. That project opened my eyes to the almost universal phenomenon of 
national identity. To my surprise I found that patriotism was a taken-for-granted 
aspect of life for many people in various parts of the world. I came to see that the 
lack of this feeling in me as well as many others in Hong Kong really made us an 
“abnormal，，group of people by a global standard. At the same time I also felt that, 
compared to people from other places, what I knew about nationhood was 
extremely limited and shallow. I seriously wondered what being a “Hongkongese” 
and a “Chinese” really meant. It was on the basis of this realization that as a 
graduate student I chose to conduct my research about the national identity problem 
of Hong Kong. 
During this research, my identity as a Hong Kong Chinese and a locally 
educated student has been an advantage for my interaction with my informants in 
many cases. For example, I noticed that some teachers became significantly more 
willing to open up when I told them about my past experience of colonial education, 
which probably made them feel that I could understand their experience and the 
issues peculiar to the Hong Kong schooling culture from the perspective of a 
‘‘native,, person. Also, although getting access to schools for participant observation 
was not particularly easy, once I was accepted into the schools to observe their 
activities I felt generally welcomed by school staff and students. It was mainly 
because those three schools which I have observed were themselves among the 
more liberal ones. But what may also be said is that had I been an employed 
researcher and not a research student or had I been a foreigner, my presence in the 
schools would probably have caused more suspicion. In fact, had that been the case, 
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I might not have even been able to gain the trust from the teachers to let me conduct 
research in their schools in the first place. 
On the other hand, however, being personally apathetic towards the nation and 
not particularly optimistic about the political integration of Hong Kong with China, 
I was careful not to reveal too much of my personal views to my informants, 
especially those who were patriotic and enthusiastic about patriotic education. I 
tried in the interviews to present myself as a neutral listener as I did not want the 
teachers to believe that I was there to challenge them and thus choose not to confide 
their true opinions in me. 
I cannot tell how my persona has actually influenced the way my informants 
reacted to me. But in the end I must admit that this research has had some impact on 
my personal sense of identity. When I started this project I had only the vaguest idea 
about patriotic education and what it meant to love one's country. But as I gained a 
more concrete understanding of China and listened more to the cause of the critical 
patriots among my informants in the process, I found myself more and more ready 
to empathize with them despite my original distrust of China and patriotism. 
Because of this, sometimes I also found it hard to stay detached when I analyzed my 
data. Although at the time of writing this I remain sceptical of patriotism and 
nationalism in general and believe in a separate Hong Kong identity apart from 
China, I have come to have a more pragmatic outlook towards the teaching of 
national identity in Hong Kong. I believe that if such teaching is inevitable in 
post-handover Hong Kong, as long as it is done in an analytical way and serves 
ultimately as a vehicle to raise concern among the rather self-interested Hong Kong 
people towards the international community, it may have some real value. 
I do not know whether such change in my attitude could already mean that I 
have become a more patriotic person. However, I remain sensitive to how this 
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research affects me and how my understanding has been transforming. Above all, as 
a researcher I try as much as possible to be objective and seek to deliver a study that 
is truest to the perspectives of my informants. 
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. In Chapter One, I set forth my research 
question and aim as well as reviewing existing literature that is relevant to my 
research in three major aspects: theories of national identity, the national identity 
problem in Hong Kong, and civic and political education worldwide. Also, I discuss 
my methodology and the methodological problems I encountered during this 
research. 
In Chapter Two, based on existing literature, I give a brief introduction about 
the structure of schooling in Hong Kong and highlight some unique aspects of the 
secondary school curriculum that are relevant to the discussion of nationalistic 
education in Hong Kong. After several decades of colonial de-politicization, there 
has been a conscious attempt since the handover on the part of the Hong Kong 
education policy makers to create a stronger emphasis on the teaching of national 
identity through the cross-curricular subject, Civic Education. This inevitably 
suggests changes in the climate of teaching political and civic education in Hong 
Kong. In order to provide a larger context for the discussion of the various issues of 
the present situation in Hong Kong education, in this chapter I sketch the 
development of civic and political education in Hong Kong from its initial years in 
the 1950s to the present. 
Chapter Three discusses the organization of nationalistic education in the 23 
schools which my 30 informants taught in. Traditionally, Hong Kong secondary 
schools have adopted school-based management; individual schools have a 
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relatively high degree of flexibility in determining the focus and approach of their 
school-based curriculum. In the colonial period, the average local school in Hong 
Kong has largely been "politics free”. The only kind of schools that were associated 
with strong political background has been the “leftist” or pro-China schools. 
However, with the government's advocacy of nationalistic education in recent years, 
the decision makers of many schools have started to orient their school to a new 
ethos. On the surface, individual schools have tried to use the same channels to 
incorporate “China elements" into their curriculum, but whether all schools place 
the same degree of emphasis on nationalistic education and whether the curriculum 
they individually implement all mean the same thing require a closer look at the 
specific themes and content of the schools' programmes. Moreover, national 
identity has been a highly controversial and politically sensitive issue in society. 
This suggests that the introduction of the teaching of national identity into 
individual schools' curriculum is likely to have some impact on the dynamics of the 
school environment. This makes it necessary to examine the question of power in 
teachers' work relations at schools. The questions I asked my informants for this 
chapter include the background and history of individual schools, their policy 
regarding civic and nationalistic education, the concrete changes related to the 
teaching of national identity in their school-based curriculum, and the division of 
labour among the teaching staff in such teaching. 
In Chapter Four, I turn to my particular informants, looking at their person 
background, their senses of national identity and their opinions of nationalistic 
education in Hong Kong in general. Unlike traditional academic subjects, civic 
education does not have a centralized syllabus for all schools to follow. What and 
how things are taught at the implementation level depend heavily on how the 
teachers in charge choose to approach the subject, which is intricately related to the 
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teachers，personal senses of cultural identity. This is why an overview of my 
informants' backgrounds and identifications is essential. While each of my 30 
informants has their own unique life history and it is hard to draw any 
generalization across them, the majority of them share a common local “Hong Kong 
identity" and agree on an alternative interpretation of patriotism other than the 
Chinese government's definition. At the same time, my informants do not have the 
same attitude towards nationalistic education. While some teachers exhibit 
indifference, some render support, and some raise objection. Each group of teachers 
justify their attitudes through various reasons. For the issues mentioned above, I 
asked the teachers to tell me their personal history, their definition of patriotism, 
how they come to develop their view, whether and why they love or not love their 
country, and whether and how they think nationalistic education should be carried 
out in Hong Kong, which in a way offers a window to the underlying ambivalences 
of the teachers in teaching and the ambiguity of the national identity problem in 
Hong Kong. 
Chapter Five and Chapter Six go beyond general perceptions to examine 
nationalistic education in practice. Just as individual teachers have their own 
interpretation of patriotism and attitude towards China, different types of patriotic 
education for China can be found at the implementation level. In Chapter Five, I 
look at how two contradictory images of China: ancient, cultural China and 
contemporary, political China, are presented in classroom to students. This entails 
the larger questions of whether civic education in Hong Kong should remain 
“apolitical，，as it has been in the colonial period and in what sense national 
education can be "political education" from the teachers' perspective. In Chapter 
Six, through examples that my informants told me of their teaching in various 
settings such as fieldtrips to mainland China, the viewing of material from mass 
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media and the flag-raising ceremony, I explore two opposite approaches, one based 
on affective and the other on cognitive/critical thinking, of teaching about China; I 
discuss how emphasizing one approach over the other is symbolic of the teachers' 
interpretations of whether loving one's country should be a duty or a choice. For 
these issues, I asked my informants to describe their experiences in teaching 
nationalistic education in as detailed a way as possible, and I asked them to explain 
their rationales behind their choices of teaching methods, and to comment on the 
students' responses when participating in these learning activities. Together these 
two chapters will show how different contents and approaches of teaching national 
identity reflect the various, and often contradictory, ways of imagining China 
among Hong Kong teachers. 
In Chapter Seven, the conclusion of this thesis, I review the development of 
patriotic education in Hong Kong through the opposite perspectives of conventional 
patriotic education and critical thinking/democratic patriotic education. I compare 
Hong Kong with societies in other parts of the world and discuss the moral purpose 
of patriotic education from the perspective of my informants. Finally, I consider the 
possible future of patriotic education and national identity in Hong Kong. 
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Chapter Two 
Schooling in Hong Kong 
This thesis aims at exploring how civic and nationalistic education is organized in 
schools and what teachers think about the teaching of national identity in Hong 
Kong; but before looking at these questions in their specifics, it is necessary to look 
at the structure of the Hong Kong education system and the development of the 
civics-related parts of Hong Kong secondary education. In this chapter, I will 
highlight some issues of Hong Kong's education system that are relevant to the 
discussion of nationalistic education so as to place the questions that we will 
explore in later chapters into context. Although it is essential to include it, the 
material that I present in the following sections has already been widely discussed 
in the existing body of literature (Adamson and Auyeung Lai 1997; Adamson and 
Li 2004; Biggs 1998; Bray 1997; Bray and Koo 2004; Choi 2003; Cogan, Morris 
and Print 2002; Fairbrother 2003; Kennedy 2005; Kerr 2000; Lee 1999; Liang and 
Liu 1997; Lo 2004; Luk 1998; Morris 1998; Morris and Chan 1997; Morris, 
McClelland and Wong 1998; Morris and Morris 2002; Tan 2004; Tse 1997; Tse 
2004a; Tse 2004b; Vickers 2003). Therefore, each of the issues will only be covered 
briefly with the aim of providing a general background to this thesis. 
Structure and Characteristics of the Education System 
The education system of Hong Kong is modelled after the British system. Since 
1978, Hong Kong has, by law, provided nine years of free, compulsory education to 
students aged six through fifteen. The system also features a non-compulsory 
three-year kindergarten, which typically runs from age three through six. The free, 
compulsory education starts with the six-year primary education (primary one to 
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primary six), and ends with the completion of the three-year junior secondary 
education (form one to form three). After junior secondary education most students 
proceed to a non-compulsory two-year senior secondary education (form four and 
form five) leading to the first public examination, the Hong Kong Certificate of 
Education Examination (HKCEE). Qualified students then progress to a two-year 
matriculation course (form six and form seven) leading to the second public 
examination, the Hong Kong Advanced Level Examination (HKALE), which 
determines students' chances of entering university. 
All public schools, both primary and secondary, are operated under the 
supervision of the Education and Manpower Bureau (EMB) of the HKSAR (known 
* 2 2 as the Education Department before the handover). Among the 501 local public 
secondary schools in the 2005/06 school year, more than 80 percent are 
government-aided schools, which are founded by various sponsoring bodies and 
financially subsidized by the government. The majority of the sponsoring bodies are 
religious organizations, mostly Christian but also Buddhist, Taoist, Islamic and 
Confucian, and charitable bodies such as the Po Leung Kuk. Schools under the 
Direct Subsidy Scheme and government schools constitute the rest of the local 
23 
public secondary school sector. 
The curriculum of local Hong Kong secondary schools is highly centralized. It 
Outside of the local public secondary school sector that I focus on in this thesis, among all Hong 
Kong secondary schools we can also find private schools, English Schools Foundation schools and 
other international schools. 
23 Government schools are schools that are directly financed and managed by the government. 
Schools under the Direct Subsidy Scheme (DSS), like government-aided schools, receive financial 
assistance from the government, but they have a higher degree of autonomy in management in that 
they are permitted to run alternative curricula, recruit students on their own and charge fees in order 
to finance their self-devised, self-operated programmes. According to Adamson and Li (2004), the 
Direct Subsidy Scheme was introduced in 1991 in response to the shortage of subsidized local school 
places. Private schools including "previously excluded schools with strong political links to the 
mainland" meeting government standards in class size and teacher quality were allowed to receive 
government subsidies, thus providing "a strong alternative to public education" (2004:52). An 
increasing number of aided schools have joined the scheme in the past several years (2004:52). 
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is set by the EMB with the advice of the Curriculum Development Council (CDC) 
in policy formulation and the assistance of the Curriculum Development Institute 
(CDI) in policy implementation, and follows closely the public examination 
syllabuses issued by the Hong Kong Examinations and Assessment Authority 
(HKEAA). Textbooks that may be used in schools are subject to review by the 
Textbook Committee of the EMB and only textbooks that have passed the 
inspection of the Textbook Committee are included in the official recommendation 
list. Thus, while they are given a degree of freedom to devise their school-based 
curriculum, Hong Kong secondary schools, which are under substantial pressure to 
ensure that students perform well in public examinations, commonly place priority 
on the core academic subjects that their students sit for in the public examinations^"^ 
and use textbooks and teaching materials that are officially approved. 
To some scholars (Morris, McClelland and Wong 1998), the heavy emphasis 
on examinations in Hong Kong's schooling is to a large extent a result of the 
market-oriented approach in education governance, most obviously reflected in the 
highly competitive mechanism of allocating primary school leavers to secondary 
schools according to the "banding" of the pupils (1998:148-149)?�Moreover, the 
24 The three essential subjects for all local schools and all forms of students are the two language 
subjects, Chinese and English, and Mathematics. The curriculum for junior forms varies 
considerably among schools, but commonly covers subjects of science and humanities in the form of 
both integrated courses and individual courses. The curriculum of senior forms, in contrast, strictly 
follows the HKEAA syllabuses. Courses popularly taken for HKALE include for the science stream: 
Biology, Chemistry, Physics; for the arts stream: Chinese Literature, Chinese History, Geography, 
Economics, History; and for the commerce stream: Business Studies, and Principle of Accounts. 
25 Under the Secondary School Places Allocation system, Primary Six pupils were placed in one of 
five bands - Band 1 indicating the top 20% and Band 5 the academically weakest 20% - according 
to their performance in internal school assessments and in an Academic Aptitude Test on Chinese 
and Mathematics monitored by the Education Department. Band 1 pupils had the advantage over 
Band 2 pupils of being allocated first to their choice of schools, and Band 2 students had priority 
over Band 3 students and so on (Morris and Chan 1997:105-106). Schools that have good academic 
reputations and thus have traditionally attracted Band 1 and Band 2 students are generally labeled 
"Band 1 school" and "Band 2 school". By the same token, schools with the weakest academic 
reputations could only acquire student intake from the Band 4 and Band 5 pools and are labeled 
"Band 4 school" or "Band 5 school". At the turn of the millennium, the banding system was changed 
from five bands to three bands (Adamson and Li 2004:50); and the Academic Aptitude Test was 
replaced by the Basic Competency Assessments Chinese, English and mathematics in 2003 (Lo 
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high potential economic reward of possessing high educational qualifications in the 
society also provides strong motivation for people to strive for academic 
achievement through formal education (1998:149). The result is the prevalence of a 
kind of utilitarianism in schooling and the use of a market-oriented standard to 
determine the value of the various subjects offered in schools. 
Traditionally, the subjects that are attributed a higher status are languages, 
mathematics and sciences; humanities subjects and subjects of a cultural or 
technical nature are generally considered less "useful" from the market perspective 
and thus are less important in schools' curricula. According to Morris's study about 
the distribution of time to school subjects in 44 schools in 1990 and 1994, the fact 
that there has been a greater emphasis on areas such as languages, math and 
sciences at the expense of other subjects was reflected not only in the official 
recommendation of time allocations for schools but even more, in the actual time 
，A 
allocation practice in those schools surveyed. Furthermore, the same hierarchy of 
subjects was also reflected in the assessment methods and relative weightings of 
different subjects in the schools' internal examinations (1998:153). 
Although Morris's study was conducted more than 10 years ago, the overall 
pattern of teaching time allocation and assessment weightings indicated in his study 
has remained the case for today's secondary school students according to more 
recent studies (Adamson and Li 2004; Morris and Chan 1997) as well as the 
depiction of my informants. This fact is important for our understanding of the 
minimal degree of emphasis that schools place on the promotion of patriotic 
2004:168). However, the pattern of allocation and the effect of the "banding" of schools on pupils' 
choice has largely remained the same. 
26 Morris's study (1998) indicates that while it was suggested by the Education Department that 
35-40% of teaching time should be allocated to Languages subjects, 20-25% to Math and Science 
subjects, 15-20% to Humanities subjects, and 5% to other learning activities, the actual time 
percentage allocated in the schools to these subject areas in 1990 were 34.4, 27.1, 17.5, 17.5 and 3.5 
respectively whereas in 1994 was 36.4, 28.5, 16.4, 15.6, and 3.1 respectively. 
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education, which I will discuss in Chapter Three. 
Language and Hong Kong's Education 
In this section I will trace the changes in the language policy of Hong Kong 
secondary education over the decades, which do not only reflect closely the shifts in 
the socio-linguistic situation in Hong Kong (Adamson and Auyeung Lai 1997; Bray 
and Koo 2004), but are also illustrative of how the nation has been symbolized in 
Hong Kong society. 
For most of the history of Hong Kong's education, both English language and 
Chinese language have been important both as academic subjects and as media of 
instruction in schools. These two languages have been for decades two of the core 
subjects (the other is Mathematics) that determine student's entry into secondary 
school and university. The total proportion of teaching time suggested by the 
Education Department for these major language subjects was as high as 35-40% of 
all teaching time (Morris 1998). 
English has been an official language of administration and law in Hong Kong 
since 1894 and the English language subject was originally introduced into the 
Hong Kong school curriculum as a colonial language. After World War II, the 
English language had become increasingly emphasized in the curriculum because of 
English's close link with economic development and its emergence as the major 
international language of communications. The status of the language continued to 
rise in the next several decades in Hong Kong's education. This is indicated by the 
fact that secondary schools that claimed to use English as the medium of instruction 
rose from 57.9% in 1960 to 87.7% in 1980 (Lee 1998:166, quoted in Bray and Koo 
2004:144). 
In the late colonial period, Hong Kong people leamt from the Basic Law that 
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English would remain an official language for at least 50 years after the change of 
sovereignty in 1997. Meanwhile, the English-medium education sector continued to 
expand as the proportion of self-proclaimed English-medium schools further 
increased from 87.7% in 1980 to 91.7% in 1990 (Lee 1998:166, quoted in Bray and 
Koo 2004:145). Parents and the general populace continued to show strong interest 
in English and English-medium education for its association with strong career 
prospects and economic returns, even though educationalists have warned that 
English as an medium of teaching did not prove to be the most effective and that the 
use of a "mixed-code" of English and Chinese is what has really been going on in 
the actual practice of teaching in many local secondary schools. 
Chinese is the native language to the overwhelming majority of the Hong 
Kong population. But the Chinese language itself is complex as it is spoken in 
different dialects in different places. In the Hong Kong context, Chinese generally 
refers to oral Cantonese, a dialect widely spoken in Guangdong Province in China, 
and written Modern Standard Chinese in traditional full-form characters. This is to 
be distinguished from Putonghua, the dialect spoken in Beijing and the national 
language of the PRC, and the simplified system of Chinese characters used in 
writing in mainland China. 
According to Adamson and Auyeung Lai (1997), the Chinese language subject 
was introduced to the official secondary school curriculum after World War II, but 
its status was not as high as that of English until Chinese became an official 
language of Hong Kong along with English in 1975. The promotion of the Chinese 
language was further emphasized during the 1990s as Cantonese and written 
Modern Standard Chinese became more widely used both in the government and in 
commercial exchange with other Cantonese-speaking regions. However, unlike the 
case in mainland China, the focus of the Chinese language subject in Hong Kong 
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was on practical linguistic and communicative skills (1997:89-90). The Chinese 
language was never used officially for promoting patriotism or ideological 
education in colonial Hong Kong and was not emphasized as a vehicle for values 
education until reforms were carried out in the curriculum in the late colonial 
years 尸 
Meanwhile, despite official recognition of the importance of Chinese, Chinese 
as a medium of instruction lost popularity since the 1970s to English. As indicated 
above, in the recent history of colonial Hong Kong's schooling, secondary schools 
that claimed to use English in teaching far outnumbered those that used Chinese, 
mainly because the claim to be using English, a language boasting high market 
value, tended to enhance schools' reputation and their competitiveness in attracting 
better students. However, the situation has changed after the handover. Starting in 
1998, secondary schools in Hong Kong could no longer choose between Chinese 
and English as their language of instruction. With the objective of promoting 
bi-literacy (in Chinese and English) and tri-lingualism (in Cantonese, Putonghua 
and English), the Education Department announced in early 1997 their policy of 
requiring most secondary schools to adopt Chinese as their medium of instruction 
starting with their form one student intake in the 1998 academic year. At the same 
time, however, the government also allowed secondary schools which wished to 
1，In the guidelines offered by the Education Department in 1990 for F. 1 -F.5, one of the two 
objectives of the teaching of Chinese language is stated as follows: “藉著本科的教學’啓發學生的 
思想，培養學生的品德’增進學生對中國文化的認識，並加強學生對社會的責任感”，which may 
be translated into English as “ To stimulate students' thinking, to help students develop virtues, to 
enhance student's understanding of Chinese culture, and to strengthen students' senses of social 
responsibility" (EMB 2007). The same moral theme is present in post-handover document, and more 
than that, a national dimension is also included in the present statements. For example, in the subject 
guidelines 2002 for the junior secondary level, it states “體認中華文化，培養對國家、民族的感情 
(to experience and identify with Chinese culture, to develop affection for the country and the 
nation)”，and in that for the senior level, it states “培養審美情趣和能力；建立品德，了解個人能 
力、性向，以籌畫未來的學習、生活和工作；加強對家庭、社會及國家的責任感（to develop the 
ability and aptitude to appreciate beauty; to develop virtues and understand oneself's ability and 
disposition in preparation for learning, living, and work in the future; to enhance senses of 
responsibility towards family, society and country)" (EMB 2007). 
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continue to teach in English to apply for exemption and officially recognized 100 
secondary schools in December 1997 to be English medium-of-instruction (EMI) 
schools. The result evoked strong objection from parents in fear of the risk of a 
discriminatory “labelling effect" towards Chinese-medium schools as well as a 
diminished opportunity for their children to gain proficiency in English.^^ Some 20 
schools appealed; in the end, altogether 114 (23% of the total) schools were allowed 
to retain English as a medium of instruction. Today, although secondary schools 
using Chinese are in the majority, the language policy is mandatory only in the 
junior levels (Form 1 to Form 3); for the senior levels, schools are allowed to decide 
on their own what language to adopt in teaching. 
In addition to the mother-tongue policy, the teaching of Putonghua, the official 
language of mainland China, has also become an important issue in the language 
policy in recent years. According to Adamson and Auyeung Lai (1997), Putonghua 
was first officially adopted in the Hong Kong secondary school curriculum in 1988 
as a full, elective subject for the junior secondary level. However, the subject had 
received only limited attention from schools until the government announced in 
1996 its plan of making Putonghua a core subject in the curriculum after the 
handover (1997:92-93). In 1998, Putonghua was taught in all schools from Primary 
1 up to Secondary 3 levels and in 2000, also for Secondary 4 and Secondary 5 
levels. At the same time, the Curriculum Development Committee announced that 
starting in November 2000 the adoption of Putonghua as the medium of instruction 
in the Chinese language subject will be their long-term goal (EMB 2007). 
28 According to Choi (2003), as all these 114 EMI schools were Band 1 schools when the 
mother-tongue teaching scheme was launched, the mother tongue education policy was in fact no 
different from a language selection policy: it dictated that only the best schools could teach in 
English, the language of wealth and power. A side-effect of the policy is that Chinese-medium 
schools would naturally be labeled as "second class" and many parents were distressed that their 
children would have to face greater competition in trying to get into the small circle of "elite" 
schools, in this case the EMI schools, in the future (2003:674, 687). 
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Accordingly, more schools have started to teach Chinese language and even other 
subjects in Putonghua instead of in Cantonese, indicating an increased popularity of 
the Chinese state language in formal schooling in Hong Kong. 
The implication of the changes in the policies concerning the status of English, 
Cantonese and Putonghua mentioned above is significant for the investigation of the 
meanings of patriotism in Hong Kong. From a purely technical point of view, Choi 
(2003) argued that the mother-tongue policy should not be seen as related to 
promoting Chinese nationalism because the government had already decided in 
1990 that mother-tongue education would be practised in the majority of local 
schools by 1998-1999 and that the change appeared drastic only because the new 
SAR government had the determination to enforce a plan that had been carried out 
half-heartedly in previous years (2003:674). However, the link between the Chinese 
language and the promotion of Chinese cultural and national identity has become an 
indispensable part of the public discourse on patriotic education in post-handover 
Hong Kong, especially since the SAR government has announced its long-term goal 
of making Putonghua the medium of instruction in all Chinese-medium schools in 
Hong Kong. The struggle between Hong Kong parents and the EMB over the 
mother tongue policy in the late 1990s was symbolic of the conflict between the 
Hong Kong government and the Hong Kong public in their views about the 
significance of the teaching of national identity in Hong Kong. While the 
government's attempt at popularizing the Chinese language reflects its wish to 
socialize Hong Kong youngsters as members of the Chinese nation, Hong Kong 
parents' rejection of the mother tongue policy manifested a disregard for the official 
nationalistic intention. Instead of seeing cultural or national value in the new 
language policy, many Hong Kong parents viewed it as a threat to the personal 
material benefit of their children, a purely instrumentalist perception that is 
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dissonant with the imperatives of Chinese nationalism. The conflict between 
Chinese nationalism and the Hong Kong popular will in this issue vividly mirrors 
the underlying tensions over the problem of promoting patriotism for China in Hong 
Kong, the central question that we will explore in this thesis. 
History Education in Hong Kong 
Vickers, discussing the characteristics of the strategies deployed by political elites 
for the purpose of nation-building, points out the commonality among modern 
societies to use history and to invent tradition to foster patriotic feelings among 
their people (2003:7). The teaching of history in Hong Kong, however, is unique to 
the city in that it has traditionally been developed into two distinct disciplines, 
namely, Chinese History and History, which differ entirely in language of 
instruction, content and approach. History basically refers to World History but also 
include modern history of China; it has been taught in English in most local schools 
until recently and its curriculum has undergone many changes over the past several 
decades, with an increasing emphasis on promoting thinking skills and creativity 
among students. On the contrary, Chinese History, a separate subject taught in 
Chinese, focuses entirely on the history of ancient China; it has continued to adopt a 
“highly chauvinistic cultural outlook" (Vickers 2003:53) and stress the 
enhancement of students' attachment to the Chinese race through glorifying the 
greatness of Chinese cultural values and historical achievements. Also, while 
History has made attempts to include Hong Kong local history in its curriculum 
after 1997, Chinese History has made no attempts to do so, but has taken the 
approach of placing Hong Kong within the history of China as whole, avoiding 
instilling in Hong Kong students a distinctive sense of local belonging and a 
separate Hong Kong identity apart from a homogenous, timeless Chinese identity 
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(Vickers 2003:52-53). In Vickers' view, the development of this peculiar 
interpretation of national history in the Hong Kong education curriculum is the 
result of the depoliticizing strategy of the colonial government since the 
mid-twentieth century in seeking to prevent Hong Kong students from being 
exposed to "vehemently nationalist" and “anti-foreign” influences from modern 
China (2003:52). 
In terms of Smith's theory discussed in Chapter One concerning the civic and 
ethnic principles of national identity (1991), we can say that Chinese History 
contrasts with History in its stress on the ethnic form of nationalism rather than the 
importance of civic loyalty to society. In post-handover Hong Kong, the contrast 
between History and Chinese History mirrors the tension between promoting a 
critical sense of citizenship and emphasizing the cultivation of uncritical patriotism 
based on an idea of homogenous "Chineseness". 
Civic and Political Education in Hong Kong: A Brief History 
At present, nationalistic education in Hong Kong is officially stipulated as a major 
component of civic education. For Hong Kong, the teaching of national identity 
through formal schooling is no doubt only a very recent phenomenon, but it cannot 
be discussed in isolation from the development of civic and political education in 
Hong Kong. In this section I will discuss the historical background of the Hong 
Kong secondary civic education curriculum from its initial years until the present, 
so that the relation of nationalistic education in post-handover Hong Kong to the 
larger culture of Hong Kong education can be readily comprehended. 
According to Cogan, Morris and Print, civic education can be defined in the 
broadest terms as “the formation through the process of schooling of the knowledge, 
skills, values, and dispositions of citizens" (2002:3). In the modern nation-state, the 
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term ‘‘civic education’,, or "civics" or ‘‘citizenship education", is generally taken as 
a synonym for political education, whose components include democratic education 
and nationalistic education (Tse 1997:37-38). Different societies define and change 
the concrete content of their civic education curricula according to the shifts in their 
socio-political situations. However, civic education worldwide is found to be 
commonly carried out by a whole-school and cross-curricular approach as well as 
through subject titles such as Moral and Civic Education, Social Sciences, and 
Social Studies with links to History, Geography and Economics courses (Kerr 
2000:211-213). The situation of Hong Kong's civic education is in this aspect 
somewhat similar to the international norm. 
Civics as a school subject was introduced to Hong Kong secondary schools in 
the 1930s and became a public examination subject in 1950 (Fairbrother 2003:38; 
Lee 1999). Although civic education is found to be one of the central vehicles used 
by political elites worldwide for socializing citizens as patriotic members of their 
nation, this has not been the case in Hong Kong for most of the territory's history. 
This fact is precisely where the uniqueness about Hong Kong regarding the problem 
of patriotic education lies. According to the existing literature, the development of 
civic education in Hong Kong in relation to the socio-political environment of the 
city can be discussed in terms of four periods. 
The First Period: Before 1965 
Colonial education in Hong Kong was traditionally a-nationalistic and 
de-politicized. In order to survive with its tenuous legitimacy, the colonial 
government adopted education policies that “did not promote school curricula that 
encouraged students to focus on their cultural identity, the status and origins of the 
government, and active involvement in the political arenas" (Morris and Morris 
2002:48). When civic education first became a publicly examined subject in the 
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early post-World War II period, Hong Kong had experienced a massive increase in 
population due to the influx of immigrants from Mainland China and also an 
enormous growth in its economy. Within the education sector, some local schools 
continued to have close links with either the Kuomintang (KMT) or the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), who were major sponsors of the early provision of 
education in Hong Kong. In the face of the loosely organized post-war immigrant 
population and the strong influences of the two Chinese political factions, the 
colonial government further reinforced its strategy of depoliticization of education. 
It exercised tight control over all aspects of education including school subjects, 
syllabi and textbooks, and banned all politics in any teaching activities by law. The 
civic education programme developed in this context was, unsurprisingly, 
distinctively de-politicized and "conformity-oriented" in nature. According to 
Morris and Morris, it avoided mention of issues about contemporary China, the 
local context and any controversies (2002:48). Also, it consisted mainly of remote 
and abstract content, with an emphasis on “describing the responsibilities of a good 
citizen, the constitutional relationship between Hong Kong and the UK and the 
ideals of the United Nations (UN)，’ (Morris and Chan 1997:103). In short, civic 
education up until the mid-1960s was intended to maintain social stability and 
preserve the authority of the colonial government by counter-balancing the spread 
of anti-government ideologies and creating a "parochial" and "subject" political 
culture (Tse 2004a: 179). 
The Second Period: 1965-1984 
The biggest local riots ever to have taken place in post-World War II Hong Kong 
broke out in 1966 and 1967. The 1966 riots, which were triggered off by public 
discontent against a rise in transportation fees of the Star Ferry connecting Hong 
Kong Island and Kowloon, served to expose the shakiness of the colonial 
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government's authority and the danger of eruption of anti-govemment sentiments in 
the local population. Political disturbances emerged again in May 1967, when 
pro-communist leftists in Hong Kong under the influence of the Cultural Revolution 
in China made use of a labour dispute in Kowloon to start large-scale riots against 
British colonial rule. Despite their earlier hostility against colonial rule, many 
ordinary Hong Kong people, whose livelihood was threatened by the 
anti-government terrorist acts, turned to support the colonial government in 
restoring public order. This signifies a new phase of local politics in the colony 
(Mathews, Ma and Lui 2008:33). 
In terms of education, the disturbances that took place in 1966 and 1967 
further convinced the colonial government of the need for maintaining a school 
curriculum which would avoid sensitive issues and would focus on promoting 
“responsible citizenship". At the same time, the emergence of a middle class and the 
growing affluence of Hong Kong society during the 1960s and 1970s brought in the 
impact of market to the school curriculum: school subjects began to be judged by 
market values such that non-academic subjects like humanities and civics were 
demoted to a much lower status than language and traditional academic subjects. 
Moreover, there was also a consensus in society that education should be kept 
depoliticized for maintaining a stable and peaceful social environment for economic 
development. In line with this trend, civic education was transformed into 
Economics and Public Affairs (EPA) in 1965, a subject that had a stronger emphasis 
on economics and was more academic in nature. According to Fairbrother, the 
civics and EPA curriculum developed in this period had included topics about 
internal affairs of Hong Kong, but civic education textbooks used by schools largely 
focused on developing individuals' awareness of civic responsibilities and still 
stressed little the promotion of senses of belonging to any larger Hong Kong or 
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Chinese community (2003:38). Following the creation of EPA, another new subject, 
Social Studies, was introduced to the junior secondary level in 1972 and the senior 
secondary level in 1984 (Lee 1999:315-316). Combining topics about geography, 
history and civics, Social Studies included descriptive topics about Hong Kong's 
government institutions and the role of citizens, and just like any other subjects 
existing in the same period, Social Studies included no elements related to China in 
its syllabus (Lee 1999). 
By the end of this period, civic education still remained largely invisible in 
official education documents (Morris and Morris 2002) and political education 
continued to be marginalized in the overall school curriculum. Nevertheless, this is 
not to say that students were totally secluded from contact with materials about 
China. In the overall de-politicized curriculum, students were exposed to Chinese 
patriotic sentiment through Chinese culture subjects, such as Chinese History and 
Chinese Literature, which, however, stressed only the apolitical cultural aspects of 
China and taught about China only in the abstract (Fairbrother 2003:38). 
The Third Period: 1984-1997 
This period is commonly referred to “the transitional period" towards the transfer of 
sovereignty of Hong Kong from Great Britain to China. The signing of the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 gave rise to concern in society of preparing 
Hong Kong people, especially young people who were found to be apathetic and 
ignorant of politics and China affairs, to become competent citizens after Hong 
Kong's political transformation in 1997. The result was a process of 
re-politicization of the curriculum signified by the removal of the ban on discussion 
of politics in education in 1990, the publication of two sets of guidelines on Civic 
Education in 1985 and 1996, and a series of curriculum reforms that aimed at 
promoting students' political and social consciousness and their awareness of local 
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and China issues. 
The Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools issued in 1985 was the first 
official education document to put civic education into focus. It recommended an 
interdisciplinary and “whole-school” approach, recognizing both formal and 
informal curricula and all existing civics-related subjects^^ as vehicles for 
promoting civic education. In terms of its overall objective, it stressed the 
importance of promoting “commitment to the preservation of social order” and 
‘‘civic awareness and responsibility" (Curriculum Development Committee 1985:/), 
with a focus on the family, the school and the Hong Kong community. It also 
included statements concerning the importance of understanding the nation and 
developing a sense of national belonging to China, but these had not been 
considered to bear much significance in the overall guidelines. 
In regard to curriculum reforms, two new civics-related subjects were 
subsequently created: first, Government and Public Affairs (GPA), a subject with a 
stress on the study of western democratic concepts and Chinese political processes, 
was introduced to the senior secondary level in the late 1980s; second, Liberal 
Studies, which dealt with topics concerning local controversies and included a 
module "China Today", was introduced to the Form 6 and 7 matriculation level in 
1991 (Lee 1999:316). Meanwhile, syllabi of existing subjects were amended to 
promote a stronger awareness of Hong Kong-China issues and a better 
understanding of political institutions. For example, in 1988, the Chinese History 
syllabus, which previously only covered the pre-1954 period, was expanded to 
include the history of contemporary China up to the year 1970; also, topics dealing 
specifically with the relationship between China and Great Britain and Hong 
29 These included Chinese Language, Chinese History, Economics, EPA, Geography, Social Studies, 
History, Religion Studies as well as the two new subjects created in this period, Government and 
Public Affairs, and Liberal Studies. 
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Kong's colonial transition were added to EPA, Social Studies, and GPA (Morris and 
Chan 1997:104; Lee 1999: 316-317). 
Despite the above curriculum reforms, many scholars commented that the 
1985 Guidelines did not in reality make significant changes to the de-politicized 
culture of Hong Kong's education. Some argued that the civic education suggested 
in the document was conservative in outlook and conformity-oriented in purpose, in 
that rather than promoting political and civic awareness and preparing students for 
change，it was de-politicized through its vagueness in delineating the concepts of 
citizenship, its tendency to avoid controversy and its stress on political consensus 
and acceptance of the status quo (Fairbrother 2003; Lee 1999). Moreover, it was 
also found that very few schools put effort to actually implement the recommended 
curriculum. According to Fairbrother, all of the civics-related subjects were found to 
be unpopular with school curriculum planners and were offered in less than 20 
percent of schools (2003:43). Such a low implementation rate has been attributed to 
two facts: first, the non-mandatory nature of the document, which allowed schools 
to decide not to implement it (Fairbrother 2003:44) and second, the recommended 
approach of infusing civics-related content across a large range of existing courses, 
which rendered the civic education programme "disorganized" and "sporadic" in 
practice (Lee 1999:318). 
In contrast to the 1985 Guidelines, the Revised Guidelines on Civic Education 
in Schools issued in 1996 has been considered by critics as a more genuine attempt 
to address the critical questions of citizenship and their link to Hong Kong's 
political transition. It placed a greater emphasis on the promotion of values related 
to active citizenship and critical thinking (Morris and Morris 2002:51) and featured 
a section about the teaching of national identity and the importance of 
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understanding China and national ideology (Tse 1997).^^ 
On the whole, pre-handover Hong Kong's education can be summarized as 
follows: only one year prior to the change of sovereignty of Hong Kong did the 
government first show a stronger commitment to civic education and express an 
explicit concern for promoting patriotic education. Nevertheless, evidence has 
shown that although civic education in the transitional period had moved gradually 
away from the "a-nationalistic" and “de-politicized” ethos of the earlier periods in 
terms of government policy, it still remained largely insignificant and apolitical at 
the implementation level of the curriculum. This reflects a general lack of concern 
for political education in the education sector, in a social context where scepticism 
about re-nationalization of Hong Kong society prevailed. 
The Fourth Period: 1997 and Onwards 
The change of the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China on 1 July 1997 signified the 
official reunification of Hong Kong with China and the official call for civic and 
patriotic education has since then continued to find explicit expression in 
post-handover education documents and government officials' speeches. 
Keen on deepening the reintegration of Hong Kong with China and fostering social 
harmony in a time of economic difficulty and social uncertainty,^' the first Chief 
Executive of Hong Kong SAR, Tung Chee-hwa, had repeatedly stressed in his 
public speeches the importance of civic education as a means to promote traditional 
Chinese values, national identity, and moral obligation towards one's community 
Much of the existing literature about civic education in Hong Kong has made official education 
documents such as the Guidelines and the Revised Guidelines major foci of their investigation. I 
have been discussing them here also. However, this is not to suggest that these documents are of 
special significance to the implementation of civic and national education. In fact, my research 
findings suggest precisely the contrary: these documents are of much less importance in actual 
practice than they have appeared to be in scholarly studies. 
31 After the handover, Hong Kong had for several years struggled to recover from an economic 
recession as part of the Asian financial crisis. Politically, it has also witnessed a lot of crises, 
including the right of abode issue, the controversy over the government's proposal of Article 23 of 
the Basic Law on national security, and more recently the debate over the issue of universal suffrage. 
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and country (Morris and Morris 2002:52; Tse 2004a: 189). In line with the 
statements made by the Chief Executive, the 2000 Education Commission Reform 
Proposals for the Education System in Hong Kong locates civic education as part of 
the overall aim of the Hong Kong education programme. Moral and Civic 
Education has been made one of the 4 “Key Tasks" on the curriculum development 
agenda since 2004, while within Moral and Civic Education, “national identity" is 
one of the five values and attitudes targeted for development. Furthermore, in 
December 2004, the National Education Centre which targets at promoting patriotic 
education among Primary 4-6 and Secondary 1 -3 students was set up under the 
supervision of the Education and Manpower Bureau. 
Conclusion 
The official policy of Hong Kong's civic and political education after the handover 
has thus taken a new direction towards an intensified "nationalistic" outlook away 
from the "a-nationalistic" and “de-politicized” ethos of the earlier periods. However, 
regardless of this trend, the literature reviewed above reminds us that despite more 
than a decade's advocacy for a strengthened civic and political education in the 
transitional period, the civic education curriculum has remained marginalized in 
practice, apolitical in content and consensus-oriented in nature. Before the handover, 
the omission of content about anything political and national in civic education was 
largely taken for granted in Hong Kong education. But it is interesting that this is 
also apparently the case today, now that education policy makers and practitioners 
have been officially called upon to bring in again “the nation", and thus inevitably 
32 The other three of the four "Key Tasks" are "Reading to Leam", "Project Learning" and 
"Information Technology for Interactive Learning". The rest of the five targeted qualities are 
"perseverance", "respect for others", "commitment" and "responsibility" (Education Commission 
2000). 
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also "politics", to civic education in Hong Kong. In the next chapter I will focus on 
individual schools. Given the long history of the de-politicized culture of education 
in Hong Kong, how do individual secondary schools respond to the rapid 
re-politicization of the education policy in the post-handover era? What changes, if 
any, have schools brought into their curricula, now that they are urged to be a major 
part of the engineering of the state-led nation-building project? How is civic and 
nationalistic education organized at the school level now? 
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Chapter Three 
An Overview of the Organization of Patriotic Education 
at School Level 
In this chapter, I will focus on the present situation of nationalistic education at 
the school level. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the official policy of 
Hong Kong's education has been moving towards an increased “nationalistic” 
outlook away from the "a-nationalistic" and "de-politicized" ethos of earlier eras. 
However, while formal principles are laid down at the top level of the education 
system, the implemented curriculum in the actual setting of the school is very often 
found to differ from the intended curriculum defined in education policies (Cogan, 
Morris and Print 2002:15-16; Kerr 2000; Tse 2004b:66). Based on my 30 
informants' recounting of the school-based curricula of 23 local secondary schools, 
I will discuss the way nationalistic education is organized in individual schools, 
paying particular attention to the various degrees of emphasis that schools place on 
the implementation of nationalistic education, to what degree and in what way the 
implemented curriculum corresponds to official advocacy, and the different factors 
that affect decision making in school-based policies. 
Differences in the Pattern of Organizing Nationalistic Education in Individual 
Schools 
In this section I will examine how nationalistic education programmes have been 
organized and implemented since the handover in the twenty three schools that I 
investigated in my research. On one hand, individual schools have adopted certain 
common approaches and methods in introducing the “national identity" dimension 
in their curricula closely in accordance with the Hong Kong government's advocacy; 
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on the other hand, however, schools exhibit remarkable differences in their 
organization patterns and attitudes towards the promotion of nationalistic education. 
When discussing the organization of nationalistic education in their schools, all 
informants were asked to think as exhaustively as possible about the programmes 
that they believed were related to the teaching of national identity. According to the 
teachers, at the school level nationalistic education is generally posited as a 
component of civic education and is carried out through the "cross-curricular 
approach". In such an approach, elements of nationalistic education are infused into 
different subjects as well as in both the formal and informal curriculum. All of the 
schools, both English-medium schools and Chinese-medium schools, conduct 
activities related to nationalistic education in Chinese. This to a large extent reflects 
the approach suggested by the prevailing official policy of the Education and 
Manpower Bureau (Education Commission. 2000). In particular, many informants 
regarded Civic Education and Chinese History as the two most important subjects 
for promoting nationalistic education in their schools. Also, some informants 
claimed that not only teachers responsible for the core subjects but teachers in 
charge of any subjects or extra-curricular programmes might also see themselves as 
having the responsibility for addressing and emphasizing the “China elements” 
specific or related to their teaching activities whenever they find it appropriate. One 
of my informants, a Physical Education (PE) teacher from a non pro-China school, 
falls into the latter category. In a highly supportive tone, this teacher related proudly 
how she was able to infuse "China elements" into her Physical Education lessons as 
follows: 
It was the 2002 Olympic Games and I came up with a brilliant idea of 
asking every student in our PE classes to pick one Chinese athlete to do 
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research and introduce the athlete's biography, achievements and history 
towards success in front of the class. This is a great way to make the 
students pay attention to Chinese affairs and people, not just to the most 
famous and popular stars in the volleyball team or the swimming team, 
but also to those players who are less well-known but are equally 
respectable for their devotion to the sports and the country. 
In addition, she also spoke appreciatively of the performance of the Putonghua 
unit of her school: 
The Putonghua Society has organized a programme jointly with Radio 
Television Hong Kong (RTHK). They brought students to visit the 
Putonghua station of RTHK; thus students have had a greater exposure to 
a favourable environment in addition to classroom learning. That is 
making a difference in our school; some students have started to speak 
one or two phrases in Putonghua when they're chatting in school! To me 
it is a real boost to their national identity. Through the extra-curricular 
activity, students have come to appreciate the language they learn in class 
and make it part of their daily life! I do think that our nationalistic 
education programme is quite successful: we have come up with different 
ideas and have gradually created a more favourable environment to 
influence our students' attitude and identification. 
The above examples illustrate how both the formal and informal curricula of 
various subjects may be used as the channels for the promotion of nationalistic 
education in the same school. It seems that nationalistic education as a 
cross-curricular subject can be very pervasive in individual schools, especially 
when teachers in the school are supportive of it. However, the situation that this 
teacher depicted in her school does not stand for the average case in my research; 
nor does her personal culturalist outlook, which associates an absolute link between 
Chinese national identity and the Chinese official language, represent the only 
interpretation of the teaching of national identity among my informants. In fact, 
according to most of my other informants, it is very rare for teachers to incorporate 
nationalistic education in classes that are not directly civics-related. The utilitarian 
and examination-oriented education system in Hong Kong still emphasizes 
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traditional academic and language subjects over other subjects. The cross-curricular 
approach of civic and patriotic education only reflects the subject's low status in the 
subject prioritization. As several teachers said or implied to me, whenever a subject 
is not defined to go with a centralized syllabus and is diffused to be everyone's duty, 
it in effect becomes no one's duty. Moreover, although some of my informants did 
stress the presentation of China in their teaching as an essential, magnificent 
cultural entity deserving one's loyalty and affection, as we will see in Chapter Four 
and Chapter Five, some teachers disagreed with such a de-politicized outlook of 
nationalistic education for China in Hong Kong and emphasized the political rather 
than the cultural dimension of China as the core of their teaching, often in a way 
that was critical of China today. 
Regarding the patterns of organization of "nationalistic education", schools can 
be generally categorized into three groups. At one extreme of the spectrum, we find 
the pro-China school, the only pro-China school in my sample, as an example of an 
explicit nationalistic orientation and a pro-China ethos.^^ Apart from this 
self-evident example, several schools that are not traditionally “pro-China，，differ 
from the average in having a centralized organization of civic education and a 
strong commitment to in the implementation of nationalistic education. 
33 Today in Hong Kong pro-China schools are also commonly known as "patriotic schools", 
"pro-Communist Party schools" or "Leftist schools". Lin (1994) identified five major traditional 
pro-China schools in Hong Kong, which were all established between 1945 and early 1951 in Hong 
Kong. These schools have all been generally recognized in recent decades as an "alternative" type of 
schools among the more than 450 local schools, isolated from the mainstream schooling culture in 
Hong Kong for their explicit pro-Communist political stance and strong emphasis on the teaching of 
patriotism for China (1994:8). The only pro-China school in my sample is the branch school of one 
of these schools; and my informant from this school described the high degree of centralization of 
nationalistic education in the school as "all-encompassing" and "omnipresent". For example, the 
school is prompt in organizing functions for all students on "good news" from China (such as hall 
gatherings for a live broadcast of Chinese astronauts returning to earth from space travel); also, all 
school staff is regularly asked to join visits to Mainland China for "cultural exchange" with the 
administration team of the school. Nationalistic education in this school is meant not only for 
students, but also for the whole teaching staff. 
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The majority of the schools fall in the middle range of the spectrum. Although 
their teachers were able to point out certain small and big projects that had been 
carried out as part of nationalistic education in their schools, they often remarked 
that those were only bits and pieces of programmes that they considered relevant to 
the subject but were not elements of an established, coherent curriculum. Regarding 
how a school within this batch would locate or define nationalistic education in 
their overall policy or curriculum, a teacher of History and Liberal Studies told me: 
I think every school in Hong Kong has more or less done something to 
promote nationalistic education. I think that this school has done 
something about it too. The only thing is that in this school we haven't 
explicitly shown that we have a direction of nationalistic education. It is 
certainly not the case in here that we would have items A, B, C delineated 
under the title of nationalistic education for teachers to work at. Although 
we have certain programmes about the topic, we do not have clear 
directives about that, I must say. 
A teacher in charge of the extra-curricular Civic Education unit from another 
school made a similar point: 
In this school, we have organized activities that are relevant to the 
teaching of national identity, such as Chinese history study tours. 
However, they are not necessarily on the agenda of my department. In fact, 
“China elements" are parts of many different activities held by different 
departments. It's just that we don't have a central unit to co-ordinate all 
the activities under the same theme of "nationalistic education". That's 
why what you see is that each department is doing something on their 
own, and a lot of things under this theme are scattered in different areas in 
the panorama of all activities. 
At the other extreme of the spectrum, one finds several schools in which no 
formal teaching of national identity is present. One such example is a case where 
there have never been any goals defined and areas of responsibility delineated for 
the teachers about nationalistic education. Correspondingly, none of the teachers in 
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their Civic Education team has chosen any topics about the nation from the 
textbooks when devising their school-based curriculum.^'^ The chairperson of this 
team told me that he had no idea and would not care yet as to how nationalistic 
education should be promoted in the school. In his words: 
We conducted the flag-raising ceremony once last year; this is the 
decision of the principal. But other than that, we have had no discussion 
on how much or even how to promote nationalistic education. It is not 
mandatory yet and teachers in our school are not very concerned about it 
yet. So, there is basically nothing else going on in our school about it. 
In this last example we see not only the absence of coordination of the teaching 
of national identity but also a sense of detachment among the teachers in the school. 
Apart from the fact that it has implemented the flag-raising ceremony, this school 
has stayed as "a-nationalistic" as most schools in Hong Kong were in the last 
several decades of the colonial era. 
The presence of such different degrees of commitment exhibited among the 
schools towards the government-led project should not be surprising even in the 
highly autocratic and centralized education system in Hong Kong, for despite its 
advocacy of the promotion of civics and national identity, the Hong Kong 
government has not required schools to offer civic and patriotic education as an 
independent, compulsory subject, which means whether individual schools 
incorporate patriotic education into their school-based policies is entirely a choice 
rather than a duty. Just as the majority of schools in colonial Hong Kong did not put 
into practice the civic education curriculum recommended by the government in the 
A Civic Education team is a unit that consists of teachers responsible for the design and 
implementation of their school-based civic education curriculum. The size of such a unit ranges from 
school to school but normally one of the team teacher acts as the "coordinator" or "chairperson" or 
"person in charge" of the unit. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the presence of such a unit or a 
coordinator does not necessarily mean that there is coordination of patriotic education activities in 
the school. 
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mid-1980s (Fairbrother 2003; Morris and Morris 2002; Tse 1997)35, many schools 
today also take a casual attitude towards such education. In a sense, this reflects the 
conventional tendency among schools to more or less resist change; but more 
importantly, the politically controversial nature of patriotism makes it an extremely 
touchy subject for schools to handle. The presence of a topic that has long been 
controversial in both society and schooling appears to be very problematic to many 
education practitioners who are not only used to the traditionally de-politicised 
culture of Hong Kong but are also lacking nationalistic feelings among themselves 
due to years of the British colonial rule. 
Not surprisingly, some decision makers of schools opted to implement the 
optional policy chiefly as a reaction to the subtle pressure form above. As a Civic 
Education teacher said: 
Of course it is to a large extent because of the advocacy of the 
government that this school has come to deal with the need for 
nationalistic education. Ever since the handover, the government has 
made it clear that they want schools to implement elements of 
nationalistic education in their teaching; however, at the same time, it's 
not been direct or explicit at all. The government is good at using 
different channels to make you know that it is very important, like doing a 
lot of public relations work, and sponsoring community organizations to 
organize student visits to the mainland. For the government, it is called 
"encouragement", but at the school level, this implies obligation, like if 
you don't follow it, you're lagging behind the government policy. 
Thus, although the education guidelines do make it optional for schools to 
implement the official recommendations, one would be mistaken to believe that the 
recent trend for many schools to follow the government's advocacy necessarily 
35 According to these studies, the utilitarian and examination-oriented ethos of Hong Kong 
schooling dictates that whatever that is not in the official curriculum and is not compulsory reflect its 
low market value and thus also remains insignificant in the implemented level of education. 
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represents strong internal identification with patriotism for China or nationalistic 
education among education practitioners. Indeed, as we will see more later in this 
thesis, nationalistic education programmes are for some Hong Kong teachers more 
like imposed duties than voluntary responses in favour of the government-led 
nation-building policy. 
Concrete Changes in the Implemented Patriotic Education Curriculum and 
their Ambiguous Implications 
In regard to concrete changes in the school-based curriculum, the majority of the 30 
schools in my sample have more or less implemented certain measures in common, 
which at first sight may give rise to the impression that schools are moving 
uniformly towards a single purpose and unified vision of patriotic education. 
Nevertheless, as Tse (2004b) has discussed in light of post-handover Hong Kong's 
civic education, the official nationalistic education project advocated by the SAR 
government is full of inherent tensions in the form of discontent from the Hong 
Kong public, the clash between the goal of nationalistic education and the goal of 
current education reforms, as well as the poorly-defined nature of the subject matter 
of "identity" (2004b:63-65). On top of these, this thesis argues in a larger sense that 
the underlying reason for the problematic nature of nationalistic education in Hong 
Kong lies in the ongoing mistrust accumulated among many Hong Kong people of 
the Chinese government since China became a communist totalitarian regime about 
half a century ago, and the reluctance of many Hong Kong teachers to wholly 
accept their political Chinese national identity as defined by the Chinese 
government. As a deeply embedded and taken-for-granted sense of national 
belonging is lacking in the wider community, today Hong Kong education 
practitioners are experimenting a wide array of approaches in the teaching of 
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national identity. At first sight, methods employed by individual schools and 
teachers under the rubric of ‘‘nationalistic education" appear to follow certain 
patterns; however, looking more closely at the content of these activities reveals that 
different approaches may imply extremely contradictory attitudes towards the 
nation. 
In the following pages, I will summarize the most prominent programmes 
implemented in the formal, non-formal and informal curriculum, and shed light on 
some of the problematic issues central to our study of the conflicting meanings of 
nationalistic education in Hong Kong. 
Formal Curriculum 
Apart from the fact that Putonghua has now become a formal subject for junior 
forms in all schools, some informants who have taught humanities and social 
studies subjects told me that their syllabi have incorporated an increased amount of 
"China Elements" into their syllabus. This trend is visible in both published 
textbooks chosen by the schools from the market and the tailored-made teaching 
materials designed by the teachers of individual schools. For example, in the words 
of a Geography teacher: "the appearance of maps of China has in these last few 
years increased to the extent that you can find them in almost every unit in the 
textbooks of every form." Similarly in the words of a Social Studies teacher: 
In our Social Studies syllabus we have included many elements of civic 
and nationalistic education. When it comes to topics like caring for the 
society, understanding the social system and legal system, we always try 
to bring in the role of the motherland. We have also selected more case 
studies of Chinese society so as to make students look at China as well as 
Hong Kong... 
Some Civic Education teachers whom I have talked to stressed that in the last 
few years many more published Civic Education textbooks have become available 
in the market. According to these teachers, most Civic Education textbooks contain 
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at least one chapter about “the nation,, out of the total of eight to ten chapters in the 
whole book,36 whereas eight or more years ago it was impossible for one to find 
any topics to do with "the nation” in Civic Education textbooks, which themselves 
were rare in the local textbook market. A teacher who has taught Civic Education 
for ten years told me: 
Ten years ago, there was not an emphasis in civic education on the 
promotion of national identity at all. It was mainly about moral and life 
education. This year, we want to change our syllabus and I've done some 
research on a range of textbooks. I found that in all of them there are new 
sections about nationalistic education; and I can't even say that it is very 
little. In fact, about one sixth of the contents of the textbooks are about the 
nation. 
Furthermore, the teachers have also reflected that in addition to the greater 
availability and use of standardized textbooks, a great many sources of teaching 
materials have sprung up from the community; teaching kits on “learning about the 
motherland" produced by educational units and social organizations have from time 
to time been sent to individual schools for teacher's free use. Such a change has 
generally been welcomed by the teachers, as nowadays they ‘‘need not worry about 
lacking in references but only about picking the most suitable ones", as one of my 
informants told me. 
From the above, it appears that recent official curriculum reforms have subtly 
or not so subtly affected schools' teaching syllabi, and that the greater availability of 
textbooks and teaching materials have made it more convenient for teachers to 
implement nationalistic education, but this does not mean that all schools welcome 
36 To take the Civic Education textbooks published for Form 1 to Form 3 by a major textbook 
publisher in Hong Kong and used by one of the schools where I conducted participant observation 
as example, out of the six modules which each book consists o f , which are, “家庭” 
("Family"), “鄰里社會”（“Neighbourhood Community"), “地區社會”（“Regional Society"), 
“國家民族社會”（“National Society"), “國際社會”（“International Society") and “公民素 
質及公民社會”（“Civic Quality and Civil Society”)，“國家民族社會”（“National Society”） 
constitutes the biggest section in all three levels, amounting to nearly one forth of the total 
contents of the whole junior secondary Civic Education syllabus. 
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the idea of making Civic Education an independent formal subject. Out of the 23 
schools in my sample, only 7 actually offered Civic Education as a formal and 
independent subject. Moreover, the teaching time devoted to Civic Education in 
most of these seven schools has been limited: only one to two periods in every 
six-day or seven-day cycle in just one or two junior forms.^^ Furthermore, 
according to most of the teachers who taught Civic Education, generally less than 
10 percent of their subject syllabus is designed for teaching about the nation or 
China. As for the rest (16) of the schools which did not offer an independent Civic 
Education curriculum, 9 of them offered formal subjects like Social Studies, Liberal 
Studies, EPA, and Religious and Ethics Education, which are traditionally regarded 
as civics-related. But many informants who taught these subjects said that what they 
taught in these classes was not related to the promotion of national identity. 
On the whole, it can be said in general that students' exposure to patriotic 
education through formal curriculum in these schools has been extremely limited. 
The promotion of national identity happens instead largely outside the formal 
curriculum. In some schools it is led by a team of teachers specifically responsible 
for implementing non-formal and extra-curricular programmes under the various 
themes of civic education.^^ Within the area of national identity, the most 
prominent activities are flag-raising ceremonies and student visits in China as well 
as other extra-curricular programmes. In the words of some teachers, 
37 Let me put this into a formula, suppose there are 8 periods per day and 40 minutes per period. In 
this case, offering 2 periods in a 6-day cycle would occupy less than 4.2 % of the total formal 
learning time of one particular form of students. Considering also that Civic Education is, according 
to my informants, normally only offered to just one or two junior forms of students and the section 
about the nation occupies only about 10% of the subject content, it is legitimate to say that the 
presence of patriotic education in the formal curriculum is extremely small. 
38 The themes covered are diverse. To take one school as example, apart from national identity, their 
annual plan also include topics about sex education, health and hygiene, environmental issues, social 
service, and current affairs; to take another school as example, the topics covered include national 
identity, anti-drug and violence, family and school life, as well as respect for life/friends/ parents/the 
elderly. 
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extra-curricular activities are the most "educationally effective and beneficial" 
forms of national education because of their “flexible,，and “open” nature. Beyond 
this, the diversity of their formats and contents makes them ambiguous and thus 
particularly revealing of the multiple meanings of the teaching of national identity 
in Hong Kong. 
Flag-raising Ceremony 
All of the 23 schools in my sample have had the experience of raising the Chinese 
national flag in flag-raising ceremonies, which typically takes place in the morning 
assembly, which all students of the whole school must attend. Thus, the flag-raising 
ceremony has become a popularized and standard item in the schools' curricula. 
However, evidence shows that the policies of conducting the ceremonies are not 
standardized across schools, nor is the idea of conducting the ceremony popular 
among all teachers. The degrees of emphasis that different schools place on the 
practice are remarkably different. In terms of the frequency of holding the ceremony, 
the number ranges from once a year to at least once a month; in terms of formality, 
some schools emphasized the ceremony as the most symbolic activity of their 
nationalistic education programme and had student flag guards who have received 
professional training at the Association of Hong Kong Flag Guards to perform in 
the ceremony, but some schools only sent the school janitors to raise the flag and 
did not train students how to behave in the ceremony beforehand. The different 
meanings that are attached to the flag-raising ceremony will be discussed in Chapter 
Six. 
Fieldtrips in Mainland China 
In her studies of cultural exchange activities for young people between Hong Kong 
and mainland China, Lu mentioned that the total number of such activities funded 
by the government and other major funding units in Hong Kong annually has 
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undergone a tremendous increase from only 22 in the mid-1990s to more than 300 
in 1999, suggesting that such cultural exchange activities were a phenomenon 
worthy of the researcher's investigation (1999:4-5). Corroborating the findings of 
Lu, my research also shows that joining fieldtrips to mainland China has been one 
of the most significant parts of Hong Kong secondary school students' experience 
of learning about China in recent years. According to my informants, not only have 
there been numerous mass programmes organized by official bodies, such as the 
National Education Centre, and community organizations for students to visit China 
under the theme of “nationalistic education", there has also been a huge expansion 
of sources of funding available from the government and non-official units such as 
the Commission of Youth and the Jockey Club to support schools to carry out their 
individual study tour programmes. In general, many teachers commented that the 
“Go to China" wave has become highly noticeable and would become more 
intensified in the future as part of the implementation of nationalistic education in 
Hong Kong. 
However, although it is definitely true that schools have found this means of 
teaching more and more feasible, it certainly does not mean that all schools have 
made use of it to the same extent. Among the schools of my sample, while at least 
one school has organized as many as four fieldtrips in a year specifically targeted at 
patriotic education, a number of schools have not organized any such tours in the 
past several years. This indicates various degrees of emphasis placed by the schools 
on this aspect of education. 
Apart from the quantity, the content of the programmes is equally a point of 
ambiguity. Lu's study has identified six non-mutually exclusive themes that the 
exchange activities between Hong Kong and mainland China were centred on 
before 1999: academic study tours, China studies tours, life experience tours, 
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voluntary service tours, sightseeing tours, and cultural exchange (with local people) 
tours (1999:76). Similarly, many of my informants have remarked that the 
programmes that they have organized on their own had diverse and overlapping 
themes, but generally with a stronger focus on China studies, voluntary service, 
sightseeing, and cultural exchange activities. Although all of these programmes take 
place in mainland China and most of them are related to “understanding China,，， 
some teachers reflected that to lump them all under the title of "nationalistic 
education" is problematic, as these fieldtrips do not have the same nature and same 
purpose. For instance, a programme that brings students to take an academic course 
in Beijing or one that organizes students to do voluntary work in remote and poor 
areas would not necessarily be conceived by my informants as a "patriotic 
education" programme. This is related to what teachers assume nationalistic 
education should be about and should consist of. A discussion of the different 
orientations of fieldtrips will be found in Chapter Six. 
Extra-curricular Activities 
My informants offered many examples of extra-curricular activities which they 
considered to be parts of their schools' nationalistic education programme. To 
mention but a few: essay competitions on themes related to “the motherland" or 
Chinese traditions, debate competitions on issues about Chinese society, and visits 
to thematic exhibitions about China. According to the teachers, these activities have 
largely been carried out irregularly and organized independently by one or two 
teachers of a certain subject or a certain extra-curricular functional unit, but 
sometimes schools would organize week-long programmes centred on a certain 
theme, such as “Chinese Culture Week", "Chinese National Day Week", or ‘‘June 
Fourth Incident Week". Again, despite the same format, certain themes of these 
programmes appear to be paradoxical: while “Chinese Culture Week" is chiefly 
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about the appreciation of ancient Chinese culture and traditional values, “June 
Fourth Incident Week"^^ highlights a controversial, grim facet of modem China's 
politics. The contrasting themes of these two programmes in Hong Kong's 
education symbolize the paradoxical image of China in the eyes of many Hong 
Kong people. On the one hand, China represents a great ancient civilization to 
which many Hong Kong Chinese feel they belong at heart; but on the other hand, 
China as a communist society and political dictatorship is in the minds of many 
Hong Kong Chinese repelling and threatening. The ambivalence of Hong Kong 
people towards these two extremely different images of China is illuminating: if 
nationalistic education in Hong Kong is in the first place the teaching about China, 
it is necessary to ask: which China? Is it ancient, cultural China or contemporary, 
political China? While the specific subject matter is not readily visible in the 
school-based policies, opinions of individual teachers concerning this issue will be 
explored in subsequent chapters. 
Decision Making and Power Relations in School-Based Curriculum 
Influences of Sponsoring Bodies and Decision Makers of Schools 
I have shown earlier in this chapter that because civic and nationalistic education is 
not a compulsory subject, whether to promote it has become a matter of individual 
schools' choice depending on their attitudes. This fact seems to have already been 
39 Whether the teaching of the June 4 Incident should be considered as nationalistic education is a 
controversial matter. Some Hong Kong teachers think that any mention of the Incident should be 
avoided in the teaching about China, as it undermines the Chinese government's legitimacy and may 
bring about negative feelings towards China. This view is held especially among those who consider 
the issue from the perspective of the Chinese government. On the other hand, some believe that the 
Incident should be included in patriotic education in Hong Kong because it is part of Chinese history, 
and more importantly, because the Incident had profound symbolic meanings regarding Hong Kong 
people's identity. According to Li, many Hong Kong Chinese, who were proverbially a-nationalistic 
and antipathetic to politics, believed that seeing the brutal treatment by the Chinese government of 
pro-democracy mainlanders has evoked in them for the first time emotional identification with the 
Chinese nation and concern for Chinese politics (2002:53). In the eyes of the latter group of teachers, 
the participation of Hong Kong people in the pro-democracy movement in support of the Chinese 
student protesters was in a sense a display of Hong Kong people's patriotism for the Chinese nation. 
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taken for granted among the education profession. As a Civic Education teacher 
mentioned this point matter-of-factly to me: 
In Hong Kong, you can always find a great variety of schools; they were 
set up by different organizations; they have different histories of 
development, different cultural values and different approaches of 
operation. In every school there are different subjects and each school has 
its own relatively strong and relatively weak subjects. Some schools may 
emphasize, say, history education and some other may emphasize religion 
education. Many schools place priority in nationalistic education now, but 
many other schools don't. It shouldn't be surprising, because in any case, 
it all depends on individual school's own values and objectives when it 
comes to locating the focus. 
Many teachers, like this one, were apt to emphasize the "pluralism" of the 
schools' management style in Hong Kong in order to show that prioritizing a wide 
range of different subjects is a "normal" and regular part of a school's school-based 
administration. In a sense, the overt stress on the "pluralism" of the system is a way 
for the teachers to de-politicize, either consciously or unconsciously, the already 
politically sensitized subject. In my interviews, the majority of informants were 
keen on presenting nationalistic education as "just another new subject added to the 
curriculum" as if it required no particular critical examination. The prevailing 
discourse among the education profession seems to wrap nationalistic education up 
with all other educational tasks that must be accomplished, dismissing it as 
something technical and generic. 
At the same time, however, what the teachers depicted about the arbitrariness 
of the situation of nationalistic education is quite true. On the surface, it is hard to 
see any direct relationships between the typological characteristics of schools and 
the nature of school-based nationalistic education programmes. Among the 23 
schools of my sample, neither location of the school, academic performance of 
students (‘‘banding，，of the school), medium of instruction (English or Chinese), nor 
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sex of the students of the school (single-sex or co-educational) is directly related to 
the formulation of the school's patriotic education. Only sponsoring bodies and 
school principals seem influential in the control of the implementation of patriotic 
education. This finding is reasonable if we consider the fact that the sponsoring 
bodies finance the schools and school principals are the highest authority in the 
day-to-day administration of schools. 
How power is exercised by each of these two categories, however, is a 
complex question. First, regarding the various types of sponsoring bodies of the 
schools, three affiliating factors, namely, the government, religious organizations, 
and pro-China bodies, have been emphasized by my informants. In terms of the 
government factor, although some of the teachers mentioned that government 
schools are likely to follow more closely official advocacy and thus must be more 
“patriotic，，，my two informants who taught in government schools did not fully 
agree with this association. To quote one of them: 
This school emphasizes nationalistic education, but not because it is a 
government school. Our strong nationalistic education policy is peculiar 
to this school only. Not every government school stresses this aspect as 
we do. It is true that all government schools must have the flag hoisted in 
their school; however, the flags can be placed at different locations in 
different schools; certainly not every government school puts the flag at 
such a visible place as we do! The fact is, there's still a large variance 
regarding each government school's policy. 
Thus, whether being a government school is indicative of having a strong 
patriotic education programme is unclear. Opinions among the teachers are split, 
with some asserting and some denying the association. 
The religion affiliation of the schools has also been invoked in the justification 
for the patriotic education policies in individual schools, but for two completely 
opposite reasons. In one Christian school where patriotic education is deliberately 
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emphasized, the teacher in charge of the Civic Education panel explained the role of 
the religious affiliation of that school as follows: 
The founder of our school, the Methodist Church, actually gives much 
freedom to every individual school under the association to have their 
own policy and vision of teaching. They allow each school to have their 
own characteristics. So they wouldn't tell us what we should do, and what 
we must not. However, having said that, the Methodist Church actually 
has its origin in mainland China. It was set up by missionaries from Great 
Britain and America who had a very deep love for China and thus brought 
Christianity there. But then, it's not like the founding organization 
demands every school under this foundation to promote national 
education. They still respect every school's own policy and own path of 
development. At the same time, they don't object when individual schools 
want to emphasize this aspect, since the organization itself was founded 
upon the idea of loving China. 
Meanwhile, the Civic Education teacher of another Christian school, one 
which did not stress patriotic education, said: 
We conducted the flag-raising ceremony once last year; this is the 
decision of the principal....There is basically nothing else going on in our 
school about it (patriotic education). Why is that? Well, I'm a Christian 
myself, and so are my colleagues; and this school is founded by a 
Christian body. As you know, nationalistic education is something that 
people commonly consider “Leftist’’，and the image of Christianity is 
really not closely associated with being “Leftist,，. So, I think the religion 
factor explains our lack of nationalistic education, that's partly why we 
haven't been keen on this aspect of teaching. 
From these two informant's explanations, it seems that neither of the religious 
sponsoring bodies had intervened in the schools' implementation of patriotic 
education. The role that religion plays in school policies is only explicable on a 
case-by-case basis. Instead of proving religion affiliation decisive, my informants' 
words imply that the attitude of the principals of individual schools is a more 
important factor. 
The strong affiliation with mainland China of the founding organization of a 
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school has unanimously been recognized among the teachers as a highly relevant 
factor in motivating a school to have a strong patriotic education policy and 
programme. In contrast to the pro-China schools which have long carried the 
reputation of being "patriotic", other schools that are not in this category are by 
definition not readily identified as “patriotic’，. But in reality, a relatively strong form 
of patriotic education close to the pro-China schools is already being undertaken in 
some "non pro-China" schools. The teachers from these two “new pro-China” 
schools in my sample were quick to point out the close connections of the school's 
founder with mainland China when asked why they seem to have a much stronger 
emphasis on patriotic education than their counterparts in the category of “non 
pro-China schools”.*�Here is how one teacher attributed the strong patriotic 
education policy in her school to the unique pro-China background of the founder 
of the school: 
This school has a very close link with mainland China. The founder of 
this school was a descendant of one of the four prominent figures in 
Chinese history — Liu Bei, Guan Yu, Zhang Fei and Zhao Yun; this makes 
it a mission of the school to promote Chinese culture. Our principal has 
emphasized that one way to do it is through nationalistic education. Thus, 
we teachers have often been told to do something to strengthen this aspect 
of education. 
Thus, regarding the influence of sponsoring bodies, pro-China affiliation 
stands out for its role in catalyzing the formation of a strong patriotic education 
policy. 
In many of my informants' answers，the presence of school principals has also 
These teachers, however, were also keen on distinguishing between their schools and the 
traditional pro-China schools. To quote one of these teachers: "there are different types of schools in 
Hong Kong, but when you're talking about nationalistic education, there are mainly two types. 
Those schools that are recognized as "pro-China" undoubtedly have a much longer history and 
strong reputation of implementing patriotic education; they give students much more exposure to 
patriotic sentiment; their ideological and physical settings, and the ethos their teachers convey are all 
quite different from my school. Although this school has a strong Chinese background, compared to 
the 'real pro-China schools' it is more like the many ordinary schools you would find in Hong 
Kong". 
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been prominent. The power of the heads of schools is, first of all, embedded in their 
position of being the ultimate decision makers about who would be responsible for 
the teaching of national identity and how the teaching should be conducted in the 
schools. In talking about power relations with their principals, there are two major 
concerns on the part of the teachers. First, they do not want to feel that they have 
been forced to teach any subject that they are not comfortable in teaching; second, 
they do not want to feel that they are restrained from teaching what they desire to 
teach. From the teachers' perspective, overlooking the first wish would mean 
manipulation of the teachers as a tool of propaganda; disrespecting the second wish 
would result in the exercise of censorship. This problem can be discussed by 
looking at how teachers became responsible for patriotic education and how free 
teachers are to decide the content of their teaching. 
As mentioned earlier, civic and patriotic education may be implemented as an 
independent, formal subject or a cross-curricular, informal subject in schools. The 
majority of the 23 schools of my sample had either a Civic Education teaching 
panel (for schools that offered formal, independent Civic Education course) or 
extra-curricular Civic Education unit (for schools that taught Civic Education 
primarily through extra-curricular programmes). The size of these panels or units 
ranged from 4 to 10 teachers from school to school, with the norm leaning to the 
smaller size. In some cases, within the Civic Education unit, two or three of the 
teachers were specifically placed in charge of national identity; in some cases, no 
teachers were assigned to the particular task.4i As Civic Education is not stipulated 
as a compulsory independent formal subject by the Hong Kong government, 
teachers of civic education and patriotic education did not necessarily have formal 
41 As discussed earlier, the majority of the schools tend to have a loose rather than strict 
co-ordination of patriotic education. 
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qualification in the subject. Many teachers claimed that they were recruited because 
they were personally interested in affairs about China, and in their own words, were 
‘‘not forced,, to take up the post. 
To illustrate this, a Civic Education teacher said: 
In my school, the Civic Education team is responsible for patriotic 
education. Most of the teachers in the team don't have a formal 
background in Civic Education: Fm from Computer Science, and my 
closest colleague in patriotic education is from Biology. In fact, most of 
today's Civic Education teachers work in Civic Education because they're 
personally interested in it. When it comes to recruiting members for the 
teaching team of a subject, there usually is not any problem. As long as 
you've taught in the school long enough, the principal or the 
vice-principal would get to know which of their staff have a stronger 
interest in current affairs and China affairs. And that's how I became 
responsible for patriotic education in the beginning. 
Similarly, another Civic Education said: 
The principal did not pressure any colleagues to take up the job. It was 
mainly motivated by the nationalistic education unit, which is formed by 
several teachers within the Civic Education team. But of course it is not as 
if everyone in the Civic Education team has fought to work for in 
nationalistic education! Colleagues who are in the first place more 
interested in the subject just naturally became team members. 
The majority of the teachers who worked in patriotic education, like the above 
two, maintained that teachers were recruited into their teams because they 
volunteered to do so and that there was compatibility between the demand of their 
work and their personal aspiration. The overwhelmingly positive depiction of work 
relations, however, does not apply to all cases, as several of my informants candidly 
told me that they felt compelled to take up the duty. In the words of the head of a 
Civic Education panel: 
I think it is a waste of time to promote patriotic education. We are doing it 
simply to fulfil the demand from the upper level. It is an imposition on us 
teachers. We don't have any choice, because they are the boss, and we are 
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the subordinates! We must follow orders! 
At the same time, a teacher who was responsible for raising the flag at another 
school aired his dissatisfactions as follows: 
This school used to raise the flag every day out there in the courtyard. It 
was almost a tradition which no one has asked anything about or said 
anything against. And then when I came to teach in this school, the duty 
was passed to me. And just like that I automatically became responsible 
for it! I'm more relieved now that the school has realized that raising the 
flag every day is not necessary and has reduced the frequency to just once 
in a while. You know, I really find this practice superfluous and 
troublesome! 
These complaints came from the teachers among my sample who did not 
support the teaching of national identity in their schools or in Hong Kong in general 
because they could not agree with the kind of patriotism that the Chinese state seeks 
to promote or could not trust any type of political indoctrination in general (to be 
discussed in Chapter Four). From these teachers' perspective, they were powerless 
in fighting against the "imposition" on them from the upper level of the school 
hierarchy and were serving as tools of the government-led propaganda for 
patriotism. 
Even if the majority of the teachers had no problem about teaching patriotic 
education, there is the question of to what extent they had the freedom to decide the 
content and method of their teaching and to what degree the teaching was dictated 
by the top directors of the schools. On the one hand, there are schools that allowed a 
relatively open flow of ideas from the teachers and exercised relatively less control 
over how teachers managed their teaching tasks. A teacher from one such school 
said: 
The principal and the top level of this school have never given us any 
pressure or specific directives on how to promote nationalistic education. 
They didn't do anything to stop us from bringing up sensitive topics. But 
at the same time, they didn't do anything to encourage it either. It 
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basically depends on who's in charge of the subject panel to decide the 
themes and the content of our programme. Of course, the principal knows 
what is going on with our teaching, because we circulate our decision 
among the staff in the school. But so far, teachers in our school have had 
absolute freedom to make decisions on our own. 
On the other hand, there are schools that exhibited a rigid hierarchy where the 
principal and the top-rank decision makers exercised absolute power in monitoring 
what was to be taught in patriotic education. One teacher in charge of the 
nationalistic education programme in a “new pro-China" school reflected on his 
powerlessness in decision making as follows: 
This is quite unfortunate, I know, but our principal is a conservative 
person; he does not approve of the mentioning of any politically sensitive 
subjects. Some years ago I suggested that we might add the Tiananmen 
Square Incident to our Civic Education programme, but the principal 
rejected it firmly. He insisted that this event had not yet been settled and 
we're not in the position to discuss it or make judgment about it. I'd 
approached him a few times after that, but his answer was always "no". I 
have not brought up the topic with him since then. It is very sad, I know, 
but I can't do anything about it. 
Today the June Fourth Tiananmen Incident of 1989 is still among the biggest 
politically taboo topics in mainland China. Even in Hong Kong, where the society is 
considerably more relaxed about discussion of the topic, the teaching of the Incident 
has deliberately been left out officially by both the colonial and the SAR 
governments. As such, the current Chinese History syllabus (2005/06) of all 
secondary levels (including HKCEE and HKAL) covers modern Chinese history 
only up to the year 1976; this shows that the taboo subject of contemporary China is 
still discouraged in post-handover Hong Kong's official history education. In the 
case above, we see an explicit contradiction between the principal and the teacher in 
charge of Civic Education in their views of what civic and nationalistic education 
should consist of. While the Civic Education teacher does not see that breaking the 
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Chinese government's taboo is a problem, the principal, in refusing to acknowledge 
the June Fourth Tiananmen Square as part of China's history, demonstrates strong 
compliance with the Chinese government, which has been characterized of being 
absolutely intolerant of political dissent (C.K. Lau 1997:4). Amidst the negotiation 
between the principal and the teacher in charge of the Civic Education programme, 
an imbalanced power relation is highly visible; from the perspective of the teacher, 
the forbidding of the teaching of politically sensitive topics dictated by the principal 
in the school constitutes an act of "censorship from above”. 
Thus, in terms of both how teachers became responsible for patriotic education 
and how free teachers were to decide the content of their teaching, cases that 
involve unequal power relations were present to prove against the harmonious 
impression that many teachers tended to make about the teaching of patriotic 
education in Hong Kong. 
The Unquestioned Matter of Power 
In all the talk of work relations, informants have largely endorsed the "laissez faire 
policy" and emphasized the unproblematic functioning of the teaching of national 
identity in their schools. However, their focus on the technical dimension and 
effective outcome of their teaching has ignored the material basis of all real-life 
work relations which may fundamentally explain why some teachers would 
volunteer to handle this “extra duty" despite their already tight schedule and why 
some would choose to stay in the position even reluctantly.^^ In addition to the fact 
that teaching is, after all, a paid occupation, we must also recognize that to take up 
42 Teachers who are in civic education teams do not handle civic education only; their major 
responsibilities are in teaching other formal academic or technical subjects. Unless in schools where 
civic education is strongly emphasized, which is not the usual case as found in my research, duties in 
the civic education team are commonly considered as "special responsibilities" rather than major 
teaching duties. 
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the supplementary responsibility of directing a specific area of educational tasks is 
an important criterion for teachers to get promoted to a higher rank (and in the long 
term a higher salary). Although many teachers had tried to stress that it was "just 
natural" for them to be in their specialized patriotic education team, arguably being 
among the first to be in charge of a curriculum that has been stipulated as a key area 
for development by the government was a boost to the teachers' share of power and 
an advantage for their long-term career.43 
At the same time, why the majority of the school principals would give a free 
hand to the teachers of patriotic education also demands a different perspective of 
investigation other than that of simply seeing it as a testimony of "absolute 
freedom" as claimed by a few of the teachers. A quote from a teacher demonstrates 
this: 
Of course the principal would like to see it develop faster. But when it 
comes to a certain situation, when you are situated in a working 
environment, you cannot just push. Well, at least that is not the culture of 
our school. In the school environment, new methods and ideas are usually 
the result of discussions among the teachers. Things may work differently 
� in other cases. For example, in some primary schools, the style of 
management is clearly top-down: when the principal says this should be 
done, then the teachers must do as it is required. But secondary schools 
are different - especially in our school, most of our policies are not 
carried out in a top-down manner. Our principal has allowed a great 
diversity of ideas and given us absolute freedom in this aspect. 
While emphasizing the "liberalness" of the teaching environment, the above 
comment also recognizes the inherent tension in the actual work relations, and 
points out that in the secondary school environment, where the composition of the 
teaching staff is relatively complex and team work is the central mode of operation, 
excessive and overt uses of power would probably not be strategically wise on the 
43 According to Poon (1995:7), Civic Education Coordinator was recognized by the Education 
Department as a promotion post after the 1985 curriculum guidelines on Civic Education. 
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part of the school principal. Subtle control without direct intervention is thus widely 
accepted in the management of the teaching staff of a secondary school. 
The need to maintain a relatively harmonious relation among workers is 
particularly acute when it comes to patriotic education, which is perhaps the most 
politically touchy and obscured topic in Hong Kong education today. The 
controversial, embryonic nature of nationalistic education in Hong Kong and the 
lack of experience among individual schools' decision makers in handling this 
element of the curriculum have given rise to a context in which school principals 
would rather withhold direct intervention and rely mainly on the teachers to devise 
and practise their school-based programmes by trial and e r r o r . From the 
perspective of school management, being entrusted to a particular duty was not 
meant to be a form of empowerment for the individual teachers; rather, it only 
meant that teachers were left with the tricky task of balancing the interests of their 
own and that of the ultimate decision makers in their schools without in many cases 
any explicit “hint” from above or any standardized reference from convention. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined how nationalistic education is organized in the 23 
secondary schools that I studied. I have shown that although patriotic education has 
in general received more attention in Hong Kong education, it is actually 
implemented with various degrees of emphasis and contradictory contents, which 
are strongly affected by the political affiliation of individual schools' sponsoring 
bodies and the power relations between teachers and decision makers of individual 
44 Many secondary school principals present at the International Symposium on National Education 
in June 2005 and the seminars organized by the Joint Committee for the Promotion of the Basic Law 
of Hong Kong have expressed their uncertainty about nationalistic education; many admitted that 
they had just started to leam and were trying to grasp the meanings and methods of implementing 
nationalistic education in their schools. Basically, school principals were just as new and 
inexperienced in handling this aspect of education as their teaching staff. 
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schools. However, the inherent tensions and conflicts within the practice of patriotic 
education in Hong Kong were largely downplayed in the words of my informants. 
This is because some education practitioners in Hong Kong, especially those who 
have not been directly involved in the teaching, were oblivious to the complex 
nature of the subject, and more importantly, because the majority of the education 
practitioners in Hong Kong still had a strong tendency to de-politicize any 
problematic issues in school policies. 
The depiction offered earlier in this chapter about school-based curricula has 
shed light on the ambiguous nature of their programmes, indicating that there are 
diverse attitudes among the organizers towards the meanings of these programmes. 
Then, how did the teachers perceive their own senses of identity? How did they 
interpret the meanings of patriotic education in Hong Kong? These are the questions 
that we will explore in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
The Meanings of National Identity and Nationalistic Education: 
Views of Education Practitioners 
Today, nationalistic education has become more of an ordinary, workaday term than 
an awkward, unusual jargon among Hong Kong education practitioners. However, 
this alone certainly does not tell us what such education really means to the 
education practitioners. In fact, there are diverse attitudes among Hong Kong 
teachers towards this new education item. This chapter deals with the diversity by 
exploring the background of my informants and how individual teachers personally 
think of the meanings of patriotism and their role of promoting patriotism in Hong 
Kong. 
Teachers’ Background 
In our interviews, my informants spoke to me as both ordinary Hong Kong Chinese 
and professional education practitioners. For some informants, their senses of 
cultural identity may appear to be compatible with their roles in teaching patriotism, 
but for other informants, contradictions between their personal and professional 
identity are obvious. Although it is hard to denote any one-to-one relationship 
between different variables, as each individual has their own unique life history, 
parallels can still be drawn among the stories of my 30 informants. Before 
examining their perceptions of national identity and nationalistic education, it is 
necessary to have an overview of my informants' personal background and general 
attitudes towards patriotism. 
Among the 30 teachers I interviewed, the majority (16) were in their thirties, 
seven in their forties, six in their twenties, and one in her fifties. Seventeen of the 
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teachers are male and thirteen are female. 
In terms of their national attitudes, while all of the 30 teachers recognized 
themselves as culturally Chinese, four teachers said directly that they did not have a 
very strong Chinese national identity and were indifferent about the nation. Twelve 
teachers averred that they love their country, and nine of these teachers explicitly 
said that this love did not extend to the Chinese government. The rest of the 
teachers, fourteen in total, expressed concern about the Chinese nation but were 
reserved about claiming any love for the country. 
If one considers the reputation of Hong Kong Chinese being politically 
apathetic and a-nationalistic, one may think that my informants in general represent 
a more patriotic attitude than that of most Hong Kong Chinese. Indeed, many of my 
informants said that they have a more involved or affectionate attitude towards 
China and a stronger commitment to nationalistic education than many of their 
fellow Hongkongers. They considered it to be related both to personal attributes and 
increased exposure to the subject matter in their job. Nevertheless, the situation of 
Hong Kong as a whole may be more complex. A survey conducted in 2005 found 
that although 21 percent of Hong Kong respondents opposed patriotic school plays 
or lessons and 39 percent opposed schools to teach the singing of the national 
anthem and to raise the national flag every day, the percentage of those who 
supported the former was 50 percent and that of those who supported the latter was 
31 - both higher than those in 1998, which are 43 and 20 respectively (Hong Kong 
Transition Project 2005:19). This indicates that there has been a higher degree of 
acceptance about patriotic display and patriotic education among Hong Kong 
people. According to another survey conducted in 2007 about Hong Kong people's 
feelings about the celebration of October National Day, it appears that patriotism 
has risen in Hong Kong in the past decade, in that the percentage of respondents 
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who were indifferent to the Chinese National Day has dropped from 73 in 1997 to 
52 in 2007, while the levels of feelings of pride have risen on average from 7 
percent in 1997 to 13 percent in 2007. Thus, although it is true that by my 
observation some of my informants seemed to have a more eager attitude towards 
patriotism and patriotic education than an average Hong Kong person, it should be 
pointed out that apparently the general attitude of Hong Kong people towards the 
subject has already been changing, and the teachers I interviewed should not be 
considered atypical in their views and attitudes as compared to the broader 
panorama of Hong Kong senses of Chinese national identity. 
In regard to education background, the large majority of the teachers received 
all of their education in Hong Kong. Three teachers, who were in their thirties, 
studied in secondary school or university in Great Britain. Four out of the total of 
my informants were born in mainland China. Among them, one informant, who was 
in his twenties, received all of his education in Hong Kong, two informants, who 
were in their twenties and fifties respectively, had studied in primary school in 
mainland China for several years before they moved with their families to Hong 
Kong, and the remaining one informant, who was in her thirties, completed junior 
secondary school in mainland China before she moved on to senior secondary and 
tertiary education in Hong Kong. 
Those teachers who received most of their schooling in Hong Kong commonly 
recalled the experiences that most local students in colonial Hong Kong had gone 
through. Many of these teachers said that they learnt from their education no 
concept of what the nation or national identity are supposed to mean. Concerning 
the lack of nationalistic education in pre-handover schooling, an Economics and 
Public Affairs (EPA) teacher in his thirties said: 
If you're wondering why people of my generation don't know what being 
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nationalistic means, well, I'd say that's totally understandable; our 
experience has been really different from what you see today. Take me as 
an example: I received all of my education in Hong Kong; I come from a 
traditional British mode of schooling and all politics was removed from 
education at that time. When I was in school, there was no such a thing as 
nationalistic education at all. Even in EPA, the subject that I'm teaching, 
the topics covered were up to pre-handover situations, there were never 
any topics about the nation, or your identity, whether you are a Chinese or 
whether you are anything....Thus, for all these years, I've grown up 
without any nationalistic consciousness. 
Another Civic Education teacher in his forties spoke of the lack of nationalistic 
indoctrination in earlier times as follows: 
In the past, if you studied in an ordinary subsidized school, you never saw 
any flag. You did not raise the Chinese flag, not the British flag either. I 
grew up under the British rule, and I never saw the school raise the British 
flag. The British people did not want us to raise their flag, because they 
did not want us to love Great Britain. They never expected us to become 
their citizens. At the same time, I never witnessed the Chinese flag being 
raised either....In the past, some government schools would raise the 
British flag but those were only very exceptional cases... .So, when the 
majority of our schools have never raised any flag, neither the Chinese 
flag nor the British flag, it is really not surprising that we have had a big 
gap in our concept. This is a very natural result; our education never 
offered that. So, if you speak of real nationalistic education, it's a matter 
of just these recent few years, something that's new to me too. 
While teachers commonly said that there was a lack of influence from their 
schooling, a Civic Education teacher in his twenties who was brought up and 
educated in Hong Kong emphasized the role of his family in fostering his interest in 
caring for the country: 
Actually, I am "made-in-China". I was born in mainland China; but I was 
brought to Hong Kong right after my birth. In my early life I did not know 
or care much about China, just like any average Hong Kong person. If 
you want me to tell how I got to know more about China, I believe that is 
because I read newspapers. Basically what I know about China is from 
Hong Kong newspapers. Even if you study Chinese History, what you can 
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get from that is only some ancient stories. You know what Chinese 
History is like; it only talks about the decline and the glory of the ancient 
dynasties but very little about modern history. So, I mainly learn about 
China from newspapers and books. I can't say that I visit the mainland 
very frequently either. I used to visit only places around Guangdong 
province; the first time that I've gone farther than that was with my 
students in a fieldtrip to Hainan Island.... But then above all, family is the 
most important factor. It has much to do with my father, who always told 
me things about China since I was very small. That is, whenever 
something comes up about the motherland, my father always has lots of 
comments. He would keep talking about it. I don't always agree with him; 
but I can't deny that my father has a big influence on me regarding my 
consciousness of learning about China. 
Another teacher in his thirties attributed his concern for the country entirely to 
his personal interest: 
I was bom and brought up in Hong Kong. As for my identity, well, I have 
a very strong Chinese identity, I would say. But why is that? I don't know 
exactly! I think it's a kind of sentiment that grows naturally; there has 
never been anyone there to teach me about it. My parents never taught me 
about it. I think it comes from within me. I care about China, and am 
willing to know more and to even help bring changes to it. That's what 
drove me to study politics and government affairs in university. To look 
back, it's entirely due to my personal interest. In fact, my primary and 
secondary education had not offered me much encouragement; the 
teachers didn't stress that in their teaching at all. You know, in my 
generation, really, not many people would bring up such topics. To care 
about your country? There's no such thing as that! Generally speaking, 
teachers who are of the same generation and background with me have 
never been exposed to any influences of nationalistic education. I am an 
exception, because of personal interest. 
An individual's identity may indeed be shaped by various forces and multiple 
factors during one's life course. In drawing attention to certain factors in particular, 
each of my informants was only trying to narrate and explicate their identity 
through recalling their personal learning experience and life history. In some cases, 
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family stands out as the most powerful factor; in others, personal disposition is 
believed to be the most decisive. We are thus prevented from making 
overgeneralizations among my informants about the influences of certain factors on 
individuals' sense of national identity. 
That said, however, there is one specific experience that many of my 
informants regarded as crucial in shaping their consciousness of national identity. In 
the words of a Civic Education teacher in his thirties: 
If you ask me, I do have a relatively strong identification with the country. 
In fact, when I was really young, this didn't mean much to me at all. But 
then the Tiananmen Square Incident happened when I was in secondary 
school. The influence was not so noticeable back then. But as I think of it 
now, it did have a long lasting impact on me. After all, for a teenager to 
go through such a historically significant event, the experience just sticks 
in your memory. And this event did make me start to care about China. 
Also, in university I met other students who had experienced the same 
event and were interested in discussing China and Hong Kong affairs. As 
you know, birds of a feather flock together. So, it was a main source of 
influence to me too. 
Similarly, another teacher in his thirties said: 
Like most of the people of my age, I was brought up under the colonial 
education system. When I was a student, the nation was never a topic of 
concern. For a long time it had remained distant and something that's not 
my business.... The only thing that truly stuck me — and people around 
me as well - personally and emotionally was in 1989. The petitions, the 
demonstrations, and all those movements.... I was still studying in 
secondary school, come to think of it! I've joined activities about the 
Tiananmen Square Incident since then, and I am still involved today. 
Thus, if anything is to be said in general about the background of my 
informants, it would be in terms of two experiences. 
First, all of my informants have undergone the “depoliticized,，and 
"a-nationalistic" education that typifies pre-handover schooling in Hong Kong, and 
to almost all of them, formal schooling had not been an influential socialization 
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agent for their attitudes towards the nation. The only exceptions, perhaps, were the 
three teachers who had received education in mainland China. But among these 
three teachers, two of them reflected that since they were very young when they 
immigrated to Hong Kong, the influences of the several years of primary school 
education in the mainland had only been short-term and they have then rapidly 
become assimilated into Hong Kong society and its style of living and mentality. 
To quote one of these teachers, who is now in her fifties, as she described the 
change in her sense of belonging towards China and Hong Kong: 
It was the 1960s when I came to Hong Kong. I remember that I felt so 
moved and touched when I saw the Chinese flag on the screen in the 
cinema in Hong Kong! And I do feel that youngsters from Hong Kong 
back then and even now wouldn't feel that way. My initial impression of 
Hong Kong was that there's undoubtedly much more freedom in this city, 
but at the same time it appeared to lack the kind of spirit that can glue 
people together. But of course, after several decades staying in Hong 
Kong, I think I've become part of the Hong Kong community; I even feel 
uncomfortable in mainland China when I go back there now....To be 
honest, in the long run, I would not want to see an assimilation of Hong 
Kong into mainland China; instead, I wish to see an assimilation of China 
into Hong Kong's system. 
The only teacher who was educated on the mainland until junior secondary 
level consistently reflected a much more sympathetic attitude towards the Chinese 
government concerning controversies such as the Tiananmen Square Incident than 
the average informant. She said that she had always had a deep love for China, 
claiming that it was “just natural" for a Chinese to be patriotic towards China. In 
this case, it is difficult to single out formal schooling to be a major factor shaping 
her sense of patriotism. However, even if this teacher failed to recognize it, the link 
between her longer years of exposure to social influences in mainland China and 
her stronger patriotic feelings for China is still quite obvious. 
Second, all of the teachers have witnessed and have constantly been reminded 
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through the Hong Kong mass media of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, an 
event which had transformative impact on Hong Kong people's identity. As 
mentioned earlier, the Hong Kong population in the 1980s was largely descendants 
of Chinese refugees who came to Hong Kong in the post-second world war period 
in escaping from Chinese political turmoil. Since the 1970s, Hong Kong Chinese 
had developed a strong sense of belonging to Hong Kong and a high degree of 
apathy towards China and politics, although culturally they did identify themselves 
as Chinese. However, the Tiananmen Square Incident evoked in Hong Kong an 
unprecedented large-scale political activism against the Chinese government (S.K. 
Lau 1997:19), and the involvement of Hong Kong people in Chinese politics after 
the Incident put an end to “Hong Kong's political seclusion” since the 1967 riots 
(Mathews, Ma and Lui 2008:46-47). For many Hong Kong Chinese, the Incident 
has reinforced their sense of "Chineseness"; it aroused their concern for the Chinese 
nation and provided a chance for them to foster a deeper emotional attachment with 
their pro-democracy mainland counterparts (Li 2000:60). At the same time, 
however, it also provoked much fear and disillusionment among Hong Kong people 
towards the Chinese government (S.K. Lau 1997:19). The impact of the Incident on 
the shaping of the distinctive Hong Kong identity among ordinary Hong Kong 
Chinese is arguably still powerful (Leung 2003:16-18; Thomas 1999:87-88). Every 
year since the spring of 1989, large candlelight vigils on the anniversary of June 4 
have been organized in Hong Kong in which people commemorate the victims of 
the Incident and demand that the Incident be vindicated. Four of my informants, 
including the one quoted above, have joined these candlelight vigils every year. 
Although not all of my informants were among the political activists, they all shared 
a collective memory of this social movement. To some of them, the event served to 
awaken their consciousness about and concern for the nation at an earlier time of 
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their lives. To others, especially those of a younger age，it served to mentally 
alienate them from the already distant China and reinforce their sense of separate 
Hongkongese identity. 
In terms of age I cannot tell how my sample of teachers is related to the 
general profile of teachers in charge of civic and nationalistic education in Hong 
Kong, as data about teachers' background in Hong Kong is not accessible. The 
majority of my informants are in their thirties; they are the generation that 
experienced the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in Hong Kong as teenagers, 
which for many of them were first “initiation” to politics, and the handover of Hong 
Kong and its political controversies as young adults. This group of teachers happen 
to be the most quoted in this thesis; they do share certain common historical 
background, but this does not mean that they all have the same views regarding my 
questions. 
This thesis does not intend to present my informants as representatives of 
teachers or people in general in Hong Kong. As already mentioned, there is a 
generally positive attitude towards nationalistic education held by the majority of 
my informants, and this fact perhaps marks them as being apart from the norm in 
Hong Kong society. This is natural, since these people have volunteered to teach 
nationalistic education. At the same time, however, these individuals see themselves 
as Hong Kong Chinese and have sought to comprehend the Chinese nation and state 
from the perspective of a “Hong Kong person”，thus their narratives do show us 
something about what it means for a people to learn to belong to a country which 
they both love and fear. 
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Teachers，Attitudes towards Nationalistic Education 
When asked what they thought of the value and importance of nationalistic 
education in Hong Kong, my informants had a range of ideas. Their answers ranged 
from "absolutely essential" to "utterly unnecessary". The 30 teachers I interviewed 
can be categorized into three groups. First, twenty of the teachers, mostly teachers 
of Civic Education and Chinese History, agreed in principle that nationalistic 
education was worth emphasizing in Hong Kong and expressed support in the 
promotion of nationalistic education, although what particular type of nationalistic 
education the individual teachers referred to varied. Second, eight of them, although 
agreeing in principle that nationalistic education was necessary in Hong Kong, had 
neutral or detached attitudes towards the actual implementation of such education. 
Finally, the two remaining informants, one EPA teacher and one Civic Education 
teacher, took a stance of objection, saying that nationalistic education was utterly 
unnecessary and meaningless. In any cases, the values that the teachers attached to 
nationalistic education and the teachers' own senses of national identity are 
interlocking and reflect one another, as I will discuss below. 
Support for Nationalistic Education: Cultural，Legal, Psychological, and 
Economic Levels 
The majority of my informants claimed to be supportive of patriotic education. 
There are four major grounds why my informants argued for the importance of 
teaching national identity in Hong Kong. 
1. Cultural Grounds 
Throughout its history, Hong Kong has remained a Chinese society. Perhaps except 
the small proportion of expatriates who may not readily claim or be accepted to be 
Chinese, most of the local population has no problem in considering themselves 
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culturally and ethnically Chinese. The only point of controversy, as I will discuss in 
the next section, lies in identifying with the political aspect of China, which many 
Hong Kong Chinese have found it hard to embrace or trust especially since 1989. 
Nevertheless, for the majority of the 30 teachers, their ambivalence about China in 
the political sense has not constituted a reason to reject nationalistic education in 
Hong Kong. My informants have generally taken their Chinese cultural identity for 
granted; this is the basic premise on which they support a strengthened nationalistic 
education in Hong Kong. 
A Civic Education teacher in her thirties who was born in China spoke of her 
Chinese identity in the following words: 
This is obvious and clear, that you're part of the Chinese race, that you're 
born Chinese! These are simple facts, and you have no way to deny 
them! ... What I want to point out is that your cultural identity is given to 
you already. You are by nature a Chinese; you have no way not to admit 
this; your appearance, your skin colour, and everything speak for 
themselves! So, why don't we focus more on the level of understanding 
the nation? If students can do well in this aspect, I'm sure they'll find it 
worthwhile! 
Similarly, a Hong Kong born Civic Education teacher in her thirties said: 
I think every person has their own race and ethnicity. That is, all humans 
on earth are given their own community by heaven and nature, and the 
primary identifiers of that would be your race and ethnicity: whether you 
are black or you are yellow.... No matter how reluctant you are to admit it, 
much of our culture is part of Chinese culture, and we are part of the 
Chinese nation. 
Both of the above comments appeal to the concept of ethnicity and race to 
define national identity as given by culture as well as by "blood" — by heredity. 
According to these teachers, a person's national identity, like their hair and eye 
colour, is automatically given by birth. This is natural that they should embrace this 
cultural identity, just as they accept their own physical traits, these informants felt. 
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This notion leads to the assumption that if the students in Hong Kong are not 
conscious of their Chinese identity, it is against nature and constitutes a problem for 
the teachers to correct. Furthermore, from these teachers，perspective, for their 
students to simply have consciousness of their Chinese identity is not enough. 
Being Chinese also entails a sense of belonging to China and a sense of 
commitment to the country. As a Hong Kong bom Civic Education teacher in her 
thirties said: 
Since we are Chinese, it is our responsibility to care about developments 
in China. To know what's happening to your own country is simply a 
righteous thing for anyone to do. It is also a good thing if each of us can 
do something for the well being of other people in the country. 
When arguing that it is obligatory for students to leam to understand their 
country, my informants often invoked the metaphor of family. In the words of a 
Civic Education teacher in her thirties: 
You are bom Chinese, you have yellow skin; the blood in your body is 
Chinese blood. You cannot deny this. It is just the same as your family. 
Sometimes, students tell me that they don't like their parents. But I 
always tell them: no matter you love your parents or not, from the 
moment you were bom, they're your parents. There's no way that you can 
deny that. How much you love them or how you feel about them is a 
different matter. But now that you're born Chinese, it is necessary to 
nurture your sense of belonging further; it's just like you're bom from the 
flesh and blood of your mother, but from time to time you still need to go 
out for tea with your mother to cultivate your love. So, it is the same with 
your country. You need to do something to reinforce your understanding 
of it. 
The analogy between a person's relationship with the nation and familial 
relationship reflects my informants' belief that national identity is as natural and 
indispensable as kinship. For these teachers, helping students develop a sense of 
national belonging is a responsibility. That nationalistic education is requisite is 
self-evident to them. 
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2. Legal Grounds 
A number of my informants have argued for the universality of the system of nation 
as a basis of the need to foster the concept of national identity among students. 
A Civic Education teacher in his thirties told me: 
As a matter of fact, everyone is a subject of a certain nation, no matter if 
he or she is an American, a Latvian, or a Russian; under the modem 
nation-state system, none of us can live without holding a passport. In 
view of this, every nation more or less has to teach their citizens about 
their national identity....In the past, Hong Kong seriously lacked this part 
of education under the British rule. But today we're part of our country, 
so that makes it necessary now. That is, when you're a part of the country 
and yet you still know nothing or care nothing about it, then I do feel that 
it is a problem. 
Similarly, a Civic Education in her thirties said: 
Everyone must belong to a group. When it comes to an international level, 
and a legal level, you have a nationality. You hold a passport. It represents 
the fact that you are protected by a country even if you are away from it. 
This is the concept of "nation". Even when you come across troubles 
outside your country, your country has the responsibility of taking care of 
you. And when we talk about rights, we must also talk about duty. So, to 
me, this is something natural that we humans have got to have by birth. 
That we do not have this element is simply because of historical 
circumstances which deprived us of it. If you take a look at history, you 
would find that there are a lot of great people who have sacrificed their 
lives for their countries. They bled and sweated, they worked for the 
advancement of the standard of the country; they stood out and brought 
back glories for the country. Indeed these are all embodied in the concept 
of "nation" itself. 
Another Civic Education in her thirties said, somewhat more forcefully: 
Is it necessary to promote nationalistic education? Well, to me the answer 
is very simple. Hong Kong has now been returned to China. This is a fact. 
We must recognize it. At the same time, we are Chinese. This is also a fact. 
And we must recognize it too. So, if nowadays some Hong Kong people 
still don't accept their identity of being Chinese, I think there's definitely 
a problem with this attitude, because Hong Kong is never a country but 
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only a region! In fact, you may look at other countries, say, the United 
States; you'll see that Americans have an extremely strong national 
identity too. Even for a country that has so much democracy and freedom, 
its people are so nationalistic! I think it's time for Hong Kong to find and 
recognize her own position too. You can, of course, retain your Hong 
Kong identity. But when you enter international organizations or 
international competitions, you are always "Hong Kong, China", and not 
"Hong Kong". So, I think it is a must to let students recognize this and 
accept this. It is a fact already! 
These comments point to the fact that in today's world, individuals belong to 
the existing world structure, which they should naturally accept and adapt to. To 
these teachers, while in the past Hong Kong students might be excused of the 
responsibility of caring about any particular nation, today the official return of the 
sovereignty of Hong Kong to China automatically necessitates the socialization of 
Hong Kong children into patriotism and nationalism. This last comment, in fact, has 
summed up all the points mentioned so far: it is unrealistic for Hong Kong locals to 
resist identification with China, because of the people's irreducible Chinese cultural 
identity, the irreversible nation-state system working across the globe, and the 
indisputable status of Hong Kong being officially a part of China. 
J. Psychological and Spiritual Level 
Human beings are social beings. Some of my informants believed that 
psychologically human beings need to feel they belong to a larger community and 
they argued for the values of the nation in its function of fulfilling this human 
psychological need. To quote one of them, a Physical Education teacher in her 
thirties: 
Nationalistic education is important. It is to let students know about their 
country and to teach them to place the country in an important position. 
It's to prevent them from feeling as if they are rootless souls without a 
resting place. 
Thus, arguably, the nation serves as an anchor for the restless, roaming soul of 
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human beings. However, considering the fact that the nation is only a rather recent 
creation of the modem world (Anderson 1991, Breuilly 2001; Gellner 1983; 
McCrone 1998) and only one among the various sources of meanings in life 
available to people today, can we say that it is not as essential and irreducible as 
some of the teachers above have claimed? In response to this, a Civic Education 
teacher in her thirties said: 
I think even when you say that the concept of nation itself is not a natural 
one, as it already exists now, I still don't see that it is a bad thing. As long 
as the relationship between countries is not in the form of negative 
competition, not something like “we are China, you are Japan, and thus 
we are forever enemies to each other，,，I don't see that the concept of 
nation is a bad thing at all. On the contrary, I think that to have a sense of 
national belonging is something that can enrich the meanings of the 
human world. For example, when the Chinese astronaut, Yang Liwei took 
off from the earth towards space, holding in one hand the Chinese flag 
and in the other the UN flag, he said: "When Chinese fly to space, it is for 
world peace." In other words, through its actions, China can contribute to 
the whole world. I think what I want the students see is this kind of 
human spirit. Nationalistic education is to bring students to see “the 
global". I think this is where its beauty lies! 
Smith, in attempting to explain for the persistence and the pervasiveness of the 
nation, writes that "the primary function of national identity is to provide a strong 
‘community of history and destiny' to save people from personal oblivion and 
restore collective faith" (1991:161). By focusing on the benefit that national identity 
may bring to humans at the psychological and spiritual levels, the above two 
comments parallel Smith's statement. In the eyes of some proponents of 
nationalistic education, the fostering of national identity is essential for human 
beings at the deepest and most universal level for the sake of their ultimate 
psychological well-being. 
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4, Economic and Material Reason 
Teachers were also keen on noting the material benefits brought about by the 
intensified interconnectedness between Hong Kong and China. 
First, in the face of the closer links between Hong Kong people and mainland 
Chinese after the handover as well as the immense economic opportunities from the 
rapidly expanding Chinese market, it is pragmatically regarded as essential that 
Hong Kong young people understand the mentality of mainland Chinese people and 
be able to communicate with them. 
To argue for the urgency and the gravity of the subject, teachers emphasized 
that recognizing one's Chinese identity and learning about China are not simply a 
cultural or ideological matter, but a realistic calculation for one's economic survival. 
Here is how a Civic Education teacher in her thirties put it: 
We are not only talking about promoting Chinese national identity per se; 
perhaps an even bigger question here is to know more about China. Do 
you know that China is changing really fast? People in mainland China 
are no longer talking only about the Pearl River Delta; they're already 
talking about the Yangtze River Delta! And do you know that Suzhou's 
industrial production has developed so fast that its gross production has 
exceeded Shenzhen's? From all these, we see that the world is changing 
really fast. As teachers, our major duty is to equip our students with the 
ability to face this fast-changing world. 
A Civic Education teacher in his forties argued that studying about China at 
present is the door to greater opportunities in the future, as if it is a kind of 
investment that will pay off in the long run: 
The circumstances of our society today require that our students must not 
ignore the importance of caring about China. No matter whether we are 
talking about trading with China or having a career in China, students 
must now be prepared to react to changes, to make decision in the face of 
the abundance of information that keeps rushing in. This is for students' 
own good, because China is bound to be a key issue demanding our 
concern; students had better learn how to handle any information about 
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China, especially when Hong Kong is such a free place where information 
flows from all directions. To a certain extent, Hong Kong students 
actually enjoy a much greater advantage compared with their counterparts 
in other parts of the world, because Hong Kong is so close to China. 
In the eyes of these informants, nationalistic education is not in itself all that 
important. Rather, its value lies in its instrumentality through which Hong Kong 
students can make use of their situational advantages in realizing their personal 
ambitions and aspirations. 
China's growing global influence and China's strengthened national power 
have changed some of my informants' attitudes towards China. When discussing 
whether having a Chinese national identity is a positive thing, an informant in his 
forties commented: 
If you're talking about China thirty years ago, what we knew about the 
country was mostly negative: poverty, communism, corruption and so 
on....All these, I must say, are not very attractive. But then from the 1980s 
onwards, China has indeed undergone some changes in different aspects, 
including its economy, national power, sports and even academics. These 
changes have raised China's international status somewhat and they did 
have some impact on our views of the country. In the past, being Chinese 
wouldn't make you feel proud. But now, is it good to be a Chinese? I 
would say: it's not a bad thing. 
While some are impressed by the enhanced international reputation of China, 
others are appreciative of China's performance in dealing with Hong Kong issues — 
in particular, economic affairs. When discussing whether the Hong Kong part or the 
Chinese part of her identity is stronger, a Hong Kong-born teacher in her thirties 
said: 
Of course my Chinese identity is stronger! Why? You know, I used to 
think that it was better to have a British-Hong Kong identity. It's after I 
had to get out of the trap laid by the British that I felt deeply that we 
really can't deny the favour that China has done to us. It is a very striking 
realization for middle class people like me in Hong Kong. The British left 
us a bubble economy. If it wasn't for the Chinese government's financial 
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support after 1997, Hong Kong people would have been doomed! If 
China hasn't opened its door and let independent travellers come to Hong 
Kong, Hong Kong's economy could not have survived in the aftermath of 
SARS. So, if you ask anyone out there, they may not agree that China is 
better than Hong Kong, but they would certainly agree that the Chinese 
government is an important source of resources and money for Hong 
Kong's economy. If you only relied on Tung Chee-hwa, your life would 
have ended much faster!45 
Another teacher in her thirties said: 
Inevitably we need to change our attitude. We can no longer believe that 
Hong Kong people are superior to mainland Chinese. On the contrary, we 
Hong Kong people are depending on the Chinese people now! Without 
Chinese people, Hong Kong people really won't have a future. In the past, 
Hong Kong people thought that they're so superior; they looked down on 
the mainland people. But look at today's China, they are progressing so 
quickly! And what about Hong Kong? Still struggling in the same place, if 
not moving backward. Why do you think so many Hong Kong people 
seek jobs on the mainland? Simply because China is developing so well, 
and is in demand of talented people. Even the talented people in Hong 
Kong are from the mainland! So, there is no choice; you've got to accept 
that you're Chinese. If you want to be superior, you better admit that 
you're a Chinese! It's not like the olden days when Hong Kong people 
called the mainland Chinese “Ah Chan"; nowadays no one calls them “Ah 
Chan" any more, right?46 In the past, Hong Kong people felt that the 
British were more superior. So, Hong Kong people all wanted to think 
that they're British. They all wanted a British passport or BNO. But now, 
would they still think so? Of course not! Forget about the British passport! 
No one wants it now. It's much more convenient to use the SAR passport 
now. So when you hold the SAR passport, you automatically admit that 
you're a Chinese. This is a larger trend of the society. If you still think 
that you're British, people will laugh at you! 
45 Tung Chee-hwa, the first and former Chief Executive of the HKSAR government, has been 
widely criticized as an ineffective leader in various aspects of governance during his tenure. Due to 
his unpopularity among the Hong Kong public and probably also loss of support from the PRC's 
government, Tung stepped down in March 2005, three years into his second term as Chief Executive. 
46 "Ah Chan" is the nickname of a character in a local television melodrama produced in 1979. In 
the television drama, Ah Chan was depicted as a dirty and ill-mannered man coming from mainland 
China to rejoin his family in Hong Kong. In real life, for more than a decade since the 1980s, "Ah 
Chan", with its stigmatizing connotation, had been a popular collective name given by Hong Kong 
people to Chinese immigrants who came from mainland China in the 1970s (Ma 1999:62-67). 
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The last two comments seem to reflect an internal adjustment of attitude 
towards the nation resembling the psychological process of internalizing the symbol 
of the state as a "materialistic benefactor" as discussed by Bloom (1990). The shift 
of the teachers' attitude towards China from aversion to appreciation as well as the 
withdrawal of loyalty in Britain shows a conditional rather than unconditional 
loyalty to the nation, in terms of capitalism and materialism. In such cases, China is 
judged by its performance, through a set of values that stands in sharp opposition to 
the goals of moral and patriotic education of China whose basic principle, the 
socialist moral principle, stresses the collectivism of the communists as the essential 
value and the individualism of the capitalist class as the enemy (Li 1990). Such 
ideas are explicitly stated in the Outline on Secondary School Moral Education 
issued by the State Education Commission of the PRC government in 1995, in 
which both “love for the socialist motherland" and "a willingness to repay the 
motherland" are frequently emphasized. In particular, the content of senior 
secondary moral education is defined by such statements as "education in the 
history of the Chinese people's struggle, revolution, and endeavor and carrying on 
and developing the glorious tradition of patriotism", "education in the development 
and prospects of socialist modernization and repaying the motherland", as well as 
‘‘education in a more advanced understanding of the concept of the nation — that the 
nation's interests come above all else and that individual interests must follow the 
nation's interests" (Qiang and Fairbrother 2006:25). Arguably, the emphasis among 
my informants on what China has done for them instead of what they have done for 
China is fundamentally contradictory to the Chinese official definition of patriotism, 
which demands unconditional devotion to the country from all Chinese citizens. 
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Indifference 
Among my sample, there is a small group of teachers who exhibited the “typical” 
characteristic of Hong Kong Chinese as being indifferent towards politics and did 
not have strong opinions about patriotic education at all. A Hong Kong-born History 
teacher in his thirties commented: 
I'm basically indifferent about the government's reform of patriotic 
education. I neither support it nor oppose it. Actually my attitude has 
always been like that; teaching is only a job to me. I'm not like some 
other teachers who would have strong opinions about policy. If the EMB 
says we should “keep up with the pace of our time", that our students 
should learn more about recent history of China and Hong Kong, I have 
no objection to it. More importantly, Hong Kong is a pluralistic society. 
People have freedom in what they say, what they think. Some changes in 
the curriculum would not bring a big impact on students' senses of 
identity. 
This group of teachers consists mostly of those who have not been directly 
involved in the promotion of patriotic education in their schools. They include 
English teachers, teachers of traditional academic subjects such as History and 
Chinese Language, as well as two Civic Education teachers whose schools did not 
place strong emphases on patriotic education. As a matter of fact, these teachers 
represented the norm of the education profession before the commencement of 
official patriotic education in Hong Kong. The presence of this group of teachers in 
my sample reveals that there is for sure a continuation of indifference towards 
politics and detachment about political and nationalistic education. Thus, although 
there are teachers who had relatively stronger opinions, one must be reminded that 
patriotic education in Hong Kong's secondary education has still been a minor item 
and not yet permeated into all teachers' conscious and c o g n i t i o n . 4 7 
47 
Leung's questionnaire survey of 369 civics teachers in Hong Kong found that two years after the 
handover the percentage of respondents who agreed to make nationalistic education the core of civic 
education was 44.5 %. Those who disagreed constitute 37.4% of the respondents and those with no 
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Opposition to Nationalistic Education: Political and National Aspects 
As mentioned earlier, very few of my informants have claimed to be completely 
opposed to nationalistic education. Several points are crucial in understanding such 
findings. First, the generally positive attitude towards nationalistic education among 
my informants may partly be due to the bias of my sampling: teachers who would 
agree to be interviewed tend to be individuals who are already more enthusiastic 
about and ready to defend the subject. Second, the politically sensitized nature of 
the teaching of national identity has made the teachers particularly cautious of being 
outspoken; in regard to this, a Civic Education teacher in his twenties told me: 
A radio station once invited me to speak about the promotion of 
nationalistic education in our school, but I refused to go, because I didn't 
know what to say. If you say something on the good side, they would say 
that you're pro-China; if you say the opposite, they'd say that you speak 
for "the right"; if you say that you're neutral, they'd think that you are 
eager to please both sides.... So, whatever you say would be wrong! 
The worry of saying “something wrong” is, in fact, quite notable among many 
of my informants. Some teachers were more explicit about their concern and more 
nervous about having their identities exposed than others; in one extreme instance, 
one teacher, before airing his criticisms against the government, warned me that if I 
taped his voice and revealed his identity to others I would face a lawsuit from him. 
That interview was the only interview in my research that I did not tape. 
That said, however, I have come across two clear opponents to patriotic 
education among my sample. In the words of an Economics and Public Affairs 
teacher who was responsible for coordinating the flag-raising ceremony in his 
opinion 15.4% (2003:187). This may provide a more general picture about the varying degree of 
emphasis that Hong Kong civics teachers place on nationalistic education. The fact that there are 
more teachers who did not claim to agree (including those who disagreed and those who were 
indifferent) than those who did suggests that support for nationalistic education can hardly be 
claimed to be generally strong, although the picture may be changing in the several years since the 
data was collected. 
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school： 
What is so meaningful about patriotic education? I really couldn't argue 
for those who support it. In this school I'm given the duty of hoisting and 
taking care of the national flag. But to be honest, I 'm against the idea of it. 
I think it is totally unnecessary to have the ceremony. I really think so! 
Trust me; students wouldn't come to develop that so-called sense of 
cultural or national identity or sense of belonging to the country simply 
because of the fact that you hoisted the flag! This kind of teaching is, if 
you don't mind, stupid and superficial. We didn't have this in the past and 
I don't think we need it now. 
This teacher, in rejecting the kind of patriotic education that was encouraged 
by the Hong Kong government and was going on in his school as well as many 
other schools in Hong Kong, argued that patriotic education is not an essential 
element of Hong Kong education. In contrast with the proponents of patriotic 
education, he did not deem that the political shift in the status of Hong Kong should 
necessitate any changes in people's cultural or national identity. Nor did he think 
that any government education policy concerning the promotion of national rituals 
would make any difference, or do any good, for the society. This implies in this 
informant an overall lack of either internalization of the national Chinese identity or 
compliance with the official imperatives to behave like a Chinese national. 
In an equally critical tone, another opponent, a Civic Education in his forties, 
said: 
It is meaningless to even discuss it. Now all schools in Hong Kong are 
doing the same things; they have all suddenly become "patriotic", but it's 
just a show! The government thinks that raising the flag once in the 
morning, once in the afternoon, once in the evening is going to change 
everything. But let me tell you, it is stupid! When they ask me to teach it, 
of course I would do it, only because I am forced to do so. If a 
government official asks me the same question, of course I will tell him 
that I've done the job. But the bigger question is: so what? Now I have 
done the job, as have all schools in Hong Kong, and yet what can you get 
from it? Do you find that all of our students have suddenly become 
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patriotic? Of course not! 
The disdain for nationalistic education expressed in the above lines does not 
necessarily connote a lack in a sense of national belonging. Rather, it conveys a lack 
in attachment to the government. This teacher went on to explain: 
National identity doesn't need to be taught; it is already there. My 
Chinese identity is rooted in my skin and blood! Thirty years ago, when 
the Diaoyu Island disputes broke out, who was the first to stand up against 
the invaders? It's Hong Kong people! They reacted even more strongly 
than the mainlanders! And where was the Chinese government? It stepped 
back! It did nothing to support the protesters from Hong Kong! Back then, 
no one raised the Chinese flag in Hong Kong. So, where did Hong Kong 
people's feelings come from? It came from within the Chinese soul! 
Chinese people don't need the Chinese government to teach them to be 
Chinese. When things happen, people's identity always emerges naturally 
at the critical moment. 
This teacher attached no importance to nationalistic education, ironically not 
because he did not identify with his country, but because he saw national identity as 
something so natural and innate to the people that it did not require any artificial 
instillation. In lines with some of the teachers who support nationalistic education, 
this teacher believed that national identity was analogous to inborn physical 
characteristics. In contrast with them, he maintained that the relationship among kin 
needs no nurturing. In this view, national identity is more like a biological instinct, 
maybe latent but in any case awaiting the right moment to emerge. The stimuli 
should be accidental rather than intended, and the display of nationalistic sentiment 
spontaneous rather than deliberate. 
In essence, despite the differences in their arguments against patriotic 
education, both these two opponents had the same sceptical attitude about the 
credibility of the state-led nationalistic education programme. According to their 
reasoning, how one's national identity exists and is expressed is a debatable 
question, but above all else national identity should not exist to serve the interests of 
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the government. 
From the above overview of teachers' accounts of their attitudes towards 
nationalistic education, we see a distinction between two different realms of the 
nation: the apolitical realm and the political realm. For all of the teachers, loving 
“China the motherland" as an expression of one's ethnic identity, a channel to get 
integrated into the world nation-state system, a realization of individuals' 
materialistic aspirations, or a means to achieve one's sense of security in the vast 
universe is desirable, or at least unproblematic. The fact that love for the apolitical, 
cultural China has been taken for granted among Hong Kong Chinese has provided 
justifications for many teachers to support nationalistic education in Hong Kong. 
However, when it comes to the political dimension of the country, nationalistic 
education becomes a much more fuzzy matter. The idea of loving "China the state" 
as assumed in the Chinese official definition of patriotism'^^ constitutes a reason for 
some to object to the teaching of national identity in Hong Kong. In fact, all of the 
teachers who agreed on the importance of nationalistic education excluded "loving 
political China" as a reason for their support. This is pivotal in our study of the 
teachers' attitudes. Among these teachers, the divergence lies not in whether Hong 
Kong should have nationalistic education, but in what kind of and by what ways 
48 The Chinese official discourse on nationalism is acknowledged to be state-centred and 
party-centred (Liang and Zheng 1998; Seckington 2005). To illustrate this, the following statements 
have been extracted from a public speech published in Liberation Daily on 12 May 1996 of Jiang 
Zemin, the former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and President of the PRC 
government: "Members of the Communist Party are the most resolute and thorough-going patriots. 
The patriotism of the Chinese Communist Party is the highest example of the Chinese nation and 
Chinese patriotism" (Seckington 2005:26). In addition, Chinese educationists Qi, Gan and Li (1984), 
in introducing the principles of China's socialist patriotic education, stated that "to correctly 
understand the past and presence of the motherland and develop a strong sense of pride in the 
nation", "to fervently love the socialist system and the communist party's leadership", and "to realize 
all these values through action" are the fundamental responsibilities of the Chinese people 
(1984:65-69). In all these accounts, the emphasis of orienting patriotic education towards the 
purpose of serving the ruling party of the PRC government is explicit. 
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nationalistic education should be promoted in Hong Kong. 
Before examining the different ways in which individual teachers define 
nationalistic education in terms of its content and approach, in the next section we 
shall look at how teachers narrate their love for the country and articulate their 
personal perceptions of being responsible for promoting nationalistic education. 
This will offer a context for the investigation of the actual practices of nationalistic 
education in later chapters. 
Which Patriotism? Ambivalences in the Teaching of Patriotism for China 
What is the nation and what does loving the country means to the teachers? In 
academia, much has already been discussed about the concepts of nation, national 
identity, and patriotism/ nationalism (Smith 1991; Conner 1994; McCrone 1998; 
Fairbrother 2003). Among studies of Hong Kong, Huang (1992), in her study of 
nationalism and democratic movements in Hong Kong, addressed the characteristics 
of Hong Kong people's national identification. In her analysis, identification with 
the nation among Hong Kong people can be understood at three different levels: the 
nation as an ethno-cultural entity, as a political community, and as a sovereign-state 
(1992:28,45-55). 
Whereas in the last several decades of the colonial period Hong Kong had 
generally not been concerned with the conceptualization of or love for the nation, in 
2004 the Hong Kong public has engaged in a hot debate on the meanings of 
patriotism (Ming Pao Editorial Board 2004), although commentators were largely 
confined to elites of the society such as government officials, politicians and 
intellectuals. Echoing some of the themes of the debate, my informants have also 
tried to articulate their personal understanding of the meanings of nation and 
patriotism. Although identifying with non-political and cultural China was generally 
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taken as unproblematic among all of the teachers, many harboured a considerable 
degree of uncertainty and evasiveness in their attempts at assessing their senses of 
affection and loyalty to the country. 
When asked whether they considered themselves patriotic,49 my informants 
gave a wide spectrum of answers. At one extreme, a few teachers answered that 
they felt completely indifferent about the nation; at the other extreme, some teachers 
said that they considered themselves absolutely "patriotic", but only so in their own 
way. The majority of the teachers did not give a simple “yes/no” answer but instead 
claimed to have the consciousness of being Chinese and of caring about Chinese 
affairs. 
Many of the respondents who felt indifferent about the nation described 
themselves as having views echoing that of "typical" Hong Kong Chinese. To give 
one example, a History teacher in his thirties said: 
Well, just like many Hong Kong people, I wouldn't say I really love my 
country. I may illustrate it this way: I like football; when it comes to Hong 
Kong versus Real Madrid, I would wish the Hong Kong team good 
luck....If it is China versus Real Madrid, I would wish the Chinese team 
good luck too. But I wouldn't feel sad if the Chinese team loses, you 
know....How do I feel when I see the Chinese national flag or hear the 
national anthem? Nothing special. I don't have a strong feeling about the 
nation or things like that; actually, I'm just like any ordinary Hong Kong 
people. 
The majority of teachers were meticulous in describing their national attitudes. 
They refrained from using such emotion-laden words as "love" and "patriotic", and 
focused, instead, on discussing the formulation of their national identity. As a Civic 
Education teacher in his thirties said: 
49 I asked in Cantonese: “你認爲你自己愛不愛國？” (Do you think you are patriotic?) or “你愛你的 
國家嗎？” (Do you love your country?). 
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Am I patriotic? I do think that I am a Chinese; I admit that Chinese is my 
identity and I also care a lot about affairs in the motherland, like the 
conflict between China and Japan over the textbook controversies; I did 
pay very close attention to it.^ ^ However, if you ask me whether I am 
patriotic, I really don't have an answer to this question. It's just like the 
debate on the meanings of patriotism which took place not long ago. I 
discussed the question with my colleagues but we found that in fact 
there's not any universal standard to measure it. I can only tell you that I 
believe I am a Chinese and I care about my country. 
Just as this teacher avoided measuring his love for China, some other teachers 
attempted to articulate their attitudes and sentiments towards China by wondering 
aloud, “what should count as patriotic". Some teachers spoke of nationalism in 
terms of having a sense of pride in the country, which may be measured in terms of 
the country's achievements and national power. One Civic Education teacher in his 
forties said: 
Do I love my country? It's hard for me to tell....When I see the country 
grow stronger, I feel happy for her and feel proud. Does that count as 
patriotic? 
A teacher of Liberal Studies and History in her twenties said: 
Am I patriotic or not? Well, to me there's no such thing as loving or not 
loving your country. I only think that whether it is Hong Kong people or 
Chinese people, they both have the same kind of sentiment. That is, when 
they see that China has achieved something, they would support it and 
applaud. It's just like when you watch the World Cup, you would naturally 
cheer for the Chinese team. I don't know whether it is because 
subconsciously we all believe that we are Chinese. 
Some other teachers who evaded answering whether they were patriotic 
assessed their Chinese identity by situating it in the specific Hong Kong-China 
5° The controversies refer to a series of international debate on the Japanese government's approval 
of the use of secondary school level history textbooks which de-emphasize the extent of war crimes 
such as the Nanking Massacre committed by Japanese troops during the Second World War and 
emphasize the positive achievements of Imperial Japan in the first half of the 20* century. The 
Chinese government and the South Korean government have been among the strongest protesters 
against incidents of Japan's screening of school history textbooks in the past. The latest incident 
happened in spring 2005, which involved anti-Japanese demonstrations in China and Hong Kong. 
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context and through the way their Hong Kong-Chinese identity has changed over 
time. In the words of a Civic Education teacher in her thirties: 
In the past, I really didn't have such a strong identity of being Chinese, 
definitely not in my primary or secondary school years. It is only in recent 
years, after I have started to teach Civic Education and have engaged in 
different activities, that I have become reflective on this matter. So, am I 
patriotic? Well, I would put it in this way: I definitely identify myself both 
as a Chinese and a Hong Kong person. Just like, if you ask me what my 
hometown is, I would say it's Shanghai; if you ask me where I am from, I 
would say Hong Kong. If it comes to the national level, then of course 
I'm Chinese! It is as simple as that! Since we are having a conversation 
within the boundary of China, naturally we would identify ourselves by 
regions and go by Shanghaiese and Hongkongese. 
In the words of a Civic Education who was in his forties: 
I really should say that my concept of the nation was not strong at all. Of 
course, if you ask me whether I am Chinese, I definitely am Chinese! At 
the time when the June Fourth Incident took place, I had always thought 
that I was more a Hong Kong person than a Chinese. Well, I mean, at that 
time only! If you, however, ask me now, since it's already been several 
years since the handover, I have somehow come to feel that after all, 
Chinese are still and will always be Chinese, so to speak. 
Instead of addressing directly how much and in what way they love China, 
these informants tried to show that they have resolved the identity crisis that is said 
to have haunted Hong Kong Chinese for the past several decades (C.K. Lau 
1997:18). To these informants, their Chinese identity is measurable only by placing 
it side by side with their Hong Kong identity and by contrasting the relative weight 
they have placed on these two dispositions in past and in present, and they took 
their personal unconscious leaning towards the Chinese side of their identity as an 
indication of a stronger nationalistic orientation. Obviously, individual teachers did 
have their subjective ways of conceptualizing and articulating what love for country 
means to them. But the tendency among these teachers of avoiding defining 
patriotism by a single, absolute standard and of emphasizing "having a sense of 
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Chinese national identity” over “harbouring an emotional attachment for China" is 
quite prominent. 
The above two types of answers might appear to be lacking in conviction to 
"patriots" in many other countries. Nevertheless, coming from a Hong Kong person, 
such a reaction is typical and is a direct reflection of the background of my 
informants, most of whom, as we have seen earlier, have lacked any socialization 
into national identity, not to mention into the rhetoric of patriotism. 
Some teachers admitted that they were patriotic, but emphasized that love for 
the country had different dimensions such as the cultural and the political, and that 
adhering to one dimension does not mean the same as adhering to the other. 
Regarding this, Hong Kong scholar Joseph C.W. Chan, commenting in the debate 
about patriotism in Hong Kong, also mentioned that there have been two prevailing 
idioms by which Hong Kong people have expressed their love for the country: one 
involves a kind of affective attachment towards the country's people, land, history 
and culture, and the other involves a quest for a closer bond between the country 
and the people in the form of more power and autonomy for the people (thus 
democracy) against governments' and politicians' domination. According to Chan, 
both of these idioms exclude the element of loving the Chinese government (Ming 
Pao Editorial Board 2004:180). In accord with this observation, some of the 
teachers addressed directly the problem of loving the political realm of the country. 
To quote a Civic Education and Chinese Language teacher in his thirties: 
Am I patriotic or not? I think you have to define what the country is first. 
Are you talking about the land, the people, the culture, or the government? 
You have got to make it clear. . . .If you're talking about loving the people, 
the culture, and the history, then I believe I am patriotic. But if you're 
talking about the government, I have much reservation about that. 
To quote a Civic Education teacher in his thirties: 
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Yes, I think I am a patriotic person. But in Hong Kong, this term has been 
severely abused. For example, there are people who always like to talk 
about the criteria of loving the country, something like, “only if you are 
this or that or if you do this or that, can you be considered patriotic." 
There are certain pro-China people who would tell you that loving the 
country means you have to support the government; you must follow the 
government's way to help ensure prosperity, stability and so on. At the 
same time, if you say anything in objection to the government's policy, if 
you go on protests or demonstrations, then you would be classified as 
unpatriotic. So, there are people who define patriotism this way. Of course, 
personally I don't agree with this kind of interpretation at all. I love 
mainland China, but not the Chinese government. This is very clear. To 
me, my type of patriotism is the real one; theirs is not! 
To quote a Chinese History teacher in her fifties: 
Perhaps nowadays when some people talk about loving the country, they 
mean it to be the same as loving the Communist Party. That is, to love 
China is the same as to love the Communist Party. However, it is 
definitely not what I mean. What I refer to when I say I love my country 
is the Chinese people, and the entity called China. The two aspects, China 
and the Communist Party, cannot be put side by side with an equal sign. 
Indeed, for most of my informants, the distinction between loving the nation 
(i.e. the people of the country) and loving the state (i.e. the government) is 
unambiguous. If there is a formula for them to calculate patriotism, it should always 
be done with a subtraction sign in terms of the Chinese government. The "real type" 
of patriotism towards China according to most of my informants should never 
include loving the Chinese Communist Party, which is the one-party ruler of the 
PRC government. 
For the majority of these teachers, there is a specific reason why they argued 
for “the real type of patriotism" to "the other kind of patriotism" — that which they 
commonly designated as “pro-China patriotism". A Civic Education teacher in his 
twenties who was bom in mainland China but grew up in Hong Kong illustrated the 
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differences between the two types of patriotism in the following words: 
My father is patriotic. So am I. However, we are different: my father is 
blind! Yes, I do think he is! When it comes to the motherland, it's like 
everything he says must be in favour of China. For example, many people 
would criticize that the Chinese government was too blind in supporting 
Tung Chee-hwa to continue to be the Chief Executive, but my father's 
always on the Chinese government's side. To him, all opinions other than 
those in favour of China are wrong. Whatever you say that is not in a 
pro-China tone, he would never accept it. To me，he belongs to the blind 
obstinate type of patriot. You know what I mean, right? It's like when it 
comes to Tung Chee-hwa or some past leaders in China like Chairman 
Mao, my father only praises. He always avoids talking about the wrong 
these people have done. One more example: if you ask my father about 
the Tiananmen Square Incident, he would definitely say that the Chinese 
government was right. He believes that if the Chinese government hadn't 
taken suppressive measures, there would have been a lot of chaos; and if 
they had let the riots go too far, there could never be an economy as 
prosperous as it is today. So, in short, the Chinese government is always 
right. And to that I must disagree. I believe that there were many possible 
solutions to the problem and the one that the Chinese government chose 
was not the best. 
While the father of this teacher fit the model of a “true patriot" by the standard 
of the Chinese government, this teacher argued that the “pro-China type" of 
patriotism represented by his father is not to be trusted because of its blindness to 
right and wrong and its autocratic quality in insisting on only one side of opinion. 
In general, the teachers' resistance to pro-China patriotism stemmed not just 
from their discontent towards the Chinese government in occasional incidences, but 
more, from a fundamental sense of disapproval of the Chinese government's 
dictatorship and totalitarianism. Bearing the same critical view of the Chinese 
government, another Civic Education teacher in his thirties expounded: 
If you ask me whether I love my country, I would say I definitely do, but 
definitely not as defined by the Chinese government. The thing is, in 
Hong Kong, we often hear some views from the Chinese government and 
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from individuals in political parties about loving one's country. But in 
other places, such as the United States or Great Britain, there is not a line 
written in the Constitution that requires the people to love the country or 
defines patriotism as such and such. That is, if you respect the law and 
live by it, then you're already considered to be a member of that nation. 
Thus, to me, loving the nation does not mean that you have to be 
pro-something or you have to support a certain type of value. In the 
democratic system of those Western countries, there's a clear distinction 
between political parties and the country: when I say that I love my 
country and admit myself as a member of the country, it does not 
necessarily mean I accept the rule of the party. Unfortunately, this is not 
the case in China. If being Chinese or loving China has to be the same as 
loving the Communist Party and vice versa, then I really doubt whether 
our children or even our grown-ups in Hong Kong can accept that. All in 
all, to promote patriotism in Hong Kong is difficult, unless China opens 
itself to change and develops democracy! 
By comparing the Chinese political system with examples from Western 
countries, this teacher highlighted the particularity of the Chinese government's 
political ideology and style of governance, which he deemed to be incompatible 
with the prevailing political values held by the average Hong Kong person. To this 
teacher, pro-China patriotism could hardly appeal to either adults or youngsters in 
Hong Kong today, probably not just because the socialist outlook of the Chinese 
Communist Party has traditionally not had left a favourable impression on the more 
capitalistic and "individualistic" Hong Kong people, but also because, as the last 
line of the quote implies, the one-party dictatorship enshrined in the Chinese 
political system is radically at odds with the ideal of democratization, which has 
been found to be increasingly emphasized and valued among Hong Kong society.5) 
51 A study by Kuan and Lau (1997) about the patterns of political attitudes among Hong Kong 
people based on surveys done from mid-1980s onwards to mid-1990s concluded that although a 
sense of alienation form the political system was prevalent among the people of Hong Kong, there 
was "an increase in general support for democracy" and "positive learning of the consequences of 
democratic reforms" (1997:14-15). Also, a recent study has shown that from late 2003 onwards 
support among Hongkongers in principle for constitutional changes such as direct election of the 
Hong Kong SAR Chief Executive and direct election of all Legislative Council seats had remained 
strong: most of the time above 70% of approval from respondents for both items (Hong Kong 
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Ironically, the support for democratization for some Hong Kong Chinese is in itself 
an expression of patriotism for China, as Joseph C.W. Chan argued in his article 
(Ming Pao Editorial Board 2004:180). Underlying such particular interpretation 
among some Hong Kong Chinese of patriotism for China is the contention that 
individuals should have their independent ways of loving their country and no one 
should succumb to any state ideology which they do not find acceptable. 
All of the aforementioned discussion about patriotism for political China 
largely focuses on the peculiar conditions of the Chinese political system and its 
clash with the prevailing Hong Kong mentality. However, amidst the criticisms 
against the Chinese government, there is a thread of thinking that points to the 
illogic of aligning love for the country with love for the government - not just the 
Chinese government, but any government. As one Civic Education teacher in his 
forties said: 
I love China, but to love one's country doesn't mean to love the 
government, of course. I love my country and so my love is going to stay 
constant. But to love the government is ridiculous, because the 
government changes from time to time! If you say you love the 
government, it means whenever the government changes, your love will 
change too. That just doesn't make sense at all! 
According to this argument, loving the government as part of loving one's 
country is absurd. The absurdity lies in the notion that true love is by nature 
timeless and undying but all governments are ultimately transient and changeable; 
thus, to attach the kind of commitment and loyalty entailed in true love to the 
government is against the nature of love. This argument differs from the 
aforementioned criticisms against the government in that it not only focuses on 
judging the Chinese state but instead sees all governments in the same light as being 
universally inconsistent and ultimately unworthy of human love. This view brings 
Transition Project 2006:69). 
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the query about the state to a more fundamental level and suggests that no matter 
what form it is in or how "good" or ‘‘bad” it is to its citizens, no government should 
deserve people's love. 
At the same time, however, it must also be noted that while contending that it 
is impossible to love the government, the teacher has in the first place affirmed his 
love for the “country”，and hence by his own logic he was assuming that the 
‘‘country” (which he meant as the nation and not the state) is congruent with true 
love, which is supposedly constant and immortal. At this point, one can legitimately 
ask the same question about the nation as with the state: is the nation really such a 
stable, timeless entity as he believes it to be? Does the nation deserve all of the love 
that the state does not? While a substantial body of literature about nationalism as 
politics suggests that the belief in the nation as a primordial, homogenous and 
inalterable existence is in a large part a product of myth-making in modern states' 
nation-building projects (and is just as fictitious as the idea of the nation and the 
state being synonymous and equivalent) (Breuilly 2002:49; Conner 1994:93; 
Gellner 1983), among the Hong Kong teachers the assumption of the Chinese 
nation as a great, essential and irreducible cultural entity largely appeared to be 
unproblematic. For many of them, it was an unquestioned component of their 
Chinese cultural identity and imagination of the Chinese nation. ^ ^ 
We have now seen that among the 30 teachers in my sample, patriotism for 
China can be classified into two types: one that is based on a pro-Chinese 
government attitude and the other on an anti-Chinese government attitude. Although 
In Gellner's theory, the relationship between the nation and the centralized state is intricate, not 
because they are congruent or are essential as presumed by nationalism, but because states, as 
political protectors of cultures, are apt to use or sometimes invent pre-existing cultures of the society 
and transforms them into nations (Gellner 1983:48). While most of my informants are aware of the 
distinction between the nation and the centralized state, they are generally less critical of the state's 
role in the invention of the cultural nation. 
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individual teachers had different ways to define and express their senses of national 
identification, their attitude about the kind of patriotism that they did not embrace 
was clear. Given the discrepancy between different interpretations of patriotism, 
many Hong Kong teachers, who were themselves products of the particular 
socio-political circumstances of Hong Kong and who have now been counted on to 
implement patriotic education in formal schooling, reflected that they have had 
mixed feelings about teaching patriotism to students. 
A Hong Kong-born Civic Education teacher in her thirties reflected on her 
self-doubt as follows: 
"You learn from what you teach": this is really true! In the past, I really 
didn't have such a strong identity of being Chinese. It is only in recent 
years, after I have started to teach Civic Education and have engaged in 
different activities about nationalistic education, that I have become 
reflective on this matter. I keep thinking: is this what I should offer to my 
students? Should I offer something that even I myself do not have? I have 
thought hard and long about this. It's not like I don't have reservations 
about what I teach. 
This teacher felt caught in the tension between her personal belief and the 
intended purpose of nationalistic education. She was not in the first place conscious 
of her Chinese national identity or the concept of patriotism, and was sceptical 
whether it was legitimate at all for someone like her, who lacked a sense of 
patriotism, to instil patriotism in others; hence, before handling the problem of 
nationalistic education, she had to first convince herself of the positive value of 
patriotism as well as her role in teaching it. Moreover, just like many other Hong 
Kong teachers, her distrust of the Chinese state prevented her from agreeing with 
nationalistic education for China wholly; but her lack of support for the country — 
the nation AND the state — was fundamentally contradictory to the promotion of 
patriotism for China, which was a duty bestowed on her as a teacher. 
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Thus, in the course of teaching, “what and how to teach?" involves a set of 
extremely intricate questions. The teacher had to consider meticulously: does the 
country, the nation or the state, deserve to be loved? Should students be taught to 
love the country as well as the government? To what extent should a teacher 
compromise their own belief to serve the official purpose? Do they need to? The 
dilemma of teaching patriotism was common among my informants and was most 
acute among those teachers who had been used to being indifferent about the nation 
but had felt they were urged by their job to discern their personal orientations on the 
matter. This also formed part of the underlying reason for the prevailing sense of 
uncertainly and evasiveness among the teachers when they articulated their thoughts 
on nationalistic education. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have looked at the diverse national attitudes of my informants and 
the different ways in which they understand patriotic education. The majority of the 
teachers I interviewed expressed love or at least concern for the Chinese nation but 
a few of them displayed a remarkable degree of indifference. Regarding the 
promotion of patriotism in Hong Kong, the majority of all of my informants have 
reflected positive attitudes; but beneath such optimism, ambivalence about what 
kind of and in what way nationalistic education should be practised is apparent. On 
the basis of their different interpretations of patriotism, the teachers have been 
confronted with two extreme options: on one hand, there could be an education for 
pro-Chinese government patriotism, a kind of teaching that teachers view with 
scepticism but are supposed to work at as subjects of the larger political 
environment; on the other hand, there could be an education for anti-Chinese 
government patriotism, a kind of education that is generally seen as more 
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compatible with Hong Kong society but that will continue to deepen the chasm 
between Hong Kong and China. For some Hong Kong teachers, the political 
sensitivity and inherent contentiousness of the subject matter makes the teaching of 
nationalistic education an immensely tricky task. In the next chapter, we will look at 
the education programmes that have been carried out and examine the conflicting 
ways in which teachers teach patriotism at the school level. 
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Chapter Five 
Nationalistic Education in Practice: 
The Conflicting Meanings of China and Love for Country I 
We have seen in the last chapter the general attitudes of my informants towards the 
country and their views of nationalistic education for China. It seems that to some 
Hong Kong education practitioners, nationalistic education has remained an 
ambiguous and touchy topic. This chapter and the next will go beyond the general 
attitudes of the teachers and examine how teachers' perceptions are related to their 
actual practices of teaching. 
As shown previously, while some of my informants exhibited indifference or 
disapproval of any form of nationalistic education in Hong Kong, the majority did 
agree in principle that nationalistic education for China was worth promoting in 
Hong Kong. Nevertheless, when I asked these proponents to discuss concretely 
what “nationalistic education" should comprise in Hong Kong and how the subject 
matter, i.e. the “nation”，should be approached for Hong Kong people, I received no 
consistent answers. Basing on the teachers' narrations of the nationalistic education 
curriculum implemented in their schools, two major interlocking themes can be 
identified for exploration: first, whether nationalistic education in Hong Kong 
should be about cultural China or political China and second, whether nationalistic 
education should be affective or critical. While the first question is linked with how 
Hong Kong teachers conceive of "political education" in the Hong Kong context, 
the second concerns the concept of whether loving one's country is a duty or a 
choice. In the present chapter I will focus on the first set of questions, based on 
examples of classroom teaching. In the next chapter I will examine the second set of 
questions through discussing three other settings in which nationalistic education 
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takes place: fieldtrips to mainland China, the viewing by Hong Kong teachers and 
students of a video of the Chinese national anthem broadcasted in the mass media, 
and the flag-raising ceremony. By way of looking at the content and approaches that 
individual teachers adopted in teaching different versions of “nationalistic 
education’,，these two chapters will shed light on the larger issues of what belonging 
to a country and loving China really mean in a Hong Kong context. 
Which China Should Be Loved? Ancient, Cultural China versus 
Contemporary, Political China 
Apolitical and Depoliticized China 
As we have seen, for several decades, pre-handover Hong Kong's education was 
characterized as being a-nationalistic and apolitical. According to critics, civic 
education in Hong Kong has conventionally acted more as social and moral 
education than political education (Tse 1997), with the focus primarily placed on 
conformity-oriented content such as social order, discipline, and individuals' 
responsibility to larger social units with reference to traditional Confucian values. 
As "political education", civic education in colonial Hong Kong focused mainly on 
introducing public affairs and institutional and managerial aspects of government 
and not on promoting political skills and values in students (Tse 1997:39). As far as 
education about the nation is concerned, Hong Kong students had exposure to the 
study of China only through subjects like Chinese History and Chinese Language 
and Culture, which worked largely only to promote "an idealised vision of an 
ancient and essentially changeless Confucian civilisation" (Vickers 2003:242) rather 
than a realistic understanding of contemporary Chinese society and politics. This 
appears still to be the case today, at least partially. My research has found that 
although more teachers have become aware of the contentiousness of the national 
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identity problem in Hong Kong, the tendency to take nationalistic education as 
primarily the learning of Chinese arts and culture and denying that nationalistic 
education is any kind of "political education" is prevalent among the majority of my 
informants who claimed to support nationalistic education in Hong Kong. 
As Vickers has noted (2003:53), the Chinese History curriculum has for 
decades been a major vehicle in Hong Kong education for carrying on Chinese 
cultural heritage and defending Chinese cultural identity. Those of my informants 
who taught Chinese History as well as Chinese Language, Chinese Culture and 
Chinese Literature concord on this tradition, exhibiting a remarkably strong 
inclination towards the culturalist interpretation and presentation of China. 
For example, in narrating how she tried to instil among her students their 
“Chinese identity", a Hong Kong-born Chinese Language teacher in her thirties 
said: 
In my Chinese language class, instead of just focusing on the sentence 
structures or language skills, which are the major focuses of this subject, I 
try to cultivate students' Chinese national identity by telling more about 
the cultural and historical background of the essays in the textbook. 
Whenever I come across essays that touch upon aspects of Chinese 
philosophy or Chinese traditional virtues, if time allows I will also pick 
out those points to elaborate to my students. To me, even though we live 
in a modern world today, qualities such as filial piety and diligence are 
very important. We need to focus on these special qualities of the Chinese 
people. 
A Chinese History teacher in her fifties said: 
In the Chinese History curriculum, changes that have to do with 
nationalistic education are mostly found in our extra-curricular activities, 
not in formal lessons. Last year, teachers of Chinese Language, Chinese 
History, Chinese Culture and Putonghua organized a Chinese Culture 
Week around the Lunar New Year for the promotion of Chinese traditions 
and cultures. As teachers, we expected that students should know more 
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about China, at least about the traditions of Chinese culture. So I showed 
the tea pots that I bought from Fuji an to my students to enhance their 
knowledge of Chinese tea art. I felt really good about it. I think teachers 
of any subjects that have to do with China have the responsibility to 
introduce more about our Chinese culture to students. 
In the above quotations, these teachers place a special emphasis on introducing 
"Chinese culture" as a means of cultivating “Chinese identity" among their students. 
When they talked about their personal senses of identification with China, they all 
acknowledged that the nation comprises both cultural and political realms and said 
that there are two different dimensions 一 cultural and political — to a person's 
national identity. However, in their teaching, it appears that identification with 
China is only a matter of identifying with cultural givens such as a common 
language, a shared history, and a cultural heritage. 
In this approach, love for cultural China, which includes the people, the culture, 
the history, and the land of China, is not only unquestioned but is also assumed to 
represent the whole of China. At the same time, love for political China, which 
entails the Chinese Communist state and its controversial doings in recent history, is 
unmentioned and treated as irrelevant to the teaching of Chinese national identity to 
Hong Kong students. 
Yet, to speak of my sample as a whole, the tendency of defining the country 
monolithically in terms of the cultural nation is by no means confined to the 
teaching of those subjects that are by nature related to Chinese culture. In fact, some 
teachers of Civic Education, a cross-curricular and wide-ranging subject that has 
very different objectives than the traditional China-related subjects,^^ demonstrated 
53 Traditionally, civic education has been taken worldwide as a vehicle for the inculcation of 
national loyalty and the socialization of individuals into "obedient", good citizens; but more recently 
civic education is also geared towards the cultivation of the qualities of being an active, liberal and 
multi-dimensional citizen (Leung 2003:2). We will see later in this chapter and the next chapter that 
the role that Civic Education should play in Hong Kong and its relationship to nationalistic education 
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the strongest disposition towards the appreciation and acceptance of the cultural 
nation in their teaching about China. Thus, while the average teacher often talks 
about their teaching practices in terms of the particulars of the subjects they teach, 
one should refrain from generalizing about any absolute relationship between 
teachers' attitude and any certain subject. 
Similar to the Chinese History and Chinese Language teachers quoted above, a 
Civic Education teacher in her thirties emphasized the promotion of Chinese culture 
and traditions in her nationalistic education programme as follows: 
I personally believe that in order to reinforce students' Chinese identity, it 
is important to start with Chinese culture. Like in the "Chinese Culture 
Week" that I co-ordinated last year, I chose a topic about the different 
forms of marriage and customs in mate selection in China's history for a 
hall assembly talk. I invited Chinese Language teachers, who are more 
proficient in the subject matter, to hold this assembly. I also invited Home 
Economics teachers to prepare for us some Chinese snacks and drinks -
various kinds of Chinese delicacies, dim sum and yum cha (tea drinking). 
I invited Fine Art teachers to demonstrate the making of Chinese arts and 
handicrafts, as well as Chinese Language teachers to perform palm 
reading and word interpretation for the students. It was a huge success! 
The main thing is, we were able to create a festive atmosphere around 
Chinese New Year that raised students' interest in our Chinese culture! 
It is important to note that teachers from fourteen out of the twenty-three 
schools of my sample in particular pointed out extra-curricular activities such as the 
aforementioned "Chinese Culture Week", which feature Chinese customs, foods, 
drinks, clothing, astrology and traditional festivals around the time of Chinese New 
Year, to be very typical and popular programmes in their school-based nationalistic 
education curriculum after the handover. At the same time, however, although six of 
is a topic in debate among the teachers. This is very much in contrast with the situation of the 
traditional, academic Chinese culture subjects, whose roles in the larger curriculum have remained 
largely unchanged over the years and whose relation with "Chinese national culture" is 
conventionally unquestioned. 
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the twenty-three schools have organized both before and after the handover 
large-scale activities annually featuring the June Fourth Tiananmen Square Incident, 
only three of the ten informants from these six schools cited such programmes as a 
component of nationalistic education for China. From this, one may conclude that in 
many of my informants' preconceptions, learning to belong to China is almost by 
default about learning about a cultural China endowed with a long history and 
strong traditions. The fact that many teachers did not mention the teaching of the 
Tiananmen Square Incident in their schools until they were asked about it even 
though they recognized that the Incident has had profound influence on the 
cultivation of Hong Kong people's patriotic sentiments indicates that approaching a 
controversial, political China was not an important component in the teachers' 
definition or comprehension of nationalistic education in Hong Kong.�4 
Nevertheless, no matter how much the teachers sought to de-politicize the 
nation in their teaching, the teaching of Chinese national identity in Hong Kong is 
in itself political and contentious, as civic and national identity does objectively 
mean very different things in Hong Kong and in the PRC. As Hughes and Stone 
(1999) have commented, based on the “one country, two systems" political 
principle, formal civic education in post-handover Hong Kong implies the learning 
of two different sets of concepts and values attached respectively to the Hong Kong 
local community and the Chinese national community. In education, this requires on 
the one hand the study of topics such as the Basic Law, representative government 
and elections, and the administrative systems of the Hong Kong SAR, and on the 
54 This is of course related to the problem of reactivity. As I have mentioned in Chapter 1, many 
teachers seemed to assume that I was in favour of the official version of nationalistic education and 
thus tended to present to me a more politically correct picture of nationalistic education in their 
schools. 
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Other hand the study of the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party and the 
political and economic systems of the People's Republic of China (1999:982-983). 
Although education documents and government officials emphasize the primacy of 
the Chinese national community, these two sets of content are essentially 
incompatible, in that one is oriented towards the formation of a sense of belonging 
to a democratizing regional Hong Kong society and the other towards that of a 
totalitarian national Chinese leadership (Hughes and Stone 1999:982-984). 
Indeed, among the 14 Civic Education teachers in my sample as of 30 of my 
informants in all, a majority (10) spoke of their experience in teaching both of these 
sets of content. Nevertheless, where "political China" is involved in their teaching, 
some of these teachers deliberately sought to avoid or downplay potential 
controversy. A Hong Kong-born Civic Education teacher in his thirties explicitly 
argued that his teaching about the Chinese state focused on the administrative and 
institutional aspects of the Chinese government and not “politics”，as follows: 
The overall aim of our Civic Education curriculum is to introduce the 
kind of content that is more interesting, that is, topics about the 
characteristics of ethnicity and culture, regional foods of China, local 
architecture and so on. We start with things which students can see and 
which can best represent the cultural phenomena in China, so that 
students can at least have a basic understanding of the culture and have a 
sense of belonging to the culture. As for the so-called national identity 
thing, we try not to touch on politics or concepts, which are rather hard 
and abstract to the students. At most we may give students information 
about the administrative system of the country and the structure of the 
Chinese government. However, it's not that much. If we talk about these 
features about the nation, it is only because they are already given 
objectively, that they are there as facts. And I must say that we don't have 
any plan to teach anything more than that about the political aspect of 
China, at least not in the near future. 
Like his counterparts quoted above, this teacher places a special emphasis on 
cultural China. At the same time, he also expresses considerable reluctance to 
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approach political China, despite the fact that syllabus for the formal Civic 
Education course in his school requires him to do so. By arguing explicitly against 
the inclusion of "hard politics" and "abstract concepts" into the teaching about 
China, this teacher demonstrates a degree of caution about the controversial and 
ideological aspects of the national identity issue. 
In many cases, the inherent tension in the teaching of national identity in 
practice is quite obvious; but some of these teachers did not appear to recognize the 
political or controversial aspect of certain Hong Kong-China issues at all. For 
example, a Hong Kong-born Civic Education teacher in her thirties from one of the 
three schools where I conducted participant observation described how she 
attempted to “reinforce students' Chinese identity" as follows: 
We bring students to reflect on their identity of being Chinese through 
day-to-day experiences. For example, we give Form Six students survey 
questionnaires. We ask them to make comparison of whether they think 
that they are Hong Kong people or whether they are Chinese. All the 
questions are set in such a manner of contrast.^^ 
Given the incompatibility between the “Hong Kong values” and the “PRC 
values" discussed in Hughes and Stone (1999), placing the status of being 
Hongkongese and that of being Chinese into contrast is, in a sense, a way of 
exposing students to the most ambiguous aspects of the national identity problem in 
Hong Kong. When asked how she explained to the students what each of the two 
identities symbolized, this teacher insisted that the Hong Kong-Chinese identity 
issue was not supposed to be presented as a conflicting question to the students. 
Instead, she stressed that her teaching was to emphasize the harmony of the dual 
identity: 
55 In the questionnaire, students were asked to agree or disagree with statements such as “我言忍爲我 
愛香港 ° ”（“I believe I love Hong Kong.，’)，“我認爲我愛中國。”（“I believe I love China.") and 
“我認爲香港人與中國人有明顯分別。”（“I think that there is obvious difference between a 
Hongkongese and a Chinese."). 
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The survey, as well as all other teaching material that I prepare for the 
class, is not at all about questioning one's national identity. The main 
purpose is to arouse students' consciousness like ‘‘so I am a Chinese, not 
just a Hong Kong person". 
So far, in this section I have shown that certain teaching approaches, including 
invoking only ancient, cultural China and avoiding the mention of anything about 
contemporary, political China, as well as downplaying all potential controversy of 
the national identity issue, are consistently found in the teaching of those teachers 
who insisted that civic and nationalistic education in Hong Kong should not be any 
kind of “political education", or in Cantonese, jingjihgaaujuhk (政、冶教育).In such 
teaching, “the country" refers only to the cultural nation, not the political state; 
"national identity" is assumed entirely as an ethno-cultural rather than a 
civic-political identity. When asked why exactly "China" and “Chinese national 
identity" had to be interpreted this way in the teaching of national identity in Hong 
Kong, many of the teachers attributed it to the need for effectiveness in teaching. 
For example, a Hong Kong-bom Civic Education teacher in his forties said: 
The thing is, in the unique situation of Hong Kong, we have to use unique 
approaches. Methods used by Hong Kong secondary schools tend to be in 
a very mild and soft form; they avoid political aspects, or things dealing 
with the government, and focus on cultural packaging, historical 
perspective, and the mundane life of the common people. The cultural 
dimension is considered unobtrusive and is easily integrated into the 
larger curriculum. At this stage, it is easier for schools to handle it this 
way. 
Answers of this kind reflect a very common preconception among my 
informants regarding my research question: nationalistic education in Hong Kong is 
something that one is obliged to deal with and whose meanings should be viewed 
from the perspective of "efficacy". Certainly, "emphasizing the cultural nation and 
downplaying the political nation" is reasonable as a strategy arising from 
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consideration of education efficacy and effectiveness. Nevertheless, as legitimate as 
this reason is from the perspective of the education profession in the Hong Kong 
context, in a larger and more fundamental sense what underlies the teachers' choice 
of strategy is their view of what kind of "love for China" as well as what kind of 
“political education" should be taught to students. I have shown in the previous 
chapter that the majority of my informants recognized two different types of 
patriotism, which they designated as “the pro-China type of patriotism", which 
equates loving the people and culture (the nation) with loving the Chinese 
Communist Party (the state) and “the real type of patriotism", which refers to loving 
the Chinese nation but not the Chinese state. My informants tended to regard the 
former type with disapproval and the latter type with a degree of approval. In the 
remainder of this section, I will draw on this finding and discuss the reasons that 
have been left unsaid in the teachers' de-politicizing approach to nationalistic 
education in Hong Kong today. This entails explication of teachers' underlying 
national attitudes. 
For the majority of the teachers who advocate a depoliticized version of 
patriotic education for China, their inclination to keep political China out of the 
classroom stems directly from their long-term distrust of the Chinese state. A Hong 
Kong-bom Civic Education teacher in her thirties reflected that presenting political 
China to the students was "kind of unsettling to the teachers themselves": 
We always try to affect students by focusing on the cultural level, which 
is to me a mild and more neutral approach to nationalistic education. 
Topics that are too politicized or ideas that are too one-sided and 
promotional are among the things that I never deliver in my teaching. 
When I have to invite a guest speaker, it would always be persons with a 
neutral background, such as ordinary volunteers who have contributed in 
a down-to-earth way to the country. I never invite politicians or people 
who are considered pro-China to give talks in our school. If it is an 
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activity which promotes a political party or which is full of politicized 
elements, then I would definitely have problems with it, because my aim 
is to teach my students about the concepts only. I do not want to mold my 
students to believe in any political party. 
For these teachers, when they claimed they opposed political education, what 
they tended to refer to is the kind of political education that works towards “the 
pro-China type of patriotism". These teachers are reluctant to deal with political 
China not only because they are used to living and teaching without having to 
adhere to or advocate any particular values as stipulated in the national political 
system but also because they are particularly sceptical of the pro-China doctrine. In 
fear of teaching pro-China propaganda, the teachers avoid approaching the whole of 
political China altogether in the classroom. 
That said, however, it is important to note that these teachers' avoidance of 
contemporary political China in their teaching does not by any means constitute 
resistance to the Chinese state. On the contrary, in believing that love for China 
through the apolitical realm, such as its "great people”，"magnificent culture" and 
"glorious history" is unproblematic and in taking the promotion of this kind of 
patriotism to their students as obligatory, they are acting exactly in line with the 
Chinese government's official directives in its state-centred patriotic education. 
Since the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 these directives have placed 
increasing emphasis on history and traditional culture as the two major vehicles for 
achieving such goals as creating among the Chinese masses a "correct" view of 
their cultural tradition, demonstrating a distinct national image of China, as well as 
"stabilising the public mood" and dissolving negative sentiments (He and Guo 
2000:25-30). In the state nationalism in contemporary China, arts and “culture” 
function as the most important political tool for instilling in the people an apolitical 
notion of patriotism for the Chinese state. Despite their intention to resist the 
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Chinese government's state-centric conception of nationalism, the Hong Kong 
teachers are in reality employing the tactic endorsed and preferred in “the pro-China 
type of patriotism" when they try to rely only on arts and "culture" to introduce 
China to their students. In a way, this demonstrates tacit acceptance of a political 
doctrine that runs against their personal beliefs. 
While in the majority of interviews I observed an attitude of opposition against 
pro-China patriotism, there was one particular case in which the teacher invoked a 
sentiment that is very much akin to "pro-China patriotism” when rationalizing her 
de-politicizing teaching approach. A Hong Kong-born Physical Education teacher in 
her thirties who said that she had developed a more patriotic outlook because of the 
economic benefits brought by the deeper Hong Kong-China relation since the 
handover argued in support of the absence of programmes about political issues of 
contemporary China in her school as follows? 
We have not talked about the June Fourth Tiananmen Square Incident in 
our teaching, and I don't see any problem with it. Before 1997,1 used to 
join activities concerning the event, but after 1997, I've refrained from 
doing so. I feel that in recent years the Democratic Party has headed in a 
wrong direction. They are using the masses to attack China; they rebel 
simply for the sake of rebellion. In fact, if you look at Hong Kong now, 
can you say that there is no democracy here? I don't think so. I still 
sympathize with those who were sacrificed during the June Fourth event, 
and I still respect the leaders of the 1989 protests. But now, can one say 
that there's utterly no democracy in China? I don't think so. I have come 
to trust the Chinese government much more; China has certainly adopted 
some ideas of democracy and principles of western economies, that's why 
it's been able to develop so well these years! Thus, I've come to disagree 
with the present Democratic Party's line of argument. I think they are 
spreading a kind of "anti-everything" attitude and have lost their reason. 
This teacher is the one quoted in Chapter 3 who introduced a session about Chinese national 
athletes in her Physical Education classes and one of those teachers discussed in Chapter 4 who 
argued in favour of patriotic education on an economic and material ground. 
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So, for the June Fourth event, as long as I know that such an event has 
taken place, it is enough. There is no point to bring it up again and again. 
Every society has both good and bad sides; it's impossible for anyone to 
be anti-everything all the time! 
From the above response, we see that this teacher has changed from being an 
active opponent to the Chinese state's leadership to a person who is ready to defend 
the state for its legitimacy - and even through the rhetoric of a patriot by the 
Chinese government's standard. Today she seems to view the things that she used to 
deem "wrong" of the Chinese state as completely negligible and dismisses them as 
irrelevant in the construction of one's identity in the present's Hong Kong. She also 
appears to believe that pointing out that all societies have a "bad side" in general 
can account for the particular "wrong" of her country. By claiming to support 
Chinese leadership in spite of its faults, this teacher exhibits a special kind of 
loyalty to the Chinese state that is not found in other informants who adopt the same 
teaching strategy as she does. 
Undeniably, from the perspective of an absolute pro-China patriot, the strong 
faith that this teacher shows in capitalism and the fact that this teacher has not 
actively sought in her teaching to promote the Chinese state's ideology, which 
necessarily includes commitment to socialism and love for the Chinese Communist 
Party, might appear to be contradictory to her alleged appreciation for the Chinese 
leadership. Yet, considering the inherent incompatibility between the values of the 
average Hong Kong person and those of the Chinese government in both 
socio-economic and political terms, the contradiction in question is simply one way 
to reflect the ambiguity in an ordinary person, long adapted to capitalism and also 
increasingly to democratization, trying to come to terms with the presence of a 
socialist totalitarian sovereign. 
Clearly, despite her declaration of an increasingly pro-China disposition, deep 
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down, this teacher is as acutely aware of the distinction between the state and the 
nation as any of her counterparts. This probably does not mark this teacher as a 
pro-China patriot in the ‘‘purest” sense; but on her own terms, she does play the role 
of a patriot by refraining from touching upon the state's taboo topics and preventing 
any criticisms against the state from arising both in and out of the classroom. If the 
Chinese government's standard has to be applied here, then one may probably say 
that the teacher's performance fulfils the Chinese Communist Party's “minimum 
requirement for patriotism", which, according to He and Guo, is “not to condemn 
socialism or challenge the Party" (2000:28). 
In the above, we have examined two opposite rationales for rendering 
nationalistic education in Hong Kong apolitical. On one hand, depoliticizing 
nationalistic education is a means of minimizing the risk of political indoctrination, 
and this is supposed to be a statement against pro-China patriotic education. On the 
other hand, doing so is for the sake of ruling out all possibility of breaking the 
state's taboo, and this is intended to testify to one's pro-China patriotic sentiment. In 
spite of their very different motives, teachers in both cases do in common exhibit a 
play-it-safe mentality when facing the contentiousness and ambiguity of the 
Chinese national identity problem. This makes them end up presenting China to 
their students in the way that the Chinese government wants them to. 
Political China 
According to Kerr (2000), avoiding sensitive and controversial issues in the 
teaching of citizenship education is common across different societies. Countries 
such as Switzerland, Hungary, Japan and Korea are some of the places where there 
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is a tendency among teachers to present teaching material in “a didactic, 
non-controversial way,，and a tradition of using a "formal, knowledge-based 
approach" to citizenship education(Kerr 2000:217-218). In this regard, Hong Kong 
does not look much different from these countries. However, Hong Kong is unique 
in the sense that having been returned to a national sovereign for less than a decade, 
it has started the debate on "political education" and "patriotic education" only 
recently, and extremely ambiguous interpretations of these terms are readily found 
even among my very small sample of informants. From the previous section, we see 
that “political education" may be interpreted in opposite ways such as "anti-China 
patriotic education" and "pro-China patriotic education". We also see that the 
teachers find both "anti-China patriotic education" and "pro-China patriotic 
education" too sensitive; because of this, when "political China" had to be taught, it 
was largely downplayed by the teachers to include only the teaching of simple facts 
or uncontroversial characteristics about the political system of the country. In this 
section, I will focus on the teachers who contend that the teaching of national 
identity in Hong Kong should deal directly with sensitive and controversial issues 
of contemporary, political China, in contrast to only familiarizing students with 
ancient, cultural China. 
As mentioned earlier, between the handover and the time of my interviews, six 
of the twenty three schools of my sample have carried out large-scale annual 
programmes that taught the history of the June Fourth Tiananmen Square Incident. 
Among the eight teachers I interviewed who have actively involved themselves in 
these programmes, three of them contended that the teaching of the Incident is the 
most essential aspect of nationalistic education. 
To quote a Hong Kong-born Civic Education teacher in his thirties describing 
the programme he organized in his school: 
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The review of the June Fourth Tiananmen Square Incident has been a big 
function in this school. We normally held it during the weekly assembly, 
which lasted for about one hour, for all students in our school. It has taken 
a variety of formats. In earlier years, that is, around the anniversary, 
some of our teachers sang the Movement songs; we lit candles in our hall, 
imitating what they do in the public vigils. You may say that our procedure 
was like a small-scale candle night gathering. Then, in these recent two years, 
we have invited guest speakers from outside. My colleagues invited Szeto 
Wah^^ to give a talk last year, as well as “Long Hair"^^ and the drama 
group "Tiananmen Mothers" in June this year. It was quite impressive, 
especially last year. As you know, Szeto Wah is very experienced in 
public affairs and has much insight on this matter... .Moreover, we didn't 
just invite him but we also invited his enemy, who was a member from 
the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong. 
You see, that is a way to let students know that actually there are different 
sides to the matter, there are people who support the government's 
oppressive action and there are those who object to it. 
To quote a Hong Kong-born teacher in his thirties from another school: 
We've held this function for many consecutive years. Every year there 
were some differences. Generally, we used display boards to show 
pictures and provide brief introduction. Sometimes, we made the display 
boards by ourselves — teachers and students. Sometimes, we got materials 
from some organizations. The main thing is the sharing session in hall 
assemblies where teachers would give talks on the topic. Normally, 
students have heard of the event from the news and media, but they might 
not know it in details. Thus, our purpose is to deepen their understanding 
of the event: what had happened during the event? Why do people 
commemorate it today? We hope to stimulate them to reflect more on the 
matter. Moreover, we've invited organizations to visit our school. For 
example, members from the Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong 
Kong Catholic Diocese have delivered a drama to our students before. In 
some other years, we've tried to distribute leaflets that conveyed the 
57 A former member of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, Szeto Wah established the Hong Kong 
Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China during the Tiananmen Square 
protests in 1989, and is currently the chairman of the alliance. He has been banned by the Chinese 
government from visiting China (Wikipedia 2007). 
58 Leung Kwok-hung, nicknamed "Long Hair" for his shoulder length hair, is currently a member of 
the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, a member of April Fifth Action — a radical socialist group, 
and a self-proclaimed Trotskyist (Wikipedia 2007),very much against the Chinese government in his 
rhetoric. 
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messages. There are multiple means and different focuses you can choose, 
even it is the same theme every year. For example, at one time you may 
feature the history of it; you may present it like a history book or a news 
report: in 1989, some things happened; the contributing factors are so and 
so, the course of the event and the consequences are so and so. At another 
time, you can talk about the Tiananmen Mothers, about what they're 
doing in life now. And at yet another time, you may provide comparable 
examples from other countries. For example, Korea and India have 
undergone similar movements before. We would talk about what they've 
gone through to become a democratic country today. From these 
examples we draw parallels to the June Fourth Incident and show the 
students a different level of meanings of the movement. 
By inviting political dissenters to schools and discussing the controversy of the 
Chinese government's crackdown, these teachers introduce a negative side of the 
country that starkly contrasts with the magnificent and adorable China that students 
are encouraged to approach through learning Chinese arts and culture. 
In explaining why they chose to promote patriotic education in such a way that 
contradicts the government's wish, these teachers said that their objective was not to 
be anti-Chinese government. Rather, they emphasized that learning about the 
Tiananmen Square Incident was a good channel for Hong Kong students to see what 
"love for China" really meant for Hong Kong people. As mentioned previously, for 
many Hong Kong Chinese who lived through the 1980s and 1990s, the Tiananmen 
Square Incident carries very special meanings; it was the first time for them to have 
experienced true patriotic emotion for the Chinese nation and to have been involved 
in Chinese politics. The teachers under discussion are among this category of people. 
They personally believed that the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong 
following the Incident represents a very important phase of the formation of their 
national identity and political attitudes, and as teachers they considered it essential 
to teach their students about this event. 
Moreover, these teachers argued that the conventional approach of teaching 
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national identity only through the cultural nation was biased and inadequate in 
bringing average Hong Kong students, who have long been ignorant of concepts 
about the nation and affairs of China, to truly care for their country and be 
assimilated into a sense of national belonging. 
A Hong Kong-bom Civic Education teacher in his thirties said: 
The reason why I don't like focusing only on the cultural aspect is exactly 
that it is already understood. We all know that Chinese culture is 
something that is worth our appreciation and respect, but nationalistic 
education shouldn't be only about appreciating the mountains and the 
land or experiencing poverty through cultural exchange trips in China. In 
fact, the picture behind the poverty reflects what the social system lacks, 
why the social distribution of resources is uneven, how come coastal areas 
are rich but the inland is impoverished and so on. In fact, all these point to 
politics, the Chinese state policies and the ideology behind them. All these 
are important issues that our students should look at as a Chinese. Of 
course we want to instil a sense of belonging to China in our students, but 
it is also important for them to find out where the problems are with their 
country and come to a better understanding of it as they leam to belong to 
it. 
In the eyes of these teachers, since a country objectively consist of both 
cultural and political dimensions and the teaching about China in Hong Kong before 
and after the handover has indeed neglected the political dimension, it would be 
unreasonable and irresponsible for them not to focus on political China more now 
that patriotic education has been officially encouraged in Hong Kong. They believe 
that they have the duty to counterbalance the de-politicized scene of Hong Kong's 
civic and patriotic education. 
With this principle in mind, all of the teachers in this category disagreed with 
the "play-it-safe" mentality exhibited by those teachers featured in the previous 
section. They felt that refraining from introducing all aspects of the country to the 
students is a kind of self-censorship. A Hong Kong-bom Civic Education teacher in 
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his thirties said: 
When teachers handle certain topics, can they refrain from committing 
self-censorship? Can they be free to speak their mind? Are they able to 
say whatever they think is right and correct? Nowadays it's trendy to talk 
about "political correctness". The funniest thing is that whenever you 
speak of China, no matter what it is, you can't avoid becoming “political”. 
Even if you don't mean to talk about politics, the choice of the topic 
speaks for your standpoint. The fact that you're discussing a certain 
matter or not is a statement in itself. It's not even about airing your 
opinions on the matter, but is a question of whether to mention it or not! 
Thus, whether you choose to show only the bright side or only the dark 
side of the picture becomes a critical thing to consider when a teacher 
chooses an educational topic. And very often teachers worry that if they 
express their standpoints it would violate certain taboos. Thus, sometimes 
they simply choose not to take the risk and refrain from talking too much. 
To me this is a real sign of diminishing freedom of speech, something that 
I'm very concerned about for the future of nationalistic education. In fact, 
it is precisely because the political environment of Hong Kong today is 
full of conflicting thoughts and comments about the nation that as 
teachers we have a duty to help students see through all these. Otherwise, 
they would be very easily misled and lose their ability to judge. I really 
don't think we could let them end up like this. They must learn to be able 
to judge what's right and what's wrong. 
This group of teachers are also extremely critical of the Chinese government 
and the increasingly pro-China outlook of some Hong Kong people after the 
handover. A Hong Kong-born EPA teacher in his thirties who has participated in 
commemorative gatherings on the Fourth of June every year since 1989 said: 
It's wrong for the Chinese government to order the crackdown in 1989. 
It's also wrong for some people to speak of a so-called “fair，objective and 
neutral" stance and say that the history is not yet settled. Because what 
has happened has indeed happened! You cannot say that there was no 
suppression. The tanks were there, this is a fact; the Chinese army did kill 
people, this is also a fact. You cannot say that today's stability and 
prosperity have become everything and can override everything else and 
therefore it is okay for students to believe that the past can now be 
forgotten. You cannot say that today economic development is our priority 
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SO let's just focus on the present. You cannot divert people's attention this 
way, because when you do this, it is just the same as hiding from the past. 
The fact is out there and is not for you to judge. When the guns have been 
fired and people have been killed, you can't ask students to judge: "hey, 
look at those people, they are holding a gun, would you say that they will 
kill people or not?,’ I think today it has come to the point that even the 
fact itself has become something that can be taken as debatable and open 
for anyone to judge. . . . In fact, too many people have become silent about 
this event. And when people talk about it at all, many have altered their 
standpoint to side with the government. To me this means regression in 
our society and as a teacher I do want to let my students know that there is 
a different side of the matter. 
In explicitly criticizing the totalitarianism and autocracy of the Chinese state 
and breaking the Chinese state's taboo, this group of teachers and the kind of 
patriotic education they teach are necessarily anti-China by the standard of the 
Chinese Communist Party's doctrine. Some of these teachers also added that 
political education in Hong Kong at this stage should give priority to democratic 
education over nationalistic education. One of these teachers said: 
I think nationalistic education in Hong Kong should actually start with 
democratic education. In fact, the reason why so few Hong Kong teachers 
today are promoting the kind of patriotic education that I've been doing 
for years is that our social and political environment is not in favour of it. 
To me, for nationalistic education to succeed in Hong Kong, schools must 
first teach about democracy, politics, and human right. As long as China 
improves its system and the one-country-two-system formula has become 
more solid, Hong Kong people will naturally have more confidence in 
China and nationalistic education will naturally grow by itself! 
In defining democratic education as the prerequisite of nationalistic education 
in Hong Kong, these teachers are in effect making a statement that the values 
attached to democratizing Hong Kong should be emphasized over those attached to 
their totalitarian sovereign. This, again, symbolizes resistance against the Chinese 
government. Nevertheless, these teachers did not consider themselves "anti-China". 
Rather, they said that they have been working on the teaching of national identity in 
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Hong Kong for a long time. Some of them also exhibited strong senses of national 
belonging to China as well as strong commitment to the promotion of patriotic 
education in Hong Kong. Like any Chinese patriot, they sometimes spoke of a 
timeless China. As a Hong Kong-bom Civic Education teacher in his thirties argued 
that national identity should be taught irrespective of changes of times: 
To me nationalistic education is not just a response to the government's 
urge. I have organized these programmes for more than ten years. It is not 
because it's after 1997 that we need to do so and so. Your identity of 
being Chinese should have always been the same, no matter before or 
after 1997. 
To put it in terms of my earlier findings, the kind of patriotism that this group 
of teachers have strived to teach is the "anti-China type of patriotism" discussed in 
Chapter Four, which is based on the notion that the state and the nation are two 
different realms and loving one of these does not essentially entail loving the other. 
Although as discussed throughout this thesis most of the informants of my sample 
in common believe that love for the Chinese nation is essential but love for the 
Chinese state is unacceptable, this group of teachers are different from the rest of 
my informants in that they seek actively to convey this view in their teaching. By 
bringing the ambiguity and controversy of the national identity issue into their 
teaching instead of hiding it from their students, they offer a version of nationalistic 
education in Hong Kong that is close to their personal senses of national belonging 
but runs fundamentally against Hong Kong's and China's nation building agenda. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined two different ways in which China is presented in 
the teaching of national identity in the classrooms. On one hand, teachers who 
146 
Chapter Three Tse Yuen Man 
wanted to stay away from pro-China political indoctrination and teachers who 
intended to avoid violating the Chinese authorities' wish in common sought to 
de-politicize patriotic education by emphasizing "culture" and arts and downplaying 
controversy about the country in their teaching. Despite their opposite intentions, 
both of these two groups of teachers interpret patriotic education the same way, 
equalizing it essentially with the teaching about ancient, cultural China. On the 
other hand, teachers who have been personally affected by stories of contemporary 
Chinese politics and hold pro-democracy views emphasize the teaching of 
controversial issues of contemporary, political China to counter-act the 
de-politicized ethos of Hong Kong civic and patriotic education. Their teaching 
approach is fundamentally against the Chinese official directives; however, this 
does not necessarily imply that these teachers do not love their country. In fact, they 
often displayed deep concern and strong sentiments for the Chinese nation like any 
average patriots. On the whole, we see that while the two teaching approaches 
discussed in this chapter convey two distinctive images of China, each of them is 
justified by contradictory rationales. 
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Chapter Six 
Nationalistic Education in Practice: 
The Conflicting Meanings of China and Love for Country II 
Affective or Critical Education/ Loving the Country as a Duty or a Choice 
According to my informants, civic education is both affective and cognitive. In one 
informant's words, at the affective level, nationalistic education involves “the 
fostering of sentiment and an emotional attachment towards the country"; at the 
cognitive level, nationalistic education involves “the provision of knowledge in 
order to enhance students' understanding of the country". In the eyes of some 
teachers, these two faculties in the same education model are not mutually exclusive 
but are rather complementary of each other. Nevertheless, in a fundamental sense, 
these entail two opposite kinds of learning experience, one involving approaching 
the country through feeling and emotion and the other through thinking and 
reasoning. In the context of Hong Kong, where there has not been a 
taken-for-granted concept of patriotism and where widespread ambivalence towards 
the country remains, emphasizing one of the approaches over the other is symbolic 
of choosing between the two rival kinds of nationalistic education we have 
discussed. In this chapter I will explore how these two approaches are employed in 
various education activities. I will focus on three major components of today's 
nationalistic education in Hong Kong: first, fieldtrips in mainland China, an 
increasingly popular and “the most effective" means of nationalistic education in 
the eyes of teachers; second, the territory-wide telecast of the Chinese national 
anthem, a material from the Hong Kong government's official nationalistic 
education campaign viewed by teachers and students, and third, the flag-raising 
ceremony, a convention that nationals worldwide have take for granted and has 
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recently been brought into the Hong Kong school culture. 
While illustrating how affective and cognitive/ critical nationalistic education 
may be taught in Hong Kong, I will also explore what these approaches represent to 
the Hong Kong teachers about the nature of love for country. According to Smith 
(1991:15)，there are two different concepts underlying the construction of national 
identity, namely, the civic principle and the ethnic principle. While a love for 
country based on the civic principle would be a matter of choice, as individuals may 
judge the nation according to its performance and decide whether they would attach 
their sense of belonging to this nation or civic culture, the ethnic principle 
emphasizes common descent or common race as the basis for unifying the country, 
which implies that individuals' national identity is a given and not a chosen aspect 
of themselves. With reference to these concepts, the underlying concept of whether 
loving the country is a duty or a choice for the teachers will be discussed. 
L Fieldtrips to Mainland China 
As mentioned throughout this thesis, Hong Kong youngsters have often been said to 
be ignorant and disinterested in their country. This can be understood in the light of 
their lack of nationalistic socialization in the past. Despite the closer links between 
Hong Kong and mainland China in recent years, Hong Kong youngsters' feelings 
towards mainland China appear to remain conflicted. According to many of my 
informants, Hong Kong students' impression of China has been found to be still in 
large part negative. In general, there are two major reasons for this. First, the image 
of China as poor and backward has long been seated in the minds of many Hong 
Kong people and has continued to dampen China's prestige in the eyes of Hong 
Kong youngsters, even though in reality China is rapidly becoming wealthier. 
Second, the reputation of the Chinese government and her politics is still often 
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associated with autocracy, which further intimidates and repels many Hong Kong 
students, who have been sheltered in a politically untroubled environment almost all 
their lives. 
A Chinese History teacher in her fifties has offered a capsule description of 
Hong Kong students' attitudes towards China as follows: 
When we talked about the history of modern China, many students had a 
very strong feeling that they did not like China. The major reason, I think, 
is that the presentation in the mass media, whether newspapers, radio, or 
一 television, often delivers messages about China that are often more 
negative than positive. For example, lately we have learnt that there are a 
lot of fake products from China. It seems that a lot of bad things are going 
on in the mainland. So maybe that's how students are influenced; they 
tend to associate China with corruption and poverty. Moreover, Hong 
Kong students have a strong sense of individuality; when it comes to 
ideas like belonging to a nation they just won't pay much attention. Of 
course, there are also students who grew up earlier under colonial 
education and have simply not been encouraged to love China or any 
nation. 
When adopting the affective approach, teachers tend to view the above 
characteristics of Hong Kong students as defects that must be remedied. In their 
attempts to alter their students' perceptions of China, the teachers largely work at 
positive presentation of ancient cultural China and much less explicitly, also at that 
of contemporary Chinese society and government. The most prominent examples of 
these can be found in the teachers' accounts of students' fieldtrips in mainland 
China, which half of the 23 schools of my sample have organized since the 
handover.59 
59 
A typical format of a tour would be of around three to seven days, with outings scheduled for the 
daytime and discussion sessions or study groups at the end of each day. Fieldtrips organized by 
individual schools normally accommodate around 20 to 30 participants, including students, teachers, 
and even parents. The National Education Centre, a unit under the direction of the EMB, has 
organized a large-scale programme of 180 participants four times in July 2005, December 2005, 
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In the words of many teachers, the trips in mainland China are effective 
vehicles for promoting nationalistic education because they offer students 
“first-hand” information and empirical experience of “real China", something not 
accessible in any educational setting back in Hong Kong. To quote a Civic 
Education teacher in his thirties: 
Hong Kong students still have a lot of misconceptions about China; they 
still find China very distant to them. When students have the opportunity 
to see the landscape in China with their own eyes, it makes a whole world 
- of difference! Only once have they stepped to a Chinese city would they 
realize that their perception of China has not done the real situation justice. 
In Hong Kong, the most you can do is to tell students by words about the 
country. They will listen to what you say but afterwards they will forget 
what they hear very soon. But when they were in China, as they looked at 
the Chinese artifacts and were told that Chinese heritage has not received 
enough protection, they would instantly wonder aloud: "What should we 
do to protect our heritage? Our heritage is so valuable!" The impact of 
real experience is enormous; it dramatically facilitates the inculcation of 
value. 
To put it simply, these teachers believe that the naturalistic setting of the 
fieldtrips can bring close what has been distant to the students and can turn China 
from an imagined entity in their minds into a tangible object of affection. 
There are several patterns of “rectifying,，through these programmes the 
defects that some teachers see in Hong Kong students. The presentation of a 
magnificent ancient, cultural China is a major theme. One Hong Kong-born Civic 
Education teacher in her thirties told me that bringing students to "appreciate 
traditional Chinese wisdom" can result in the instilling of a sense of pride in China 
April 2006, and July 2006. It was basically a combination of China Studies, Sightseeing, and 
Cultural Exchange programmes. I have approached individual schools and the National Education 
Centre for joining their tours. But for reasons explained in Chapter 1 my participation in these 
programmes has not been realized. 
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among the students: 
You should probably know that Chinese medicine is a very distinctive 
part of Chinese culture. In a trip in Sichuan, we were brought to the 
experimental herb laboratory up at Mount Emei. On the way, the 
professor from Chengdu University randomly picked up a bunch of grass 
and told us wonderful stories about the plants and their medical usage. 
The fact that the herbs which were first used several thousand years ago 
are still being utilized today absolutely amazed the students. And they 
were all like: wow, Chinese people are so intelligent and awesome!...So, 
when you come to this, you don't need to teach them to identify with 
一 being Chinese. They automatically want to say that they are Chinese, 
because being Chinese makes them proud! This is basically the way I 
prefer in my teaching, that is, by moving them affectively, arousing their 
sentiment. 
For these teachers, the image of China being a poor and backward country 
constitutes a problem. In order to counter it, many visits - unless they are under the 
theme of voluntary service in remote regions — seek to demonstrate that the old 
image of an impoverished China is no longer the reality of China today， 
A Civic Education teacher in his twenties recalled his experience on Hainan 
Island: 
Before the trip, students were under the impression that mainland China 
was very dirty and people there was really uncivilized; but once they 
reached the beaches in Hainan Island they instantly changed their mind: 
they were amazed at the cleanliness of the environment, which cannot be 
compared to Hong Kong's! 
In a similar tone, a Civic Education teacher in her thirties said: 
Before the students reached Chengdu Airport, they still held the old 
picture of a very backward China in their minds. When they entered the 
city itself, they were shocked to find that the city was as good as Hong 
Kong! When you look at the city planning, the public transport, the 
shopping malls, and the way people there dress, the city appeared to be no 
60 As mentioned in Chapter 3, fieldtrips to mainland China may be categorized under six major 
themes: academic study, China studies, life experience, voluntary service, sightseeing, and cultural 
exchange with local people (Lu 1999:76). 
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different from Hong Kong! And that is when the students realized that 
they've been wrong in their imagination. 
Although the visits to mainland China could not change the fact that China is a 
developing country, by picking newly-developed and visitor-friendly sites for the 
participants to visit — not hard to do, given China's development 一 many teachers 
felt that some programmes have the effect of lightening or reversing the negative 
impression that China used to make on students. 
Apart from juxtaposing and paralleling Hong Kong with major cities in 
mainland China, comparing schools in Hong Kong with schools in mainland China 
is another strategy for enhancing the recognition of China as a country that is 
getting increasingly affluent. The teacher accompanying the Chengdu trip reflected: 
Our visits to the key schools in mainland China were absolutely 
eye-opening. The resources that the key schools there have are abundant! 
Our students commented that Hong Kong is obviously no match to them! 
For one thing, the schools there were as big as can be. Their computer lab 
is one whole building, which means several floors of computer rooms. In 
Hong Kong, our computer lab is only one classroom! Also, they have 
their own track and field courts; some schools even have private 
swimming pools and fields for student to practise driving. So, we were 
actually like country bumpkins being in the city for the first time. We 
went “wow” whenever we were introduced to a new spot. Those of us 
from Hong Kong had never imagined anything like that! 
A Hong Kong-born Civic Education teacher in his forties who led a trip in 
Xinjiang told a similar story: 
I've once brought students to Xinjiang. The place doesn't give you a very 
modern image, but the school that we visited there was exceptionally 
modern and spacious. In Hong Kong we have a big theatre in the Space 
Museum, but there they have one in the secondary school! The facilities 
in that school are far better than what we have here. Of course, they 
always want you to see the best school; they wouldn't choose an old and 
shabby school on the brink of collapse in a remote rural area for you to 
visit. But I think the comparison is fair because I teach in a top school in 
Hong Kong; so, we are comparing schools in the same rank in our 
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respective regions. And the impact of the experience was definitely 
immense for our students. 
In the above two cases, which are typical, the modernity and prosperity of the 
environment where their counterparts in mainland China live and learn has been 
highlighted to impress Hong Kong students with the aim of bringing about a shift of 
attitude from aversion to appreciation. The emphasis of the programme on the fast 
economic progress in China suggests an attempt to appeal to the materialistic values 
that are rooted in the mentality of the Hong Kong youngsters. The thrust of the 
programme seems to be to create an image of China as a country full of merit and 
promise and to urge Hong Kong students to look up to China for her strength and 
glamour, thus enhancing their trust and affection in China. 
With regard to students' indifference to and ignorance about China, it is typical 
of the teachers to evoke a sense of inadequacy among the students. A teacher 
described the tour in Yunnan that she has organized and led as follows: 
Yunnan is the most ethnically diverse region in China. So, in that trip the 
students saw many different faces, different lifestyles and customs, some 
beautiful and some weird. The appearances of some of the minority 
people are so different from us. They don't look like Chinese at all. 
However, they claim themselves to be Chinese! What a shock to us! Thus, 
this is to make students think: in such an extensive land as China, there 
are so many different ethnicities, and every person has their own ethnicity. 
A person doesn't only claim themselves to be a member of their minority 
group, but they also dress in the style of that minority in front of others. 
So, I asked my students: what about Hong Kong? Hong Kong people are 
not characterized by any ethnicity; we don't have a concept of ethnicity! 
If you ask Hong Kong people to dress in their traditional clothing, we 
really wouldn't know what to do! So what the students have realized 
afterwards is that they lack this feeling of being rooted in a particular 
culture, or the identity of belonging to a cultural group. 
What the teacher tried to make the students see in this programme is more than 
just the concept of ethnicity. In their encounters with minority peoples, the teacher 
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tried to shape the Hong Kong students towards a realization that they were lacking 
in national identity and cultural heritage. By depicting China as an entity endowed 
with “diverse cultures" and “rich traditions" in contrast to the supposed cultural 
deficiency and shallowness of the local Hong Kong identity, the teacher expects that 
the sheer magnitude of Chinese national identity will evoke a sense of humility 
among the Hong Kong students and prompt them to seek identification with the 
greatness of China. 
This particular programme was also aimed at enhancing the reputation of the 
Chinese government by pinpointing the tolerance and benevolence of the state 
towards minorities. As the teacher pointed out: 
The message behind the Yunnan trip is to see how tolerant and 
accommodating a place China is. As we know, the largest ethnic group in 
China is Han, about ninety percent of the population. But apart from that, 
there are actually fifty-six minority groups in China. So we want students 
to see how China manages to accommodate all these different peoples, 
instead of using a policy of force. 
Thus, it can be said that the mission of such a programme is twofold: the 
glorification of Chinese culture aims at reinforcing students' affection for the nation; 
downplaying the totalitarian quality of the Chinese government aims at dissolving 
students' distrust of the Chinese state. 
Despite the teachers' enthusiastic tone in depicting their experiences in 
practising affective patriotic education, Hong Kong students' attitudes towards 
China remain conflicted, according to some teachers. A Chinese History teacher in 
her fifties said: 
Although bringing students to visit local people and historical sites in 
mainland China is for helping students develop positive attitudes towards 
China, I believe that many of my students still have very negative 
perceptions of China. I haven't really done surveys on that, but that's 
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what I've observed from my experiences. For example, in 2000 I 
accompanied a cultural exchange fieldtrip in Shangdong. After the trip 
students shared their experience in a hall assembly. I was not in charge of 
that assembly; I was sitting among the audience, but unlike what I 
expected, most of the things that students said about China in the 
presentation were unpleasant things! You know, that's totally against the 
original purpose of that talk, because initially we aimed at introducing 
students to look at Chinese culture and society in a more appreciative way! 
So that presentation was really a disaster; it was very embarrassing. Many 
teachers, especially those teaching Chinese History and Chinese 
Language, were shocked that the talk turned out that way.... So, finally, at 
the end of the talk, before the students were dismissed, I added my 
comments to correct any negative impression left on the students; I 
reminded the students that China is a big country with a long and 
complicated history; thus one cannot expect it to be perfect. There's much 
for us to learn about its political system; we need to look forward, we 
need to have the hope that it'll get better. When we look at China, we 
should have more tolerance for the bad things and more appreciation for 
the good things. Students tend only to remember those things that are 
obvious to them. As a teacher I felt that I needed to remind them that they 
shouldn't just focus on the negative side but should have a more 
appreciative attitude towards our country. 
In only recalling their unpleasant experiences in front of their fellow students, 
the student participants of the above fieldtrip demonstrated their disinterest in and 
disapproval of China, which is a genuine reflection of the mentality of many Hong 
Kong teenagers, who have been impoverished in both their understanding of and 
affection for their country due to their lack of nationalistic socialization. However, it 
seems that in the eyes of many teachers, not understanding and loving one's country 
when the country does not seem to do well is a shame and a mistake. The 
sympathetic attitude towards “imperfect China" that my informant wanted to 
convey to her students is predicated on the idea that loving one's country, despite its 
flaws and misdeeds, is something that we should do - by implication, it is a duty. 
In reality, feeling for the country based on emotion is not necessarily linked to 
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the idea of loving the country as a duty. For example, people who participate in the 
annual Tiananmen Square Incident vigils in Hong Kong calling for the vindication 
of the event and democracy in China do share strong feelings for China through the 
commemoration; but "loving China is a duty" is not the message that they want to 
convey through their gathering. Nevertheless, it must be noted that in their actual 
teaching, or at least in their way of justifying their teaching to me, teachers who rely 
heavily on the affective approach tend to see love for country as essentially a duty. 
Also, in all their talk about the country, the object of affection in question is largely 
assumed to be cultural China. This may be understood as part of the de-politicizing 
phenomenon that I have discussed in the previous chapter. 
Discussion of political China is not an important theme in affective 
nationalistic education. But sometimes political China is inevitably involved. In this 
case, the teachers' focus tends to be showing the benevolence of the Chinese 
government. 
A Civic Education teacher who was in her thirties and born in China said: 
We had an evening debate session about Hong Kong-China relation 
during a trip in Beijing. One question I gave my students is “do you think 
CEPA shows that the Chinese government loves Hong Kong?"^^ Some 
students said yes because it brings a lot of business to Hong Kong. But 
some students disagreed and said that this is all about mutual benefit and 
reciprocity of interest. China's showing so much kindness because they 
gain a lot from Hong Kong! I tried to challenge these students: then why 
doesn't China show this kindness to other Chinese provinces, but only to 
Hong Kong? The students counter-argued: that's because Hong Kong has 
an extraordinary geographic advantage, Hong Kong is a special piece of 
land, a financial centre, a central point for flows of capital.... But I told 
them that in fact, Hong Kong is losing its advantage to many big cities on 
the mainland now. China is developing so fast today; mainland students 
61 CEPA, short for Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, is an economic agreement between 
the Hong Kong government and the Beijing government. Its aim is to "strengthen trade and 
investment cooperation between Mainland China and Hong Kong and promote joint development of 
the two sides" (Wikipedia 2007). 
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also outshine Hong Kong students in many ways; so you guys really 
shouldn't take things for granted! 
Underlying this attempt to argue in favour of the Chinese government so as to 
impress students and change their negative perceptions is the teacher's assumption 
of a destined, irreducible bond between the people and the state. This teacher 
appears to be totally willing to subject herself to the leadership of the Chinese 
government, and she urged others to follow suit: 
Don't ever think that you can resist the government, because Hong Kong 
has officially been returned to China and the deal is done! There's no way 
that any of us can change it. There's no use denying the reality. That kind 
of attitude won't do you good. Instead, try to view it from the perspective 
of the country. Sometimes the methods that the government use to handle 
problems may not seem to be correct, but these are not something that any 
individuals can change. 
That said, however, teachers who rely heavily on the affective approach are in 
general not as explicit as the above teacher in defending the Chinese government. 
Instead, they tended more often to rationalize the "indispensable" relationship 
between an individual and the country in terms of the bond between a child and its 
parents. 
To emphasize this familial bond, a Chinese History teacher in her fifties told 
me this long story: 
To me, no matter whether the country has done something good or bad, I 
would try to understand. If she has done something wrong, I wouldn't say 
that it is right. A mistake is a mistake. However, I would also view it with 
tolerance. I would still love it and hope that it'll do better in the future. I 
anticipate that gradually it will progress and correct the wrongs done in 
the past. I wouldn't want to deny the country completely simply because 
there are some problems with it. At the same time, I would not confuse 
the bad with the good. If it is wrong, I would say it is wrong; if it is good, 
I would say it is good. It is very much like what happens in the family. I 
can tell you a story about this. Last night I listened to a radio programme 
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in which the two hosts acted as mediators to solve conflicts of the 
phone-in audience. At the moment I turned on the radio, the hosts were at 
the point of trying to contact the daughter of a woman who phoned in at 
an earlier time. The daughter was the eldest child of the family. Some 
time ago, she brought her two younger sisters and left the family, 
probably because she's mad at something that her mother has done. To 
judge from her voice, the daughter was not a young woman any more. So, 
the thing is, after a period of no contact with each other, the mother 
wished to make up with the daughters. So this mother had called in and 
confessed in the programme that she had been wrong and was very sorry 
for her mistake; she told the hosts that Grandma was now at the elder 
people's home and hoped that the daughters could drop by some time to 
visit Grandma. She also said that she didn't dream of being forgiven right 
away but still hoped that the daughters could give her a chance to 
communicate with them and so on. 
After all these had been said, it was the eldest daughter's turn to 
speak to the hosts. And she responded that actually her aunt had tried to 
convince her to resume contact with her mother, but she just didn't know 
why she couldn't let the past go. On hearing that, the two hosts suggested 
that she should try to open her heart from then on, since her mother had 
been so brave in asking for understanding despite her being a parent, a 
senior figure of the family. It's worth giving both of them a chance, the 
hosts said. And finally, the eldest daughter agreed that she would try. So, 
the story is a metaphor to what I just said of my relationship with China. 
Just like the mother in the programme, China has undeniably done 
something wrong in the past. Yet, I feel that we should still give her a 
chance and hope for it to become better. We shouldn't just discard 
everything whenever something bad happens. This is the attitude that I 
have towards China. I try to convey this perspective to my students when 
I teach, that is, if your mother doesn't treat you well, would you 
immediately deny her as your mother? If you try to think of it, after all, 
mother and children are bonded by flesh and blood, right? 
Love for the country, as implied in the familial metaphor, is assumed to be a 
duty and not a choice. When attempting to assimilate students into accepting their 
relation with the country as given and into loving the country irrespective of good 
or evil, the teachers in this category often neglect distinguishing between the nation 
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and the state, although it is something that most of them recognize when they 
formulate their personal senses of national belonging. In the above narrative, the 
country, which is defined by Anderson as an "imagined political community, 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (1991:6), is personified by the 
teacher as a living parent with flesh, blood, and emotion. But the fact that it is the 
political apparatus of the country (i.e. the Chinese government) that authorizes the 
country's action in the real world has been ignored. In identifying herself with the 
eldest daughter in the story, who was trying to forgive her parent's wrong doing, the 
teacher expressed great empathy with her country, even though in reality the 
Chinese government has not officially admitted any fault or asked for forgiveness 
from anyone including Hong Kong people, her "recently returned child". The 
teacher's use of the familial analogy may thus be taken as illustrative of a patriot's 
subjective longing for an unconditional relationship with the country. 
While the teachers discussed above believe in presenting a benevolent image 
of China to instil affection among students, from the point of view of the teachers 
whom I will feature next, that is, those who believe that nationalistic education in 
Hong Kong should be taught as a form of cognitive education through critical 
thinking, the kind of nationalistic education discussed above is both contradictory to 
reality and "untrue to oneself. 
The teachers in this category hold the view that a "full picture" of the “reality 
of China" should be presented to students in fieldtrips. In the teaching of China, 
they emphasized "employing a liberal approach" and "playing the role of a neutral 
presenter" without placing special emphases on certain aspects of China. A Hong 
Kong-bom Civic Education teacher in his thirties captured these principles in the 
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following words: 
I never indoctrinate students to accept ideas saying China is good or evil 
and I never teach students to blindly believe that what the Chinese 
Communist Party does is right or wrong. Even when I bring students to 
visit China in a fieldtrip, I always try to strike a balance in choosing our 
destinations. I wouldn't bring students to see only the most developed 
parts of China in a fieldtrip in order to impress them; and I wouldn't 
deliberately pick the most underdeveloped sites of China so as to put them 
off either. Personally, I am critical of the Chinese Communist Party and 
some phenomena in mainland China, but I am careful not to express my 
personal viewpoint strongly. Very often, during our visits in China, 
students came to me and asked me about the problems or unpleasant 
things about China that they had seen with their eyes. In those cases, I 
explicated a full picture of fact and laid out different views about the 
issues to them. I never told them whether I agree or object to something 
directly. It's not good to shape their mind that way. I have to be a neutral 
presenter. 
While the previous group of teachers emphasize instilling affection among 
their students towards China through exposing them to the "real China" during 
fieldtrips, the teachers in this category are extremely sceptical of such interpretation 
of "experiencing China" and "reality". 
A History teacher in her twenties who was born in China said: 
Last year I attended a meeting of Chinese History teachers from several 
secondary schools; they had a discussion topic specifically about 
nationalistic education. They actually placed "national identity" on their 
reform agenda! But what do they mean by nationalistic education anyway? 
Teaching Chinese History is still only about teaching Chinese history! So 
what makes it different now than before? I remember that the teachers in 
that meeting talked about bringing students to visit Beijing as part of their 
current nationalistic education agenda. They argued that letting students 
experience the "real" China would help. But I just wondered, are 
organizing cultural exchange programmes and teaching more Chinese 
history anything new at all? Could they show that there would be any 
changes in the way they approach the subject? The thing is, I've talked to 
students who study Chinese history and have joined those fieldtrips. They 
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did tell me that those fieldtrips were fun, which is not surprising, if we 
view them from a tourist's perspective. But fundamentally, I don't think 
these have strengthened students' national identity. No, that really hasn't 
happened! The only thing that I still hear from students today is that they 
find Chinese history too heavy for them to study, that there's too much to 
memorize and they hate it. And some of them also questioned what they 
see in those fieldtrips: “we saw a lot of wonderful things in China, but of 
course we did — do you think that they would show us bad things? They 
only showed us good things!" So, what has studying Chinese history, 
culture and experiencing “real” China helped in promoting nationalistic 
education? 
This teacher suggests that bringing students to visit China “in person" is not 
necessarily the same as letting them experience the "real China" as the previous 
group of teachers claimed. According to these teachers, revealing the "reality" 
means offering balanced content of different aspects (i.e. both cultural and political) 
and an unbiased depiction of the conditions (i.e. both good and bad) of the country. 
In these teachers' eyes, the average fieldtrips that Hong Kong students join, which 
are largely oriented towards creating positive experiences with the country and thus 
typically appealing to such positive aspects of the country as modernity, 
hospitability, and historical and cultural sophistication, are essentially contradictory 
to “reality”，since they tend to selectively present aspects of China that fit in Hong 
Kong Chinese's imagination of the idealized nation. At the same time, although 
these teachers also emphasized the importance of presenting "reality" to their 
students in the sense of "a balanced and thorough understanding of China", they 
recognized that in whatever context, "reality" is but "relative reality" and not 
"absolute reality". 
A Hong Kong-born Civic Education teacher in his forties saw this dilemma, 
but justified his attempt in promoting nationalistic education on the basis of this 
dilemma: 
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When we organize our programme, we have a clear and simple aim: we 
want students, through participating in different activities, to have a better 
understanding of different levels of the country and to be able to see the 
‘‘real China". Of course, here I mean the relatively real China, for there 
does exist some bias....In fact, whenever we set foot on the mainland, the 
hosts there always treated our students as very important guests. They 
choose families that are wealthier and more presentable to entertain us. In 
this sense, it is biased. However, on the whole, I don't think it's 
something bad. After all, it all depends on what you expect from these 
trips. For example, last year I brought students to the Three Gorges region 
along the Yantze River, a region that is undergoing tremendous economic 
development and construction. Some of the students did interviews with 
people they came across on the street. And their findings from the 
interviews were very telling. In the interviews they did in the first village, 
responses from the local villagers about the development of the region 
were highly positive. They were happy that their fields were transformed 
and the shabby huts were turned into more modem houses. However, as 
we reached another village, the villagers there complained incessantly 
about the developments, although the buildings and multi-storey houses 
there appeared to be even more modern than those in the previous village! 
The fact is, this second village was built in a higher location and the 
villagers were actually forced to relocate there. They found that they 
couldn't farm in the remote high land and couldn't make a living by 
keeping a grocery store any more because people no longer went there. 
They complained that the government didn't give them enough 
compensation. The expense of moving homes led them into serious debt 
and so on. So, from these interviews, students actually came across two 
completely different pictures of the same project. They really came to 
realize that the story was never that simple. The reality was much more 
complex than they'd thought. Without this first hand, real-life experience, 
the teaching could never achieve what it should have. 
Thus, while both groups of teachers have spoken highly of fieldtrips in 
mainland China as one of the most effective means of nationalistic education, it is 
important to note the discrepancy in their objective in those programmes. For the 
first group of teachers, patriotic education is ultimately about the evocation of love 
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for China; thus their priority is to make students feel for the country through 
emotion regardless of what they perceive or know of the country. On the contrary, 
for the second group of teachers, patriotic education in Hong Kong should work 
towards an informed understanding of China that does not include "love for 
country" on its agenda or entail idealizing the country. 
2. An Example from the Media: the Telecast of the Nation al Anthem 
On 1 October, 2004, three Hong Kong local television channels began to broadcast 
a video entitled “Our Home Our Country"^^ produced by the Committee on the 
Promotion of Civic Education and the Commission On Youth. The video in question, 
which featured the Chinese National Anthem and clips of the Great Wall and 
famous people from China such as Astronaut Yang Liwei and Olympic Medallists, 
was shown after its debut every day before the evening news on those channels and 
received diverse opinions and criticisms from the Hong Kong public. Although the 
video was not a part of my original research question, it turned out to be a 
frequently cited example when my informants amplified on their comprehension of 
"propaganda". As the video appeared to be very relevant to some of my informants' 
perceptions of appropriate teaching methods and approaches, I decided to include 
questions about the video in the later stage of my research. ^ ^ 
Two of my informants have argued explicitly in favour of the video. To quote 
6 2心繫家國 
63 The power of the mass media in influencing Hong Kong youngsters may also be noted here. In 
examining the relative influences of five socializing agents - namely secondary schooling, the 
university experience, the family, the media, and friends 一 on the formulation of national attitudes of 
Hong Kong and mainland Chinese students, Fairbrother (2003) found that the greatest divergences 
between the two groups lie in their perceptions of the impact of schooling and that of media: while a 
great majority of mainland students said that secondary schooling has had big influences on their 
attitudes toward China, most Hong Kong students did not; while the media was perceived by many 
Hong Kong students as an important factor influencing their attitudes, this was not the case for 
mainland students (2003:94-95). Given the apparent importance of mass media as a socializing agent 
in Hong Kong, it is understandable why the video in question became a big concern to some of my 
informants. 
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one of them, a Civic Education teacher in her thirties who was bom in mainland 
China: 
Some colleagues of mine said the video was totally disgusting. But I think 
at this stage, people should get used to it. I know there are people who 
complain that it is a form of brainwashing, but I think the video has some 
important messages to convey. It tries to show the positive side and the 
achievements of the nation. To me it is very reasonable. There is no need 
to include all the tragedies, because you are supposed to make a good 
impression! Normally we ourselves wouldn't go about and tell everyone 
how terrible we feel, how miserable we are, how bad our family is, right? 
I think it is totally understandable that the government would want it to be 
this way too. Those who said that the anthem and the video are disgusting 
should re-examine their attitude. To me, the fact that there are such 
different opinions proves that Hong Kong has freedom of speech! 
This teacher illustrates the values underlying the affective approach of patriotic 
education. She believes that nationalistic education is "supposed to make a good 
impression" on people, and that individuals are supposed to accept and rejoice in 
the positive images that the nation creates for itself. This teacher seems to pride 
herself on having strong attachment and loyalty to the state, and believe that 
everyone else should be the same. By this line of thinking, the relation between 
individuals and their country should always be invested with appreciation and 
gratitude and not be challenged by judgment. 
Other teachers, however, stated forcefully that the video is "brainwashing 
Hong Kong people". They saw the positive portrait of China in the video one-sided 
and misleading. A Hong Kong-born Civic Education teacher in his thirties said that 
the broadcast of the video signified the beginning at the official level of “a kind of 
obscurantist policy that keeps people uninformed and misinformed". He argued: 
You've got to let people see the reality. You've got to let them access the 
whole picture. It's true that when we teach about the development of 
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China today, there are many positive things to mention, such as her 
economic progress and technological advancement. I tell my students 
about the positive things too. In fact, when the Chinese astronaut flew into 
space, we arranged a session to introduce the development of China's 
space technology to students. But on the other hand, we still need to ask, 
when the government, the publishers, or the teachers design the teaching 
material, have they prepared teaching resources that teach students about 
corruption in China? The huge gap between the rich and the poor in China? 
Or pollution and environmental problems? Or human rights issues? What 
is going on in our patriotic education is so strongly biased! As long as this 
bias exists, we can rightfully say that they don't want students to see the 
whole picture. They only want students to see the good things they want 
them to see! 
Generally, my informants in this category had the worry that the freedom of 
speech in Hong Kong has been diminishing after the handover. They reflected that a 
partial presentation of China with a “pro-China undertone" has become increasingly 
unquestioned, and the self-censorship of certain units in the mass media and the 
education profession has been unchecked.Considering the changing 
socio-political context, they argued that nationalistic education that is based on 
emotion and oriented towards the cultivation of love for China does more harm than 
good to the future of Hong Kong. In their understanding, approaching China by 
feeling would easily lead to "blind patriotism", which means youngsters would 
irrationally follow whatever the country or the party preaches even it is against the 
best interest of society. 
The distrust by these teachers of the Chinese government in the 
nation-building campaign is obvious. Apart from the fact that fundamentally they do 
not see it as necessary for everyone to love their country (which I will discuss more 
64 A survey conducted by the Hong Kong Journalists Association in January 2007 found that over 
50% of the 506 interviewed journalists thought that press freedom in Hong Kong has declined since 
the handover. About 60% of the interviewees thought that self-censorship, such as in downplaying 
negative news and potentially sensitive issues of the Beijing government, was more serious than it 
was 10 years ago and 30% admitted having committed self-censorship over the previous 12 months 
(Hong Kong Journalists Association 2007). 
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later on), one reason for this is that they saw a contradiction between the stipulated 
ideal and the actual implementation of the policy nationalistic education. 
A Hong Kong-bom Civic Education teacher in his thirties pointed out that the 
video, as representative of the Hong Kong government's value in patriotism, 
violates the original objective stated in the official Civic Education curriculum: 
The government says that their aims in Civic Education are to train 
students to have critical, independent thinking and multi-perspective 
analytic ability. But in reality, is what they are doing commensurate with 
their claim? From my point of view, not at all! The video of the national 
anthem they started to show on TV last year is one example. All that they 
show are positive things: Chinese Olympics medalists and the Chinese 
astronaut. This may influence our young people's mind subconsciously. It 
may work to shape them in a way that they will instantly associate their 
country with glories and be emotionally driven to reinforce their affection 
for the country whenever they hear the anthem. Music and visual 
materials have certain effects on us. It's like what you do when you train 
animals; you want animals to think of food when they hear a sound and 
you want people to think of national glory when they hear the anthem. I 
guess maybe that's what they want to get at by that video. But are all 
these really serving to prepare students to have independent, 
multi-perspective thinking? I certainly don't think so! Excuse me for my 
metaphor - but they want to turn our children into animals! 
In these teachers' vision, the purpose of civic education should be to counteract 
partiality and propagandism, and hence nationalistic education's focus should be on 
developing students' ability “to question" and “to judge" their nation through 
reasoning. For these teachers, it is ironic that what should serve to curb propaganda 
has become an instrument of propagandism. 
A Civic Education teacher in his twenties told me that he had drawn insights 
from our discussion of the video and come to a clearer understanding of the role of 
civic and nationalistic education. He said: 
To me, it's all about the individual person's ability to think critically. Just 
think of the culture of slimming and all those commercial programmes 
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about successful cases of losing weight. All of these are of the same 
format. If you don't have the ability to view it critically, you would 
probably believe everything they tell you and buy into the myth that they 
want you to take in. But if you have the ability to think critically, then you 
probably can see through it and treat it as simply just another 
advertisement. In fact, so many similar cases can be found in our society. 
It's impossible to avoid it. If you say that the video of the anthem 
shouldn't be allowed to show, then why don't you also ban all the 
McDonald's and beauty salon advertisements? What we can do now, then, 
is probably to make the video a material to teach students how to look at 
mass media. Mass media can be a tool for different things; it can be used 
to transmit the culture of slimming and it can be used to promote 
nationalistic education. So, I would treat it not as an issue of nationalistic 
education but one of media education. 
The approach to nationalistic education that this teacher illustrates is 
comparable to the “skills”-based approach to history that Vickers (2003) proposed 
for Hong Kong. Vickers suggests that history should not be taken merely as an 
academic discipline oriented towards the provision of a knowledge-based, factual 
picture of the past but rather should act as analytical training that help students 
understand "how knowledge of the past is possible, why it is important, and what is 
involved in being a good historian" (2003:252). Similarly, this teacher suggests that 
not only can there be alternative ways other than the government-stipulated one of 
teaching national identity in Hong Kong, but nationalistic education does not even 
need to be an end in itself; from a larger perspective, it could transcend the basics of 
transmitting knowledge about the nation and be a means to help students develop 
critical thinking skills, with which they could know how to "question and judge" 
instead of merely relying on feeling when approaching the nation. 
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3. The Flag-raising Ceremony 
The ideology of the modern nation-state system is such that every nation has a 
national flag to represent it, a flag that symbolizes the values and power that a 
member of a certain country invests in it. At the same time, the system also 
legitimizes the flag raising ceremony as a convention for those who believe 
themselves to belong to the same national community to display support and loyalty 
to its ideology. As illustrated throughout Billig's work (1995), the presence of 
national symbols and the practice of national rituals have long become embedded 
into the ordinary life of the majority of the population in the modem world to a 
point that they have forgotten that they are constantly shaping and being shaped by 
this culture. However, it must be noted yet again that such a case does not apply to 
Hong Kong. Hong Kong has just started to take the first steps in nationalistic 
socialization. There are extremely conflicting views among the teachers of the 
symbolism of the flag and the flag-raising ceremony, which is practised at least 
once a year in all of my informants' schools. 
On one hand, many of my informants mentioned matter-of-factly that the first 
and foremost function of the ceremony is to "remind" the audience of their Chinese 
national identity and enhance their sense of belonging to China. To quote a Civic 
Education teacher in her thirties: 
I think the most important role that the flag-raising ceremony plays is to 
make us - both students and teachers — realize that we are part of our 
country. At least we see that the flag that we raise here in Hong Kong is a 
Chinese flag, and thus we acknowledge that Hong Kong is part of China. 
So, every ceremony is a reminder of this fact. 
Some teachers also said that the ceremony is not only about flying the Chinese 
flag and celebrating China specifically but is more of an introduction to familiarize 
Hong Kong students with the almost universal nation-state system. A Civic 
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Education teacher in his thirties said: 
The ceremony should work as a means to raise students' sense of 
belonging to their country. But it is not just about the Chinese national 
flag. We want students to leam to respect a formal event like this. No 
matter which country's ceremony it is, they should be able to behave 
naturally. So this is very helpful for the personal development of the 
students. 
The above comments reflect positive values attached to the flag and the 
ceremony by my informants. This is not surprising if we consider that throughout 
this thesis many of my informants have claimed to be supportive of patriotic 
education. Some of them did exhibit strong senses of national belonging to China, 
albeit a different kind of patriotism from the Chinese official version, and argued 
that the flag-raising ceremony should be more emphasized. 
Nevertheless, while some teachers were keen on justifying the flag-raising 
ceremony, other teachers expressed disapproval regarding the ceremony even 
though they were responsible for organizing it in schools. A Hong Kong-bom EPA 
teacher in his thirties responsible for preparing for the flag-raising ceremony in his 
school told me directly that it is against his belief and he preferred to cancel it: 
I really don't see any value in the ceremony! Sometimes I really doubt 
whether the flag matters at all. When the flag is hoisted, students are made 
to stare at it, but can you tell if anyone there really has any feelings? No 
one seems to have any particular feelings about it, except me! I had a 
strong feeling about it, because it made me spend time on doing 
something that I don't believe in! 
The majority of the teachers have been less out-spoken but they exhibited 
strong detachment. This is most visible from their comments about students' 
reactions to the ceremony. 
A Hong Kong-bom Civic Education teacher in her thirties said: 
Well, during the ceremony, students were attentive enough. I would say 
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they took it seriously. At least they know that it's not a game, that is, at 
least they didn't rebel and ruin it! But as for whether they're very 
emotionally involved, I wouldn't say so. I think they treat it logically as a 
ceremony. To me, it's fair enough. We don't even make it compulsory for 
them to sing the anthem. Some students don't want to sing it; it is 
perfectly okay! 
Similarly, a Civic Education teacher in his twenties said: 
I can't say that students have very strong feelings for the flag. Would they 
cry when they see the flag? Hardly! I don't expect them to, either. But if 
you're talking about their manner, I can tell that they behaved properly. In 
the beginning, they didn't even bother to stand straight and place their 
bags on the floor. But after a few times, they've come to know how to 
behave themselves by placing their hands at their back and watching the 
ceremony attentively. So, in that aspect, I think our students have done 
quite well. 
The above quotations indicate that the teachers are satisfied with their students' 
performance in terms of their discipline, irrespective of the absence of any signs of 
patriotic fervor among them. The teachers' acceptance of the lack of patriotic 
sentiment among their students suggests that at a personal level they do not see that 
"love for the country" is a necessary part of their teaching. Despite their taking up 
the responsibility of promoting patriotic education, they do not believe they must 
fundamentally alter their students' consciousness and do not expect to create a 
necessary connection between individuals' emotion for the country and the official 
symbols of the country. 
These opinions reflect teachers' scepticism towards the professed value of the 
flag-raising ceremony. Teachers are aware of the incompatibility between the 
meaning of national symbolism and their objective in nationalistic education. In line 
with the psychological theory of Bloom (1990) about national identity,^^ the 
65 Bloom states that, "For the individual to internalise the symbols of the nation, the nation - in one 
representational or symbolic form or another, direct or indirect 一 must impinge upon the actual 
experience of the individual, in terms of psychological security, to make an identification with the 
nation" (1990:59). 
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teachers pointed out the limitation of the ceremony in its nature in invoking any 
internal realization about the nation among the students. To quote a Civic Education 
teacher in his twenties who was born in mainland China: 
As far as feeling is concerned, it all depends on individuals' experience. 
In mainland China, there are people who deliberately went to Tiananmen 
Square to watch the flag-raising ceremony and who cried once they saw 
the flag; these reactions are a matter of individuals' emotion and personal 
experience with the country. You can't force the audience to have strong 
emotional reactions. 
A Hong Kong-born Civic Education teacher in his forties said: 
Whenever you talk about feeling, it has got to be an internal experience of 
something that strikes you and makes you relate to it. I don't think the 
flag-raising ceremony serves to affect the students that way. That the 
students didn't do anything out of place during the ceremony is simply 
because they know that it is a formal occasion and that there are school 
regulations. 
Thus, it is generally recognized and accepted among these teachers that what 
the flag-raising ceremony represents is at most formality and not any true testimony 
of individuals' senses of national belonging, and that no one is obliged to make it 
otherwise. Such lack of “conviction” in the national symbols and rituals, which are 
imperatives enshrined in the official nationalistic doctrine, is necessarily related to 
the teachers' scepticism towards the state-centred nationalism of China, which is 
characterized by its assumption of an essential tie between the nation (people) and 
the state (government) as well as its demand of absolute, unconditional love from 
people to the state. The Civic Education teacher in his twenties who was born in 
mainland China quoted above captured this underlying attitude about "love for 
country" in the following words: 
Actually, whether a person loves their country is a personal thing. I don't 
think that it is good to keep indoctrinating our students: "you're Chinese, 
you must love China", which to me is what some people refer to as 
brainwashing — a kind of education that feeds students with a given value. 
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Also, it's just like the controversy about “Long Hair”，He seems to be 
fighting for this and that without much reason, but does he love China or 
not? It's impossible to tell! Perhaps he's doing something different; yet, 
he claims to be doing it for China. And we really can't judge whether he 
is patriotic or not. So, to speak of the role of the teachers, we may teach 
students about different things about China, including how to conduct the 
flag-raising ceremony, but I don't think we should, or can, do more than 
working at the cognitive level of education. 
The Hong Kong-born Civic Education teacher in his forties quoted above said: 
To identify with China or not is not a result that can be guaranteed. It is 
not even necessarily part of the objective of our teaching. That is, after 
teaching them about the flag, letting them attend the ceremony and 
discussing with them issues of the country, in the end what conclusion 
they arrive at, or whether they identify with these is entirely a matter of 
personal value. From my perspective, a Chinese person should at least 
have a certain degree of understanding about China. I think this is the 
minimum a Chinese person should do. This is my personal value and 
perception on the matter. However, if I do not find the same perception 
among my students, I don't think I must force them to buy into my 
perception, right? It just like what I said about the flag-raising ceremony: 
some may say that students should appreciate the value of national 
symbols, but ultimately it is entirely an individual's choice of view and 
value. But having said that, as teachers we still hope that through the 
learning process students will come to care more about China's problems 
and reality. 
Love for the country, according to these teachers, is by nature impossible to 
measure or impose on anyone. Hence, to these teachers it is illogical to expect 
others either to feel love or to show love as the nation dictates. Although the 
majority of my informants, as I have shown throughout this thesis, are similar to 
each other in being distrustful of the Chinese state, the teachers in the “cognitive” 
category differ from their counterparts in the "affective" category in that they did 
not choose to teach as the Chinese state stipulates. This engenders a kind of 
66 As mentioned previously, "Long Hair" is the nickname of Leung Kwok-hung, who is a member 
of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong and a member of April Fifth Action, a radical socialist 
group in Hong Kong (Wikipedia 2007). 
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nationalistic education for China which from a Chinese perspective is essentially 
subversive. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have looked at three different channels of conducting nationalistic 
education: fieldtrips to mainland China, the telecast of the Chinese national anthem 
and the flag-raising ceremony. I have shown that teachers who use an affective 
approach tend to teach love for China as if it is a duty and generally have a more 
positive attitude towards the promotion of national symbols and rituals, while 
teachers who use a cognitive and critical thinking approach tend to interpret love for 
the country as an individual choice and stress less the teaching of nationalistic 
displays. What constitutes propaganda and what counts as legitimate patriotic 
education practices is a matter of dispute between these two groups of teachers, who 
interpret patriotism in remarkably different ways. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the teaching of national identity in Hong Kong secondary 
schools. It has explored how the inculcation of national belonging is conducted on 
the ground in Hong Kong secondary schools and enquired as to the reasons behind 
the various and different patterns of such teaching in Hong Kong in relation to 
teachers' attitudes towards their country and senses of national belonging. In each of 
the previous chapters, I have shed light on a particular aspect of the question and 
attempted to demonstrate the complexities of the national identity problem in Hong 
Kong. As my conclusion, this chapter will evaluate the current development of 
patriotic education in the peculiar context of Hong Kong from two contrasting 
perspectives and conclude by discussing the possible future of patriotic education 
and national identity in Hong Kong. 
Summary of Chapters 
Before I proceed to my discussion, let me now briefly go over what I have covered 
in my previous chapters. 
In Chapter One, I introduced my research question, reviewed literature relevant 
to my research and discussed the methodology that I used in conducting this 
research as well as the problems associated with my methodology. 
In Chapter Two, I dealt with the development of nationalistic education at the 
government's policy-making level. We saw that political and civic education has 
been historically neglected in colonial Hong Kong. But since the change of 
sovereignty of Hong Kong from Great Britain to China in 1997, the Hong Kong 
government has started its nationalistic education campaign. National identity, 
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which is a sensitive issue in the depoliticized and a-nationalistic context of Hong 
Kong, has received increased attention from education policy makers. 
In Chapter Three, I looked at how nationalistic education is organized in 
individual schools. On the surface, individual schools have adopted certain common 
approaches and methods in introducing the "national identity" dimension in their 
curricula in accordance with the Hong Kong government's advocacy; however, a 
closer look suggests that schools differ remarkably in their organization patterns and 
attitudes towards the promotion of nationalistic education. In regard to the degree of 
emphasis placed on "nationalistic education", schools fall into three categories: at 
one extreme, a small number of schools, as represented by the pro-China school I 
studied, centralize the teaching of nationalistic education and diffuse "China 
elements" thoroughly into various subjects. In the middle range of the spectrum, 
where the majority of schools are found, some degree of formal organization of 
nationalistic education and an increasingly strong emphasis on its implementation is 
observed. At the other extreme, a small group of schools have made no attempts to 
co-ordinate programmes under this theme. Many of the teachers viewed this 
positively, believing that the irregular and loose development of nationalistic 
education represents "liberalness" and "flexibility" of their working environment. In 
a very general sense, this is justifiable on the ground that nationalistic education is 
indeed not officially compulsory and teachers in charge of the subject in individual 
schools do have considerable freedom to design their school-based curriculum. 
What often remains unrecognized and unmentioned among my informants in all of 
the groups is the question of power - that being entrusted with the task of teaching 
national identity does not necessarily mean they have power over what they teach; 
nor is being willing to take up the task necessarily a labour of love. At the same 
time, incidents of teachers being forced to take up the duty of teaching national 
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identity and being forbidden to mention politically sensitive issues in class by 
school principles also overshadow the overtly harmonious picture depicted by many 
of the teachers. All in all, this chapter demonstrates that the teaching of national 
identity in Hong Kong is not as unambiguous and unproblematic as it appears to be 
from a distance. 
In Chapter Four, I looked at the personal background and the general attitudes 
towards patriotism and nationalistic education of my informants. All of my 30 
informants identified themselves as Hong Kong Chinese. But their senses of 
national belonging to China varied from being deeply patriotic, albeit not 
necessarily including the Chinese government, to being totally emotionally 
detached. Also, their attitudes towards the teaching of national identity in Hong 
Kong differed tremendously. Although the majority of the teachers claimed to be 
supportive of the teaching of national identity, some exhibited indifference, and 
others expressed disapproval. 
Despite the variety of their claimed senses of national belonging and attitudes 
to nationalistic education, the majority of the teachers had something in common: 
they received most of their education in colonial Hong Kong and were fearful and 
sceptical of the Chinese dictatorship especially when they recalled events such as 
the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. They also recognized in general that the 
state and the nation are two separate realms of the country and some of them 
insisted that patriotism for Hong Kong people should always exclude the Chinese 
state and not be "pro-China patriotism", which conflates loving the Chinese nation 
and loving the Chinese state. For those teachers who do not believe in "pro-China 
patriotism", there is thus a contradiction between their personal belief and the kind 
of nationalistic education they are supposed to teach. Their ambivalence in deciding 
what to teach and what not to teach regarding China and patriotism is quite strong. 
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In Chapter Five and Chapter Six, I focused on those teachers who have 
actually been engaged in the teaching of national identity and their concrete 
practices of teaching. In Chapter Five, I examined the presentation of two opposite 
images of China, namely, the ancient, cultural China and the contemporary, political 
China in the teachers' teaching in the classroom. On one hand, teachers who believe 
that nationalistic education in Hong Kong should not be any kind of political 
education tend to de-politicize the teaching about China by only introducing the 
content of arts, culture and history of the country to students. As such, ancient, 
cultural China represents an idealized China that is worthy of students' love. 
Underlying this approach is a play-it-safe mentality, either out of fear of offending 
the Chinese government or out of worry of unknowingly spreading "pro-China 
patriotism". This play-it-safe attitude is typical of the majority of my informants. 
On the other hand, teachers who view nationalistic education as necessarily 
political may emphasize in their teaching politically sensitive and controversial 
issues, such as the June Fourth Tiananmen Square Incident. In their understanding, 
contemporary, political China represents a real China that students should learn to 
judge and criticize. Underlying this approach is a wish to counter-balance the 
de-politicized culture of Hong Kong education and to realize democratic education 
in Hong Kong. 
In Chapter Six, I focused on three different channels which are widely adopted 
to promote nationalistic education in Hong Kong: fieldtrips to mainland China, the 
national anthem played in a television advertisement, and flag-raising ceremonies. I 
investigated two contradictory approaches to nationalistic education: the affective 
approach (teaching through feeling and emotion) and the cognitive approach 
(teaching through reasoning and critical thinking) as well as their implications for 
whether love for country is a duty or a choice. On one hand, teachers who rely on 
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the affective approach tend to believe that love for the country is obligatory and that 
nationalistic education should be oriented towards the inculcation of love for China. 
In their understanding, the purpose of bringing students to visit mainland China is to 
create positive experiences for students of their country. They tend to depict China 
in a positive light by deliberately focusing on the cultural dimension of China and 
stressing the benefits brought by a deeper relationship between the Chinese 
government and Hong Kong. Also, this group of teachers tends to view more 
positively the socialization of students into identifying with national symbols and 
rituals. They believe that it is a good thing to telecast the Chinese national anthem 
in Hong Kong and to conduct flag-raising ceremonies in schools. 
On the contrary, teachers who teach using a cognitive/critical thinking 
approach do not view love for the country as a matter of duty and do not believe 
that the ultimate objective of nationalistic education is to instil affection for China 
among their students. For these teachers, fieldtrips to mainland China should be a 
means towards the promotion of an informed understanding rather than an idealized 
image of China. In regard to the promotion of national symbols and rituals, teachers 
in this group tend to have negative views. They regard the telecast of the national 
anthem as propaganda towards which students should be trained to be critical, and 
are in general sceptical of national symbolism and the value of the flag-raising 
ceremony. 
The Teaching of National Identity in Hong Kong in Review 
"Patriotic education" or "nationalistic education”，which I define in this research as 
the inculcation of identification with the nation and a sense of belonging to the 
nation through schooling, is a common phenomenon across the modern world. 
Although different countries may promote patriotic education in different forms and 
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with different content according to their particular political and social circumstances, 
in the end, nations in common shape their people through education to accept the 
values of the larger political system and seek to turn their people into loyal 
supporters of the nation. For the average citizen in the world, national identity and 
having a sense of belonging to the country are largely accepted as a natural part of 
one's life. This, however, as mentioned at the outset of this research, has not been 
the case for Hong Kong over the past several decades. But since Hong Kong started 
its official nationalistic education campaign after the territory's return to China in 
1997, “national identity" and "patriotism" have become an important teaching issue 
for some local education policy makers and teachers. The various measures adopted 
by local schools that are related to the promotion of national identity for China as 
discussed in Chapter Three are evidence of a stronger interest of the Hong Kong 
education sector in altering Hong Kong's traditionally "depoliticized" and 
"a-nationalistic" culture. Some Hong Kong teachers I interviewed have described 
positively the development of the teaching of national identity in Hong Kong; in 
their eyes, given the long-term absence of the Chinese national flag in Hong Kong 
before the handover, the fact that most schools in Hong Kong are now practising at 
least once a year the flag-raising ceremony is in itself a great improvement (in one 
teacher's words, “from zero times to one time is already a one hundred percent 
increase!”). Some teachers have observed that their students no longer show the 
kind of embarrassment or reluctance in displaying respect to the Chinese national 
flag and in singing the national anthem which they would have several years ago. 
This has also reinforced the teachers' impression that the younger generation is 
being progressively socialized into national rituals and symbols. 
The depiction offered by these teachers certainly suggests a degree of success 
of the official nationalistic education policy. Nevertheless, what we have seen in 
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this thesis is that, as “patriotism” is a much contested concept in the Hong Kong 
context, there exist highly conflicting interpretations of what purpose “nationalistic 
education" should serve for Hong Kong people. Given the multiple understandings 
of what ‘‘patriotic education" means, if one is to assess the development of 
"patriotic education” in Hong Kong, it is necessary to enquire what exactly the term 
means to different teachers. 
In the course of my research I have identified two versions of nationalistic 
education that are being practised in Hong Kong secondary schools today. On one 
hand, there is a conventional type of patriotic education, which places special 
emphasis on the uncontroversial, cultural dimension of the county and stresses love 
for country as a duty; it emphasizes one's relation to one's country as a matter of 
emotion. In effect, by downplaying the negative aspects of the nation-state, 
"conventional patriotic education" serves to reinforce the image that the national 
sovereign seeks to create for its preservation of power. On the other hand, there is 
an alternative kind of nationalistic education, which emphasizes loving the nation as 
a matter of personal choice, and emphasizes understanding the country and its 
government through critical thinking. Since this approach challenges the legitimacy 
of the Chinese government and is ultimately associated with pro-democratic values, 
it may be referred to as “democratic education" as its proponents among my 
informants have mentioned. Although in practice these two types of education • 
co-exist within the same curriculum and are not considered to be contradictory by 
many teachers, they must be distinguished for what they each symbolize for the 
future of Hong Kong people's relation with their country. Do Hong Kong people 
want to have their children taught an emotionally-based and uncritical love for the 
country, resulting from conventional, centrally-promulgated patriotic education, or 
do they want to have their children taught a more critical sense of national 
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belonging, resulting from what we have termed “democratic education"? 
In terms of the contradiction between these two prevailing forms of 
nationalistic education in Hong Kong, let me discuss below the development of 
nationalistic education in Hong Kong from two different perspectives. First, I will 
consider the perspective of people who take the value of patriotic education for 
granted and seek for students to love their country as a matter of course. Second, I 
will explore the view of those who do not take “love for country" for granted and 
seek instead critical thinking towards the country. 
The Perspective of People who Love their Country as a Matter of Course 
For outsiders from more nationalistic societies, the situation of nationalistic 
education in Hong Kong could be criticized as inadequate in at least two aspects: 
institutional measures such as central curriculum and school policy, and teacher 
attitudes. To understand how Hong Kong can be assessed as falling short in 
instilling patriotic attitudes, it is worth looking at how patriotic education takes 
place in different countries. 
The most relevant example for Hong Kong is perhaps the People's Republic of 
China. As a state-centred socialist country with one of the most nationalistic 
populations in the world, China is known for its strong emphasis on nationalistic 
ideology in its education system. In regard to this, Grossman (2004:236) writes: 
Not only does the legal framework of China stress nationalistic education, 
the formal and informal curriculum are immensely imbued with a 
nationalistic ideology. As stated in both the Primary Education Moral 
Principles (Xiaoxue Deyu Gangyao) and Secondary Education Moral 
Principles (Zhongxue Deyu Gangyao), love for the mother country is of 
primary importance in formal primary and secondary education. Students 
are required to participate in the flag-raising ceremony and to sing the 
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national anthem every Monday. 
Fairbrother's case study (2004) on the implementation of patriotic education in 
Jinling Middle School, a national-level keypoint middle school in Nanjing, provides 
a more detailed picture of the pervasiveness of patriotic education at the secondary 
school level in China's formal schooling. As he writes (2004:164): 
As mentioned by the teachers, patriotic education at Jinling Middle 
School is an all-encompassing enterprise, involving subject classes, 
class-meetings, and a variety of activities among the students. The 
flagpole from which the national flag flies each day is situated 
prominently at one end of the main sports field. A notice at the entrance to 
the school advises staff and students that 'while the national flag is being 
raised and the national anthem played, pedestrians should remain standing 
and silent'. The first of the Student Regulations displayed at the entrance 
to the senior secondary classroom building tells students to ‘be patriotic, 
love the people, uphold the Communist Party, study hard, and prepare 
yourselves to make a contribution to socialist modernisation'. Each 
classroom displays a national flag at the front of the room, and 
blackboards at the back of each classroom are often used for displays on 
patriotic themes... 
Fairbrother further notes that the school called upon all teachers to teach 
patriotism (2007:164), allotted at least 10 hours per week on social studies courses 
as part of patriotic education (2004:172), organized two to three big activities for 
patriotic education per term (2004:172), and conducted the flag-raising ceremony 
every day in order to encourage an emotional attachment to the nation (2004:167). 
While it is clear that China puts strong emphasis on the instilling of national 
identity and patriotic sentiments through its centrally-promulgated political and 
ideological education, such a phenomenon is by no means only found in China. In 
fact, the teaching of national identity is an important part of civic education 
worldwide. Leung (2003) has reviewed Japan, Thailand, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Indonesia as examples of Asian societies where civic education "has traditionally 
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been charged with the responsibility of instilling a sense of national identity, loyalty 
to the nation state and patriotism" (2003:2); also, civic education in the United 
States is no less patriotic for its stress on "unquestioned patriotism, loyalty to 
government and nationalism" (Leung 2003:3-4 quoting Turner 1981:56). 
Interestingly, despite the strong emphasis that nation-states worldwide place on 
national identity and patriotic education, detailed studies about patriotic education 
itself that examine how patriotic education is actually conducted “on the ground" in 
different societies are extremely rare in the existing literature. However, the 
interviews that I have conducted with people of eight different nationalities, who are 
from the United States, the PRC, Taiwan, Thailand, Slovenia, Croatia, Sweden and 
Norway, serve to demonstrate that patriotic training is indeed a prominent 
component of the formal schooling in many different countries irrespective of their 
form of government and political system.^^ Individuals from most of the 
aforementioned societies recalled experiences of learning to love their country in 
schools when they were very small. For example, a journalist in her twenties from 
Thailand, a constitutional monarchy, remembered attending the flag-raising 
ceremony followed by a Buddhist prayer every morning at 8 o'clock from primary 
school through secondary school; in her words, the royal anthem and the national 
flag were taught “time after time” and the teaching "was repeated often enough" 
until “the teachers were certain that everyone in the class knows everything, like the 
composer of the anthem, the designer of the flag, the words and the meanings about 
these symbols, by heart". On the other hand, Croatia and Slovenia, two nations that 
came into existence in the early 1990s by gaining independence from former 
Yugoslavia, have implemented intensive nationalistic education programmes both 
67 These interviews were conducted in the summer of 2003 with exchange students during my stay 
in Germany for my undergraduate final year research project. 
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under the communist rule before Croatia's independence and under the rule of their 
respective parliamentary republic governments after independence. A university 
student from Croatia recalled the experience of “being transformed into being a 
Croatian from a Yugoslavian" after Croatia's independence: “In primary school, 
Croatian history and Croatian literature became really important subjects, which 
were taught in extreme details, in a really in-depth approach, and we were taught 
the concept "being a Yugoslavian is a shameful past"; the Croatian national flag was 
raised in school every day and everyone learnt to know by heart the meaning of it 
and how to sing the national anthem. In fact, nowadays one can hear the Croatian 
national anthem at the end of each day's programme on the state television and 
radio channels." In addition, an American student who went to elementary school in 
Georgia in the United States remembered having been required to recite the Pledge 
of Allegiance as an everyday routine and had been taught about American history, 
society and political figures since the third grade. 
The situation of Hong Kong stands in stark contrast to that described above. 
The teaching of national identity has arguably become a workaday aspect of 
learning in many Hong Kong's local schools; and nationalistic symbols and rituals 
have apparently become popularized since more and more schools have started to 
conduct the flag-raising ceremony regularly and teach students to raise the national 
flag and sing the national anthem. However, the frequency and intensity with which 
these practices are carried out in Hong Kong schools are low in comparison with the 
previously mentioned societies. Based on the observation of my informants, the 
average school in Hong Kong raises the national flag only once or twice a year and 
does not require students to sing the anthem. Also, perhaps with the exception of the 
traditional "pro-China schools”，the kind of physical environment which “sets the 
stage for the carrying out education designed to instil students with knowledge 
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about and positive attitudes toward China” found in the Chinese middle school 
studied by Fairbrother (2004:164) is largely missing in Hong Kong. Indeed, it is 
accurate to say that school curriculum of Hong Kong secondary schools generally 
does not attach a high value on nationalistic rituals or the display of loyalty to the 
country. 
At the same time, although Hong Kong's education policy is regarded as 
increasingly stressing the significance of national identity (see Chapter Two), there 
are critical voices saying that the consciousness of promoting national belonging 
has been diminishing in the Hong Kong education sector. If the status of Chinese 
history in the Hong Kong curriculum is to be taken as an indicator, there are reasons 
for patriots to argue that concrete change in the centralized curriculum does not 
exactly parallel the urge for strengthening the learning about China in the official 
directives. In support of this view, it is pointed out that the number of students who 
sat for examinations of Chinese History in the HKCEE fell from 34918 in 1997 to 
27005 in 2007 (Li 2007). Cheung Man Kwong, the chairman of Hong Kong 
Professional Teachers' Union, predicts that the status of Chinese History will 
• • 6 8 decline further when the local schooling system is reformed into a 3+3+4 system 
in 2009 because by that time the only part of the curriculum related to Chinese 
history is “Modem China" and this section is only a small and optional section in 
the Liberal Studies syllabus (Li 2007). Hong Kong's disregard of the use of national 
history is unique for a polity that is supposed to be in a time of official national 
integration. 
The declining status of Chinese History may reflect a diminishing 
consciousness among Hong Kong education policy makers of inculcating patriotism. 
68 Three years of junior secondary school, three years of senior secondary school and four years of 
university. 
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But the attitude of teachers at the forefront who directly control what is actually 
taught to students is one aspect of the peculiar situation of Hong Kong that deserves 
more attention. A reference to Fairbrother's study (2004) of mainland Chinese 
teachers and Putman's study (1998) of American teachers should give us some hints 
of the discrepancy between Hong Kong and the two perhaps most nationalistic 
countries in the world. According to Fairbrother, patriotic education is seen by 
moral education administrators at Jinling Middle School as necessary in creating 
unity and cohesiveness among the Chinese people and as a component of a unified 
belief system without which China would face the threat of dissolution. Many 
teachers in that school also perceived patriotic education to be a means towards the 
creation of "a body of citizens willing to uphold China's glory and honour, defend 
the nation against invasion and bullying, and contribute to making China a 
prosperous, strong, civilised, and democratic nation" (2004:159). This strong sense 
of commitment towards patriotic education among these Chinese teachers is echoed 
among high school American history teachers in Knox County in the United States. 
In Putman's study, the overwhelming majority of the American teachers interviewed 
agreed with the statements "teaching about patriotism should be one of the 
objectives of every American history course" (Putman 1998:72), "teaching about 
patriotism is important to American history teachers" (1998:75), and “ I teach 
American history in a manner that emphasizes the positive features of the United 
States" (1998:83). In Putman's words, this indicates that the interviewees were 
"firm in their belief that teaching about patriotism was important to American 
history teachers", were "well equipped to teach issues that involved patriotism" 
(1998:75-76) as well as “possess[ing] strong feelings regarding patriotism" 
(1998:84). 
In contrast to the two cases above, Hong Kong teachers definitely appear to be 
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far less straightforward in their attitude towards the teaching of national identity. 
This has been shown in this thesis as well as previous studies, such as Leung 
(2003)'s finding that less than 45 percent of 369 Hong Kong civics education 
teachers believed nationalistic education should be made the core of civic education. 
In Chapter Four, I mentioned that many of my informants agreed that patriotic 
education in Hong Kong is important and I categorized four major ways in which 
informants justify the need to have patriotic education in Hong Kong. However, it 
must be mentioned here that individuals did contradict themselves and that not all 
of these teachers were equally engaged in the topic, either emotionally or 
intellectually. While the majority of my informants claimed to be supportive of 
patriotic education, not all of them have participated actively in the actual 
implementation of it. In fact, it is more accurate to say that for the average 
proponent in my sample, support to patriotic education is more in principle than in 
action. And as noted in Chapter Four, although the teachers predicate their claim of 
support on their identification with a Chinese cultural identity, they varied a great 
deal in their degree of emotional attachment to China. Just as less than half of my 
30 informants have said that they loved their country, not many of the teachers have 
ever justified their support for patriotic education through strong patriotic feeling or 
deep personal relationship with their country. When they argued in our interviews 
that national identity should be taught in Hong Kong, it was often in the tone of “I 
think it is important because this is what everyone else in the world is doing” rather 
than “I think it is important because I love my country." This constitutes a picture 
very different from the previously mentioned cases about mainland Chinese 
teachers, American teachers and people of various nationalities in which individuals 
displayed openly and naturally their conviction and passion regarding patriotism 
and the teaching of national identity. In Hong Kong, where "the country" is a 
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politically controversial issue, the attitude of teachers concerning their role in 
promoting patriotism is one that is ambivalent rather than certain. 
To sum up, in the eyes of the conventional patriot, Hong Kong's patriotic 
education can be considered weak in both policy enforcement and ideological basis. 
Differing from the "international norm”，the teaching of national identity has not 
been developed as a built-in component of formal schooling and also lacks the 
unquestioned, taken-for-granted attitude towards loving one's country among those 
people who are responsible for promoting it. 
The Perspective of Advocates of Critical Thinking and Democratic Education 
The evaluation of patriotic education in Hong Kong as discussed in the previous 
section is relatively straightforward for an outsider to comprehend because 
“conventional patriotic education" in Hong Kong, a form of education oriented to 
instilling emotional attachment to the country and stressing the display of 
nationalistic sentiment through rituals and symbols, can find many relevant parallels 
across the world and thus can be judged in a more or less internationally 
comparative context. What this section will show, however, is that from the 
perspective of teachers who believe in critical thinking education and democratic 
education, evaluating Hong Kong's patriotic education is a question that is more 
complicated. Instead of focusing on elements such as the teaching of Chinese 
culture and national symbols, this group of teachers consider promoting political 
literacy, democratic values and critical thinking to be the primary missions of 
patriotic education. Also, central to their ideal is the emphasis on the concept of the 
cultural nation versus the political nation as an object of nationals' affection. As 
already examined in this thesis, many Hong Kong teachers do personally 
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distinguish between the cultural realm and the political realm of the country; but 
teachers of critical thinking and democratic education are particularly critical of the 
conflation of loving the Chinese nation (people) with loving the Chinese state 
(government) and they endeavour to make sure that the concept of state versus 
nation is disseminated to their students. 
Since patriotic education defined in this way is in many ways at odds with the 
officially-promulgated version, the advocates generally see themselves as 
promoting an alternative version of nationalistic education and fight for their 
version in the form of counter-action and challenge to the more ‘‘politically correct" 
interpretation held by advocates of "conventional patriotic education". It is also 
necessary to note that their assessment of the situation of Hong Kong is centred on 
the fundamentally problematic and conflicting nature of teaching national identity 
in the unique context of Hong Kong in relation to China and entails a debate on 
what purpose civic education should ultimately serve in today's society. 
From this perspective, Hong Kong's patriotic education has serious inherent 
contradictions that must be addressed before one can consider the teaching's 
efficacy. One such tricky issue is related to the contradiction between “knowing’’ 
and "loving". As discussed in Chapter Six, the teaching of national identity involves 
both "knowing" about the country, which relies on reasoning, as well as “loving,’ 
the country, which rests on emotion. Initially, these two faculties should not be 
viewed as mutually exclusive, since as a matter of fact students do need to learn 
about the facts of the country in order to care for it and like it. However, teachers 
face a dilemma when what students learn about the country can undermine their 
affection for it. This is why, in order to make it easier for students to accept and like 
their country, it is common for patriots to teach national identity in a fashion that 
stresses the positive aspects of the country. The studies mentioned previously and 
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the interviews I did with individuals of different nationalities provide evidence for 
this. Putman (1998:83) found in his survey about history teachers in the United 
States that teachers were strongly inclined to teach American history “in a manner 
that emphasizes the positive features of the country". The American students I 
interviewed also reflected that schools have taught them to take pride in being 
Americans through themes such as that the United States is a free country and has 
adopted the best political system - democracy - in the world. On the other hand, 
based on what my two mainland Chinese informants told me, students in mainland 
China are not only taught to appreciate the nation's rich culture and great 
civilization but are also encouraged to take pride in the state's effort and 
achievement in helping the nation to develop into a stronger international economic 
and political power. Even Scandinavian countries which traditionally have a less 
nationalistic profile may not be exempted from this, as my Norwegian and Swedish 
informants, who claimed not to love but like their country, recalled incidents in 
which they were encouraged to feel pride about the peaceful and neutral character 
of their countries. For all of the ten informants in that research who were from Asia, 
Europe and North America, the socialization of individuals into seeing the good of 
the country began when they were very young. It is worth noting that the influence 
of the teaching, as judged from the attitudes of the individuals towards their country, 
has been powerful: while 9 out of those 10 interviewees admitted to have strong 
affection for their country and prefer being citizens of their own countries to others, 
some - the two mainland Chinese, the Thai and the Slovene 一 even claimed to be 
willing to die for their country if circumstances demanded them to do so. 
In fact, today it is also quite common for Hong Kong teachers to rely on such a 
strategy, of emphasizing Chinese culture and positive features of China, hoping to 
make their students believe that loving one's country is a duty for everyone. 
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However, to the teachers who support critical thinking, this method is unviable, 
because they see that the discrepancy between Hong Kong and China is so deep and 
evident that glorification of the country would not fundamentally change Hong 
Kong people's attitude towards China. A teacher who held such a view, a Civic 
Education teacher in his thirties, said: 
The situation we see today is bound to be one that you only reap half of 
what you sow. You want to speak in favour of China, but what they do 
there in mainland China disproves what you say. Sometimes, as a teacher, 
I feel ashamed of what I need to teach. It's terrible when you have to 
speak in favour of something that you know is not completely true. So, it 
is a serious problem. And the main thing is that the students know it. They 
can see it! 
Indeed, despite the closer connections between China and Hong Kong after the 
handover, the two societies do remain quite different from each other on many 
levels: while China is a totalitarian socialist regime with few signs of having 
fundamental political reform in the near future, Hong Kong is a major international 
metropolis endeavouring at present to map a route towards full democracy. To many 
Hong Kong people, the idea of embracing the whole of the country irrespective of 
its good or bad (which is the ultimate manifestation of real patriotism) is still 
tremendously undesirable. As information is so free and open in Hong Kong that 
people have access to all kinds of media and are exposed to different sides of 
opinions within its territory, it does not make sense to expect that students who 
grow up in this environment would be totally ignorant or unaware of the complexity 
and contentiousness of “loving China". In fact, although Hong Kong young people 
sometimes have displayed extraordinary “nationalistic fervour" (such as in 
celebration of China's technological achievements), it is questionable if their 
general sense of national belonging and national pride has been significantly 
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Strengthened since the handover. ^ ^ 
By definition, patriotic education, no matter whether it is in a conventional, 
uncritical form or a more critical form, ultimately aims at inculcating a sense of 
national belonging to the country. But given the traditionally weak national attitude 
and relatively low respect for China among Hong Kong youngsters, emphasizing 
knowing about the country, thus further exposing students to the not-so-glamorous 
reality of China such as the nation's under-performance in issues of human rights 
and the rule of law — elements that Hong Kong people highly treasure — is likely to 
prevent students from wholeheartedly embracing China in the way a real patriot 
would do. This is found to be particularly true for today's senior secondary school 
students, who have received very little or no patriotic training in the past and have 
come to develop the analytical ability to judge their society and country. It is in this 
context that teachers who advocate critical thinking find the teaching of knowing 
and that of loving the country practically irreconcilable in Hong Kong's patriotic 
education. 
Having the inevitable dilemma described above, these teachers see that the 
cause of the problem boils down in the end to one factor: the lack in mainland 
China of a social and political system which can make Hong Kong people respect 
and trust their country. To these teachers, the solution to the problem, to put it 
simply, is the development of democracy and civic nationalism in China. A Civic 
Education teacher in his thirties illustrated this clearly: 
If you want nationalistic education to be effective, what you need to know 
is that if China has a better system and a more open media, then the good 
69 Surveys concerning Hong Kong students' senses of national belonging have yielded inconsistent 
results over the years. For example, an annual survey conducted by Hok Yau Club found that the 
percentage of Hong Kong secondary school students interviewed who said they loved China rose 
from 54.4 in 2003 to 62.1 in 2004 {Hong Kong Economic Times 2004). However, the same survey 
conducted in 2005 showed that the percentage of students who said they loved China declined from 
62.1 in the previous year to 59.7, while the percentage of those who said they loved Hong Kong 
remained unchanged at 84 (Cheung 2006). 
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things about the country will automatically reach us through the Hong 
Kong media; in that way, our students will naturally leam to love it, to 
appreciate it, and to care about it and even to criticize it. On the contrary, 
if they keep having bad news about their living, their food and their bad 
political system run out and reach us, it is very difficult to make people 
believe in them. If what you report is one thing and the reality is a 
different story, just like as you keep telling us to love the country and to 
respect the government officials but at the same time ninety percent of 
what you are doing is not something that you can be proud of, then you're 
not only cheating others but also yourself. You see, it is the same as 
smokers telling their children not to smoke. You simply can't convince if 
you can't be a rule model yourself. So, that's why I think nationalistic 
education is only possible when the circumstance is compatible. If you 
ask me when patriotic education will succeed in making Hong Kong 
people love their country, I really can't tell; it's the same as asking when 
China will develop democracy! 
If one accepts such a notion as suggested by these teachers that the success of 
patriotic education in Hong Kong is hinged on the transformation of China into a 
liberal, democratic country, the next question that one may ask would be when 
China will come to have democracy. As for this, none of the teachers ventured to 
answer specifically. But what can be said in general is that despite their genuine 
hope for change to happen, they did not expect that it will be realized in the 
foreseeable future, since they all acknowledged that any change in the Chinese 
system, even the most minor one apparently, is controlled by forces that are 
absolutely beyond individuals' control. Such a view finds verification and 
elaboration in He and Guo's analysis, in which the fate of Chinese democracy is 
illustrated as a tragedy (2000:201). According to He and Guo, the position of China 
is one of "a multi-national country with the historical legacy of ‘empire”’ (He and 
Guo 2000:201). This means that the nation-state's highest priority is to hold on to 
the country's territories at any cost so as to keep the “empire，，together. As 
historically the Chinese nation-state was "never built on democratic process" and 
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was “a Party-State created through violent revolution and based merely on history, 
ethnicity, culture and Chinese language" (He and Guo 2000:209), for the Chinese 
state to start adopting democratic principles for political legitimization would mean 
that it has to be prepared to deal with the challenge of the independence issues with 
territories like Taiwan and Tibet. This represents the biggest threat to the existence 
of the Chinese nation-state. In this context, the conflict between democracy and 
Chinese nationalism looks almost irresolvable. Thus viewed, the rather grim future 
that the Hong Kong teachers as well as the China scholars have envisioned of 
democratization in China is understandable. 
Certainly, whether and when China will develop democracy is yet to be seen. 
But if the development of democracy in China is to be regarded as a condition for 
Hong Kong's patriotic education to flourish, the process may be painstakingly slow 
and the chance of success is extremely precarious in the short run. 
Having said that, however, a different angle of evaluating success can readily 
be derived from the outlook of the proponents of critical thinking and democratic 
civic education. It involves a philosophical examination of patriotism and can lead 
to an alternative conclusion about the progress of patriotic education in Hong Kong. 
One remarkable character of these teachers is their insistence on recognizing 
two possibilities of orienting nationalistic education in Hong Kong. When asked to 
comment on the progress of nationalistic education in Hong Kong, they pointed out 
that it depended on how one defined nationalistic education: whether one took a 
broader or narrower interpretation. One of these teachers illustrated their central 
idea is as follows: 
In civic education, the main goal is to be a good citizen. In real life, if one 
can be a good citizen, one would already be doing something good to the 
country. By the same token, in education, when one is learning to become 
a good citizen and be able to contribute to society as a good citizen, then 
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no matter what one is studying, one is already making contribution to the 
country. In the specific context of Hong Kong, then, since Hong Kong is 
part of China, teaching about Hong Kong is already part of teaching about 
China: Hong Kong studies is, in itself, nationalistic education. In this 
sense, nationalistic education is a broad subject. On the contrary, a 
narrower interpretation of nationalistic education is to focus exclusively 
on China — China's system, culture and society — alone. 
In other words, the narrow version of nationalistic education implies an 
China-centredness, a positioning of the nation above anything else; on the other 
hand, the broadly delineated version can be taken as civic education in general, 
which refers to a citizenship education without privileging any identifying social 
unit, be it the family, the school, the city, the nation, or the globe, over another when 
it comes to the instilling of a person's sense of belonging. Seeing that both versions 
have been put into practice in Hong Kong, the teachers under discussion prefer the 
latter interpretation over the former. 
This is closely related to two important issues that transcend the context of 
Hong Kong: first, the morality of patriotism, and second, the objective of civic 
education in today's world. 
The first issue, the moral standing of patriotism, has been of much dispute 
among scholars from the philosophy department. The debate may be summarized in 
Primoratz's words (2002) to be a struggle between seeing patriotism as “a morally 
unacceptable partiality to one's own country and compatriots, and a source of many 
evils in social and political life" and viewing patriotism as “a morally legitimate 
stance, or a duty, or a moral virtue", or in an extreme sense “the basic moral virtue 
and the source of all genuine morality" (2002:12). Tackling the question of whether 
patriotism is a virtue, Nathanson (2002) argues against a categorization of 
patriotism to be either a virtue or a vice and proposes a more situational answer: 
patriotism may be viewed as a virtue when it is "in the service of valuable ends and 
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is limited to morally legitimate means of attaining them"; but patriotism becomes a 
vice when it "leads to support of immoral ends or immoral means to achieve 
otherwise legitimate ends (2002:90-91). At the same time, as a defender of a 
“moderate patriotic view", Nathanson (2002) proposes three claims to moderate 
patriotism: patriotism could be morally permissible, a duty or an optional virtue. For 
the Hong Kong teachers from the critical thinking education camp, their evaluation 
of patriotism tends to be in favour of only the first claim. This has been shown in 
Chapter Six: although the teachers would be happy to see a strengthened sense of 
national belonging among their students through their teaching, they do not see and 
treat making their students love their country as essential of their teaching. In their 
eyes, patriotism is not a duty but rather an individual choice, at most morally 
permissible: while unanimously admitting to have a strong sense of national 
attachment themselves, they did not condemn those who did not share this 
sentiment, nor did they regard it necessary to alter other people's attitude. 
At the same time, the teachers' belief that loving one's country is only morally 
permissible but not obligatory or virtuous is reflected in the objective they set for 
their teaching. This leads us to the second issue: the debate on what purpose civic 
education should serve. Underlying the teachers' contention that patriotic education 
in Hong Kong should be treated as democratic education is their scepticism against 
the presumed elevated position of the nation in patriotic education. A Civic 
Education teacher in his forties said: 
In our school's curriculum, we do have certain programmes that promote 
national identity. However, we can't relate everything just to the nation. 
We are talking about moral and civic education here and not simply about 
nationalistic education. As a person, we are not only just Chinese; we are 
also a son, a student, a global citizen. So why does it always have to be 
the nation? Why not Asia? Why not a member of society? Why not a 
student of this school? Today, we're talking about globalization. So what 
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we are concerned about here is the identity of a global citizen. So why 
must we make the nation the only unit that is of significance to us? Why 
don't we make it the city, the province, or the world? Why do we have to 
focus only on the nation? 
In the eyes of these teachers, the nation should not be positioned as if it is 
larger than any other object of an individual's affiliation; education should be 
defined in the broader sense as previously mentioned, in which students' sense of 
national identity is enhanced as an equally weighed rather than especially 
emphasized component of the complex whole of an individuars multi-dimensional 
identity. This stance posts challenges to the assumptions of the conventional 
patriotic education in Hong Kong, and in some sense echoes Nussbaum's outlook in 
her advocacy of a move to cosmopolitanism from patriotism in contemporary 
America (Nussbaum 1996). According to the cosmopolitan ideal, a person's first 
allegiance must be to the worldwide community of human beings. Thus, as 
Nussbaum argues, national education should prepare students to become citizens of 
the world, individuals who base their everyday deliberations on the respect and 
concern for the whole humankind rather than merely patriots of a nation, 
individuals whose moral obligations are otherwise based on a system of 
differentiation. 
The convergent point of Nussbaum and the Hong Kong teachers is thus their 
emphasis on world citizenship over national citizenship in civic education. 
Nevertheless, there is significant difference between the context in which Nussbaum 
stated her case and that in which the Hong Kong teachers put forward their ideas. 
Targeting American patriotism and its possibly inward-looking quality, Nussbaum 
stated that world citizenship rather than “democratic or national citizenship" should 
be made the focus of civic education (Nussbauml996:l 1 emphasis added). As the 
United States is a democratic polity and the American identity is based centrally on 
198 
Chapter Three Tse Yuen Man 
the nation's democratic values, it is legitimate that “democratic citizenship" and 
“national citizenship" are aligned with each other in Nussbaum's case to be equally 
de-emphasized in defence of the ideal of world citizenship. However, unlike the 
United States and other liberal democratic countries, in Hong Kong a democratic 
national identity is a controversial issue. While neither democracy nor nationalism 
has yet to take root in Hong Kong, they are officially at odds and are counteracting 
each other in their courses of development. This is what makes Hong Kong such a 
peculiar case. Thus, for the Hong Kong teachers featured in this section, 
"democratic citizenship”，instead of being on equal footing with "national 
citizenship", is on the same front with “world citizenship". According to these 
teachers, cosmopolitan education is in fact democratic education, since democracy 
best represents, through its principle of equality, freedom and human rights, the 
very basic and core values that are universal to the humankind. 
Undeniably, in the global political context of the present, democracy, being the 
most favourably valued political system in the world, can certainly be viewed as a 
cosmopolitan project (Enslin 2000:153). But what these teachers wanted to point 
out further, as Enslin too argues in her article, is that in the age of globalization, 
when people, cultures, and activities across the world are becoming increasingly 
interconnected, it is no longer sufficient for anyone to practise citizenship solely by 
reason of being a member of a particular nation-state; rather, it demands individuals 
to be able to act as members in a trans-national and multi-cultural context, which 
requires the development of respect for difference and diversity, as well as 
reflexivity and awareness of happenings at both local and international levels 
(2000:154-155). In the eyes of these teachers, in Hong Kong, a society which is 
already highly cosmopolitan and is now presented with the opportunity to choose 
between a path to nationalism and that to democracy, civic education should 
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definitely give priority to the teaching of cosmopolitan or democratic citizenship 
over that of national citizenship. 
What, then, in light of the above, can be said of an evaluation of patriotic 
education? According to the teachers' articulation, the objective of civic and 
patriotic education in Hong Kong should be the promotion of cosmopolitan 
democratic principles. Although as a matter of fact the development of full 
democracy in Hong Kong is inevitably conditioned by the state of affairs of its 
sovereignty, the PRC, from the perspective of the Hong Kong teachers, as long as 
students are constantly exposed to news of democratic developments and 
encouraged to identify with democratic values, which in the end, must point to the 
development of rational and critical thinking, then patriotic education can be 
considered to be advancing towards its goal. To wrap this up through the words of 
one of the teachers: 
Teaching democratic citizenship is about teaching students of the 
importance of basic human rights and political freedom. But at the end of 
the day, it is all about the promotion of independent thinking and a critical 
mind. This is because the basis to all good decisions, like how to choose 
the right political representatives locally and how to act in the best 
interests of the global community, lies in the ability of the individual to 
reason, to understand and to judge between right and wrong. Thus, as 
long as Hong Kong students are able to see the different sides of their 
country critically and can engage themselves in a rational discussion of 
the national identity problem — which is actually what I've been guiding 
my students to do in my teaching — to me it already means a great deal for 
the good of patriotic education in Hong Kong. 
The Future of the Teaching of National Identity in Hong Kong: The Promotion 
of a New Form of National Belonging 
In contrast to the traditional notions of regarding nationalism as an exotic, extreme 
form of emotion or action, Billig (1995) proposes the term “banal nationalism" to 
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describe the kind of nationalism that is prevalent in today's societies. Billig argues 
that nationalism in the contemporary world takes a routine forms and works close to 
us in a day-to-day, mundane manner; it penetrates ordinary people's life, and 
becomes so familiar to the people that it is difficult for those who are under its 
influence to take notice of it. Billig believes that the reason why national identity 
continues to persist as a prominent phenomenon today is that nationalism is 
constantly flagged in daily life beyond the level of conscious awareness. The 
habitual use of language in newspapers, the appearance of politicians in mass media 
and the presence of a national flag hanging outside a public building are examples 
of the various ways in which people's national identity and national consciousness 
is reinforced under the influence of banal symbols. If one agrees with Bloom's 
identification theory as earlier discussed, which suggests that coercion is not a 
viable means to create among the masses of people real experience of the nation and 
positive internalization of national identity, it seems clear that the subtler but more 
penetrating flagging and reminding of banal nationalism actually makes the most 
effective and powerful strategy for a long-term nation-building scheme. Banal 
nationalism, as a stage in which people take their national allegiance for granted 
beyond consciousness, is arguably the most desirable result that a nationalistic 
education project can achieve. In today's Hong Kong, national identity can hardly 
be said to be an exotic and remote phenomenon as it was the case a decade ago. 
Flagging and reminding of nationalism through the everyday use of symbols can 
now be observed as a customary part of Hong Kong people's lives rather than 
anything original or unusual. But at the same time, my research reveals that Hong 
Kong today remains exceptional despite these visible signs on the surface, because 
the unquestioned faith that the average patriot in the world keeps with their nation 
and the nation-state system is still lacking among many Hong Kong people. 
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It should now be evident that the problematic nature of the teaching of national 
identity in Hong Kong actually stems from the tension between two disparate 
versions of loving the country in the community. As long as the pro-Chinese 
Communist Party approach and the pro-democracy approach co-exist, the teaching 
of national identity will remain a battlefield of antagonistic ideas and will continue 
to produce mixed influences on the teaching's recipients. Under this condition, 
students who are encouraged to love China will inevitably encounter the same 
ambivalence harboured by many Hong Kong people today: they will be attracted to 
the Chinese people and the nation's culture but repelled at the Chinese state and its 
politics, unable to embrace their Chinese national identity wholeheartedly. Until the 
day the Chinese state successfully establishes its legitimacy and earns genuine trust 
from Hong Kong people, which for many Hong Kong people is to be by becoming a 
democratic polity, skepticism towards patriotism for China in Hong Kong will 
persist, and it is likely that the teaching of national identity in Hong Kong will 
retain its schizophrenic character and problematic nature for a long time to come. 
For patriotic education teachers who are attempting to make change to the 
present situation, their task at hand is finding a ground on which Hong Kong people 
can relate positively and "naturally" to their Chinese sovereign on a deep level. We 
have seen that some teachers have sought to forge such a relationship through 
appealing to Hong Kong people's longing for Chinese culture while others do so 
through people's craving for universal democracy, but against the current situation 
the ultimate efficacy of these channels is questionable because neither of them are 
able to capture the attention of those who do not in the first place have any interest 
in national identity and do not support any form of patriotic education to be 
implemented in Hong Kong. 
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As gloomy as the prospect of national identity in Hong Kong may seem from 
the above, a new thread towards creating a national bond has emerged. According to 
Mathews, Ma and Lui (2008), Hong Kong people may be developing a new and 
unique form of national identity: a "market-based sense of national identity" that is 
“characterized by individual choice, and self-interest paralleling national interest" 
(2008:161). In the words of Mathews, Ma and Lui, this kind of patriotism is “a new, 
pragmatic form of national belonging derived not from the discourse of the state but 
from the discourse of the market, but that nonetheless may in effect converge with 
the discourse of the state’, (2008:152). They write: 
...Hong Kong in its adherence to the discourse of the market, offers an 
alternative to the discourse of the state; the market mentality of many of 
Hong Kong's people may cause them to view their country with a rational, 
critical, distanced eye, that in effect prevents them from fully “belonging 
to a nation" in a way that most other people in the world belong to a 
nation. However, it may be that for many in Hong Kong, this market 
mentality will come increasingly to serve not simply as an alternative to 
“belonging to a nation,” but also as an alternative path to “belonging to a 
nation" (2008:160-161). 
This argument suggests that Hong Kong people's market mentality may no 
longer be portrayed as essentially antagonistic to Chinese state nationalism. For 
Hong Kong teachers who are used to promoting patriotism either on a cultural basis 
or on a democratic basis, they may now see that the discourse of the market offers a 
third channel, one that may serve to strike a chord in terms of Hong Kong people's 
core value, which would not only offer a common ground for both groups of 
teachers but would also appeal to the wider a-nationalistic and politically apathetic 
Hong Kong public. Indeed, in the course of my research, signs of such pragmatic 
nationalism have often been detected. As shown in Chapter Four, economic reasons 
are one of my informants' major justifications for their support of patriotic 
education. Some teachers who used not to care anything for national identity have 
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now admitted in my research that the economic prospect brought by Hong Kong's 
unification with China has significantly changed their attitude towards China and 
made them more emotionally attached to their country. Moreover, based on the 
observation of many informants, Hong Kong students also appeared to be keenly 
aware of this material basis of Hong Kong-China relationship, as they were often 
reported to have cited in class examples like CEPA and the Individual Visit 
Scheme^^ to be "positive attributes" of belonging to the country. 
Of course it is hard to tell at this stage what will become of "patriotism" in 
Hong Kong, say, fifty years from now. However, it is evident from the above that 
pragmatic nationalism is gradually spreading in a real sense in Hong Kong. Thus, it 
is reasonable to foresee a more prominent role of market values as an instrument to 
trigger a real experience of the country among students. The increased incorporation 
of elements of pragmatic nationalism, cultural nationalism and democratic 
nationalism into one curriculum is an aspect that is worth keeping one's eye on for 
the future of the teaching of national identity in Hong Kong. 
Having a national identity and loving one's country, as mentioned throughout 
this thesis, is a largely unquestioned thing for many people in different parts of the 
world. This research has focused on Hong Kong, the perhaps only society which 
has been exempted from this almost universal phenomenon of national identity but 
is now being slowly assimilated into it. The diverse and contradictory ways in 
which national identity and patriotism are interpreted and taught by Hong Kong 
teachers examined in this thesis demonstrate that patriotic education is a highly 
problematic issue in the unique context of Hong Kong. At the same time, however, 
A scheme began in July 2003 which allows travellers from Mainland China, who could only 
travel to Hong Kong in group tours or on business visas previously, to visit Hong Kong on an 
individual basis. 
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the case of Hong Kong has implications for the rest of the world. While the 
emergence of the new form of national belonging as discussed above may point to 
the fact that the nation remains no less prominent in the age of globalization than 
before, the dispute over the meanings of patriotism and patriotic education among 
Hong Kong teachers raises a question crucial to our understanding of national 
identity and nationalism: is patriotism and teaching patriotism a desirable thing? 
Contrary to the assumption of an average patriot, some Hong Kong people suggest 
that the answer is not necessarily affirmative. Whether Hong Kong people will learn 
to love China in an uncritical way like people in the rest of the world and whether 
they will resist it is a huge question for Hong Kong education in the future. But this 
goes beyond the levels of what I have tried to accomplish in this study and may be 
worthy of future research of the national identity problem in Hong Kong. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Profile of Informants 
Teacher School Curriculum Taught Age Sex 
1. A Civic Education, Computer Studies, Mathematics 30's M 
2. B Social Studies, Chinese Language 30’s M 
3. B Civic Education Team 30’s M 
4. * B Chinese History 50’s F 
5. C Chinese History 30's M 
6. D Chinese History, Liberal Studies 40's M 
7. E History, Putonghua 20's F 
8. F Civic Education Team, Economics, Economics 40’s M 
and Public Affairs 
9. G Civic Education 40's _ M _ 
10. H Civic Education 40's M 
11. I Civic Education, English, Home Economics 30，s F 
12. I Civic Education Team, Geography 30's F 
13. I History 30,s M _ 
14. I Civic Education, Chinese Language 30's M 
15. J Chinese History, Ethics and Religious Studies 40，s M 
16. K History, English, Integrated Humanities 20's F 
17. L Civic Education, Chinese Language 30's M 
18. M Civic Education 30,s F 
19.* N History, Liberal Studies 20,s F 
20. N Boy Scout, Economics and Public Affairs 30,s M 
21. O Civic Education Team 30,s M ^ 
22. P Chinese History, Physical Education 30's F 
23. P English, Form Teacher 20's F 
24. * Q Economics, Civic Education Team 20's M 
25. R Civic Education 40’s M _ _ 
26. S English, Form Teacher 20,s F 
27. T Chinese Language 30’s F 
28. U Chinese Language 30’s F 
29. V Civic Education Team 40’s M 
30.* W Civic Education Team, Mathematics 30's F 
Teachers with (*) were born in mainland China. The rest were bom in Hong Kong. 
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Appendix 2 Profile of Schools where Informants Taught 
School Location Religion School Type Medium of No. of 
Affiliation Instruction Informants 
A# Eastern Christianity Aided/ Chinese 1 
District Co-educational 
B Eastern Christianity Aided/ Chinese 3 
District Co-educational 
C Kwun Christianity Aided/ Chinese 1 
Tong Co-educational 
D Kwun Christianity Aided/ English 1 
Tong Girls 
E Kwun Catholics Aided/ English 1 
Tong Girls 
F Kowloon Christianity Aided/ Chinese 1 
City Co-educational 
G Mid-West Christianity Direct Subsidy / English 1 
Co-educational 
H Tuen Mun Nil Aided/ Chinese 1 
Co-educational 
W Tuen Mun Nil Aided/ English 4 
Co-educational 
J Tuen Mun Catholics Aided/ Chinese 1 
Co-educational 
K Tuen Mun Buddhism Aided/ Girls English 1 
L Shatin Christianity Aided/ Chinese 1 
Co-educational 
M# Shatin Christianity Aided/ English 1 
Co-educational 
N Shatin Nil Aided/ Chinese 2 
Co-educational 
O Tsuen Nil Aided/ Chinese 1 
Wan Co-educational 
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School Location Religion School Type Medium of No. of 
Affiliation Instruction Informants 
P Tsuen Nil Government/ English 2 
Wan Co-educational 
Q Yuen Buddhism Aided/ Chinese 1 
Long Co-educational 
R Yuen Nil Aided/ Chinese 1 
Long Co-educational 
S* Yuen Nil Direct Subsidy/ Chinese 1 
Long Co-educational 
T Tai Po Christianity Aided/ Chinese 1 
Co-educational 
U Sheng Christianity Aided/ English 1 
Shui Co-educational 
V Yau/Tsim/ Nil Government/ English 1 
Mong Co-educational 
W Yau/Tsim/ Nil Aided/ Chinese 1 
Mong Co-educational 
# Schools where I conducted participant observation 
* Pro-China school 
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